Jonathan Way (way-j)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Alvarez, Maria and Way, Jonathan. 2024. “Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2016. “Against the Taking Condition.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 314–331. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2017. “Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.” Ergo 4(5): 121–145.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2018. “What is Reasoning?” Mind 127(505): 167–196.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2022. Getting Things Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198810322.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel, eds. 2018a. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel, eds. 2018b. Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2018c. “Introduction.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2018d. “Introduction.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 1–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
Way, Jonathan. 2007. “Self-Knowledge and the Limits of Transparency.” Analysis 67(3): 223–230.
Way, Jonathan. 2010a. “The Normativity of Rationality.” Philosophy Compass 5(12): 1057–1068, doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x.
Way, Jonathan. 2010b. “Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason.” Philosophical Studies 147(2): 213–233.
Way, Jonathan. 2011. “The Symmetry of Rational Requirements.” Philosophical Studies 155(2): 227–239.
Way, Jonathan. 2012. “Explaining the Instrumental Principle.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(3): 487–506.
Way, Jonathan. 2013a. “Value and Reasons to Favour.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 27–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001.
Way, Jonathan. 2013b. “Intentions, Akrasia, and Mere Permissibility.” Organon F 20(4): 588–611, http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/588-611.pdf.
Way, Jonathan. 2016. “Two Arguments for Evidentialism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 66(265): 805–818.
Way, Jonathan. 2017a. “Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 207–228. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198808930.001.0001.
Way, Jonathan. 2017b. “Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98: 251–270.
Way, Jonathan. 2018. “Reasons and Rationality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 485–503. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2016a. “If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to \(\Phi\), You Ought to \(\Phi\).” Philosophical Studies 173(7): 1873–1895.
Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2016b. “Reasons and Guidance (Or, Surprise Parties and Ice Cream).” Analytic Philosophy 57(3): 214–235.