Gerald Vision (vision)
Contributi a Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Vision, Gerald. 1970. “Searle on the Nature of Universals.” Analysis 30: 155–160.
Vision, Gerald. 1978. “Kripke on ‘Madagascar’ .” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 8: 639–649.
Vision, Gerald. 1979. “Cogito Per Cogitationem, Ergo Sum.” Philosophical Forum (Boston) 11: 340–362.
Vision, Gerald. 1980. “Fictional Objects.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 11: 45–59.
Vision, Gerald. 1985a. “ ‘I am Here Now’ .” Analysis 45: 198–199.
Vision, Gerald. 1985b. “Reference and the Ghost of Parmenides.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 25–26: 297–326. “Non-Existence and Predication,” ed. by Rudolf Haller.
Vision, Gerald. 1993a. “Fiction and Fictionalist Reductions.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74(2): 150–174.
Vision, Gerald. 1993b. “The Rule-Following Paradox and Dispositions.” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati and Graham White, pp. 559–566. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Kirchberg am Wechsel: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Vision, Gerald. 1997a. Problems of Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vision, Gerald. 1997b. “Why Correspondence Truth Will Not Go Away.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 104–131.
Vision, Gerald. 1997c. “Believing Sentences.” Philosophical Studies 85(1): 75–93.
Vision, Gerald. 1998. “Blindsight and Philosophy.” Philosophical Psychology 11: 137–159.
Vision, Gerald. 2001. “Flash! Fodor Splits the Atom.” Analysis 61: 5–10.
Vision, Gerald. 2003. “Lest We Forget ‘The Correspondence Theory of Truth’ .” Analysis 63(2): 136–142.
Vision, Gerald. 2004a. Veritas. The Correspondance Theory and Its Critics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Vision, Gerald. 2004b. “Perceptual Experience and Belief.” in Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, edited by Ralph Schumacher, pp. 214–231. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Vision, Gerald. 2004c. “Reply to Professor Horstmann [on Horstmann (2004)].” in Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, edited by Ralph Schumacher, pp. 236–238. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Vision, Gerald. 2005a. “Deflationary Truthmaking.” European Journal of Philosophy 13(3): 364–380.
Vision, Gerald. 2005b. “The Truth about Philosophical Investigations I.” Philosophical Investigations 28(2): 159–176.
Vision, Gerald. 2006. “Review of Künne (2003).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(2): 483–485.
Vision, Gerald. 2008. “ ‘Indeed,’ ‘Really,’ ‘In Fact,’ ‘Actually’ .” Studia Philosophica Estonica 1(1): 43–75.
Vision, Gerald. 2009. “Fixing Perceptual Belief.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(235): 292–314.
Vision, Gerald. 2010. “Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: ‘Because,’ ‘In Virtue Of,’ and ‘Made True By …’ .” Topoi 29: 109–123.
Vision, Gerald. 2011. Re-Emergence. Locating Conscious Properties in a Material World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015844.001.0001.
Vision, Gerald. 2012a. “Review of Devitt (2010).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(2): 402–405.
Vision, Gerald. 2012b. “Personal and Semantic Reference.” in Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, edited by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 161–182. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vision, Gerald. 2014. “Semantic Antirealism: Last Gasp.” in Defending Realism. Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, edited by Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson, and Javier Cumpa, pp. 323–340. EIDE – Foundations of Ontology n. 7. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Further References
Devitt, Michael. 2010. Putting Metaphysics First. Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001.
Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. 2004. “Common on Vision [on Vision (2004b)].” in Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, edited by Ralph Schumacher, pp. 232–235. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Künne, Wolfgang. 2003. Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241317.001.0001.