Michael Devitt (devitt-m)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Devitt, Michael. 1975. “Suspension of Judgment: A Response to Heidelberger on Kaplan.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 4(1): 17–24.
Devitt, Michael. 1976. “Semantics and the Ambiguity of Proper Names.” The Monist 59: 404–423.
Devitt, Michael. 1980. “ ‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’ .” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 433–439. Reprinted in Mellor and Oliver (1997, 93–100).
Devitt, Michael. 1981a. “Donnellan’s Distinction.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6: Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 511–536. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1981b. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1981c. “Critical Notice of French, Uehling and Wettstein (1977).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59: 211–221.
Devitt, Michael. 1983a. “Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Putnam (1978).” Noûs 17(2): 291–301.
Devitt, Michael. 1983b. “Dummett’s Anti-Realism.” The Journal of Philosophy 80: 73–99.
Devitt, Michael. 1984a. Realism and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Devitt (1991a).
Devitt, Michael. 1984b. “Thoughts and Their Ascription.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: Causation and Causal Theories, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 385–420. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1985. “Review of Evans (1982).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63: 216–232.
Devitt, Michael. 1986. “Review of Fodor (1983).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64: 359–362.
Devitt, Michael. 1988. “Rorty’s Mirrorless World.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12: Realism and Antirealism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 157–177. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1989a. “Against Direct Reference.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 206–240. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1989b. “A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind.” in Rerepresentation: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Stuart Silvers, pp. 369–402. Philosophical Studies Series n. 40. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Devitt, Michael. 1989c. “The Revival of ‘Fido’-Fido.” in Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C.B. Martin, edited by John Heil, pp. 73–94. Philosophical Studies Series n. 47. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Devitt, Michael. 1990a. “Meanings Just Ain’t in the Head.” in Meaning and Method – Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam, edited by George Boolos, pp. 79–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1990b. “Transcendentalism about Content.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 247–263.
Devitt, Michael. 1991a. Realism and Truth. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. First edition: Devitt (1984a).
Devitt, Michael. 1991b. “Why Fodor Can’t Have It Both Ways.” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. 95–118. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Devitt, Michael. 1991c. “Review of Horwich (1990).” Mind and Language 6(3): 273–283.
Devitt, Michael. 1993a. “A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46: 17–60. “Holism: A Consumer Update,” ed. by Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore; also published in Tomberlin (1993, 281–306).
Devitt, Michael. 1993b. “Localism and Analyticity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 641–646.
Devitt, Michael. 1994a. “The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics.” The Journal of Philosophy 91(10): 545–572.
Devitt, Michael. 1994b. “Semantic Localism: Who Needs a Principled Basis?” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Graham White, pp. 331–342. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 21. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Devitt, Michael. 1995. Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1996. “The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 159–176. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Devitt, Michael. 1997a. “Meanings and Psychology: A Response to Mark Richard.” Noûs 31(1): 115–131.
Devitt, Michael. 1997b. “Précis of Devitt (1995).” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 325–349. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Devitt, Michael. 1997c. “A Priori Convictions about Psychology: A Response to Sosa, D. (1997).” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 371–385. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Devitt, Michael. 1997d. “On Determining Reference.” in Sprache und Denken / Language and Thought, pp. 112–121. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Devitt, Michael. 1998. “Putting Metaphysics First: A Response to James Tomberlin.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 499–502. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Devitt, Michael. 2001a. “A Shocking Idea About Meaning.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55(218): 471–494.
Devitt, Michael. 2001b. “Sustaining Actualism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 415–419. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Devitt, Michael. 2001c. “Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics.” in Incommensurability and Related Matters, edited by Paul Hoyningen-Huene and Howard Sankey, pp. 143–157. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 216. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Devitt, Michael. 2002a. “The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 60–78. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Devitt, Michael. 2002b. “Undetermination and Realism.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 26–50. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Devitt, Michael. 2002c. “Meaning and Use.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 106–121.
Devitt, Michael. 2002d. “Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2(1): 1–15.
Devitt, Michael. 2003. “Linguistics is Not Psychology.” in Epistemology of Language, edited by Alex Barber, pp. 107–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Devitt, Michael. 2004a. “Pourquoi il est si difficile de faire un monde, contre la réponse-dépendance globale.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 421–444. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Devitt, Michael. 2004b. “The Case for Referential Descriptions.” in Descriptions and Beyond, edited by Marga Reimer and Anne L. Bezuidenhout, pp. 280–305. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Devitt, Michael. 2005a. “Rigid Application.” Philosophical Studies 125(2): 139–165.
Devitt, Michael. 2005b. “Reply to BonJour (2005).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 229–233, 237–240. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 197–199).
Devitt, Michael. 2005c. “There is no A Priori.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 205–222, 237–240. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 185–194).
Devitt, Michael. 2005d. “Scientific Realism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 767–791. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Greenough and Lynch (2006, 100–124), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael. 2006a. Ignorance of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199250960.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael. 2006b. “Intuitions in Linguistics.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(3): 481–513.
Devitt, Michael. 2006c. “Worldmaking Made Hard: Rejecting Global Response Dependency.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 3–25.
Devitt, Michael. 2006d. “The Pessimistic Meta-Induction.” SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7(2): 127–135.
Devitt, Michael. 2006e. “Responses to the Rijeka Papers [Busch (2006), Jutronić-Tihomirović (2006), Kante (2006), Berčić (2006) and Miščević (2006a)].” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 97–112.
Devitt, Michael. 2006f. “Defending Ignorance of Language: Responses to the Dubrovnik Papers [Ludlow (2006), Barber (2006), Smith (2006), Matthews (2006), Rattan (2006), Miščević (2006b), Rey (2006)].” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 571–606.
Devitt, Michael. 2007a. “Referential Descriptions and Conversational Implicatures.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3(2): 7–32.
Devitt, Michael. 2007b. “Referential Descriptions: A Note on Bach (2007).” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3(2): 49–54.
Devitt, Michael. 2008a. “Biological Realisms.” in From Truth to Reality. New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 43–65. London: Routledge.
Devitt, Michael. 2008b. “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism.” Philosophy of Science 75(2): 344–382.
Devitt, Michael. 2008c. “Realism/Anti-realism.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, edited by Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, pp. 224–235. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Devitt, Michael. 2008d. “Methodology in the Philosophy of Linguistics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(4): 671–684.
Devitt, Michael. 2008e. “Explanation and Reality in Linguistics.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(2): 203–231.
Devitt, Michael. 2008f. “Reference Borrowing: A Response to Jutronić-Tihomirović (2008).” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(3): 361–366.
Devitt, Michael. 2008g. “A Response to Collins’ Note on Conventions and Unvoiced Syntax [on Collins (2008)].” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(2): 249–255.
Devitt, Michael. 2009a. “On Determining What There Isn’t.” in Stich and His Critics, edited by Dominic Murphy and Michael A. Bishop, pp. 46–61. Philosophers and Their Critics. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444308709.
Devitt, Michael. 2009b. “Psychological Conception, Psychological Reality: A Response to Longworth (2009) and Slezák (2009).” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9(1): 35–44.
Devitt, Michael. 2010. Putting Metaphysics First. Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael. 2011a. “Natural Kinds and Biological Realisms.” in Carving Nature at Its Joints. Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, pp. 155–174. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 7. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael. 2011b. “Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?” Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42(2): 285–293.
Devitt, Michael. 2011c. “Linguistic Knowledge.” in Knowing How. Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, edited by John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, pp. 314–333. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael. 2012a. “Still Against Direct Reference.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 61–84. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Devitt, Michael. 2012b. “The Role of Intuitions.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 554–566. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Devitt, Michael. 2013. “Hilary and me: tracking down Putnam on the Realism Issue.” in Reading Putnam, edited by Maria Baghramian, pp. 101–120. London: Routledge.
Devitt, Michael. 2014a. “Linguistic Intuitions are Not ‘The Voice of Competence’ .” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 268–293. London: Routledge.
Devitt, Michael. 2014b. “Linguistic Intuitions: In Defense of ‘Ordinarism’ .” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10(2): 7–20.
Devitt, Michael. 2014c. “We Don’t Learn About the World by Examining Concepts: A Response to Carrie Jenkins [to Jenkins (2014)].” in Current Controversies in Epistemology, edited by Ram Neta, pp. 23–33. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Devitt, Michael. 2015a. “Should Proper Names Still Seem So Problematic?” in On Reference, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 108–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael. 2015b. “Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong.” Inquiry 58(7–8): 669–699.
Devitt, Michael. 2015c. “Testing Theories of Reference.” in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language, edited by Jussi Haukioja, pp. 31–64. Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Devitt, Michael. 2020. “Stirring the Possum: Responses to the Bianchi Papers.” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 371–456. Cham: Springer.
Devitt, Michael. 2023. Biological Essentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198840282.001.0001.
Devitt, Michael and Hanley, Richard, eds. 2006a. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
Devitt, Michael and Hanley, Richard. 2006b. “Introduction.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 1–15. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
Devitt, Michael and Rey, Georges. 1991. “Transcending Transcendentalism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 87–100.
Devitt, Michael and Roberts, Jillian Rose. 2024. “Changing Our Logic: A Quinean Perspective.” Mind 133(529): 61–85, doi:10.1093/mind/fzad010.
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim. 1987. Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Republication: Devitt and Sterelny (1999).
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim. 1989. “Linguistics: What’s Wrong with ‘The Right View’ .” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 497–531. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim. 1999. Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Further References

Bach, Kent. 2007. “Referentially Used Descriptions: A Reply to Devitt (2007b).” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3(2): 33–48.
Barber, Alex. 2006. “Testimony and Illusion.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 401–429.
Berčić, Boran. 2006. “Devitt on Moral Realism.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 63–68.
BonJour, Laurence. 2005. “Reply to Devitt (2005a).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 223–228, 237–240. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 195–196).
Busch, Jacob. 2006. “Does the Issue of Response-Dependence Have Any Consequences for Realism?” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 27–39.
Collins, John. 2008. “A Note on Conventions and Unvoiced Syntax.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(2): 241–247.
Evans, Gareth. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John McDowell.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E., Jr. and Wettstein, Howard K., eds. 1977. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Second, enlarged edition: French, Uehling and Wettstein (1979).
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E., Jr. and Wettstein, Howard K., eds. 1979. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. First edition: French, Uehling and Wettstein (1977).
Greenough, Patrick and Lynch, Michael Patrick, eds. 2006. Truth and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 1990. Truth. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Horwich (1998).
Horwich, Paul. 1998. Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First edition: Horwich (1990), doi:10.1093/0198752237.001.0001.
Jenkins, Carrie S. I. 2014. “What Can We Know A Priori?” in Current Controversies in Epistemology, edited by Ram Neta, pp. 11–22. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Jutronić-Tihomirović, Dunja. 2006. “Is Reference Borrowing a Causal Process?” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 41–49.
Jutronić-Tihomirović, Dunja. 2008. “Reference Borrowing and the Role of Descriptions.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(3): 349–360.
Kante, Boẑidar. 2006. “Devitt on Empty Names.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 51–62.
Longworth, Guy. 2009. “Ignorance of Linguistics: A Note on Devitt (2006a).” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9(1): 21–34.
Ludlow, Peter J. 2006. “The Myth of Human Language.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 385–400.
Matthews, Robert J. 2006. “Could Competent Speakers Really Be Ignorant of Their Language?” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 457–467.
Mellor, David Hugh and Oliver, Alex, eds. 1997. Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miščević, Nenad. 2006a. “Devitt’s Shocking Idea and Analyticity without Apriority.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 69–95.
Miščević, Nenad. 2006b. “Intuitions: The Discrete Voice of Competence.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 523–548.
Putnam, Hilary. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Rattan, Gurpreet. 2006. “The Knowledge in Language.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 505–521.
Rey, Georges. 2006. “Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to Devitt.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 549–569.
Slezák, Peter. 2009. “Linguistic Explanation and ‘Psychological Reality’ .” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9(1): 3–20.
Smith, Barry. 2006. “Why we Still Need Knowledge of Language.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 431–456.
Sosa, David. 1997. “Meaningful Explanation.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 351–356. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa, E. and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Tomberlin, James E., ed. 1993. Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.