Daniel Whiting (whiting-da)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel, eds. 2018a. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel, eds. 2018b. Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2018c. “Introduction.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2018d. “Introduction.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 1–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2016a. “If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to \(\Phi\), You Ought to \(\Phi\).” Philosophical Studies 173(7): 1873–1895.
Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2016b. “Reasons and Guidance (Or, Surprise Parties and Ice Cream).” Analytic Philosophy 57(3): 214–235.
Whiting, Daniel. 2006. “Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom’s Theory of Meaning.” Acta Analytica 21(3): 3–22.
Whiting, Daniel. 2007a. “The Normativity of Meaning Defended.” Analysis 67(2): 133–140.
Whiting, Daniel. 2007b. “Defending Semantic Generalism.” Analysis 67(4): 303–311.
Whiting, Daniel. 2007c. “Inferentialism, Representationalism and Derogatory Words.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15(2): 191–205, doi:10.1080/09672550701383483.
Whiting, Daniel. 2007d. “Critical Notice of Brown (2004).” Philosophical Books 48(3): 233–240.
Whiting, Daniel. 2008a. “Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives.” Philosophia 36(3): 375–388, doi:10.1007/s11406-007-9109-1.
Whiting, Daniel. 2008b. “Meaning Holism and de Re Ascription.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38(4): 575–600.
Whiting, Daniel. 2008c. “The Use of ‘Use’ .” Grazer Philosophische Studien 76: 135–147.
Whiting, Daniel. 2009a. “Between Old and New: Brandom’s Analytic Pragmatism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17(4): 597–607.
Whiting, Daniel. 2009b. “Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90: 535–555.
Whiting, Daniel. 2009c. “On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity.” European Journal of Philosophy 17(3): 416–434.
Whiting, Daniel, ed. 2010a. The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Whiting, Daniel. 2010b. “Should I Believe the Truth?” Dialectica 64(2): 213–224, doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01204.x.
Whiting, Daniel. 2010c. “Particularly General and Generally Particular: Language, Rules and Meaning.” Logique et Analyse 53(209): 77–89.
Whiting, Daniel. 2011a. “Spinoza, the No Shared Attribute Thesis, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19(3): 543–548.
Whiting, Daniel. 2011b. “Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.” European Journal of Philosophy 19(4): 607–624.
Whiting, Daniel. 2012. “Does Belief Aim (only) at the Truth?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 279–300.
Whiting, Daniel. 2013a. “Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.” Erkenntnis 78(4): 847–867, doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9383-6.
Whiting, Daniel. 2013b. “It’s Not What You Said, It’s the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures.” Analytic Philosophy 54(3): 364–377, doi:10.1111/phib.12024.
Whiting, Daniel. 2014a. “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief and the Aim of Action.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 219–238. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Whiting, Daniel. 2014b. “Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 184–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Whiting, Daniel. 2015. “Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.” Erkenntnis 80(6): 1245–1253.
Whiting, Daniel. 2017a. “Don’t Take My Word for It: On Beliefs, Affects, Reasons, Values, Rationality, and Aesthetic Testimony.” in Art and Belief, edited by Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley, and Paul Noordhof, pp. 230–246. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805403.001.0001.
Whiting, Daniel. 2017b. “Languages, Language-Games, and Forms of Life.” in A Companion to Wittgenstein, edited by Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman, pp. 420–432. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118884607.
Whiting, Daniel. 2019. “Whither Higher-Order Evidence?” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 246–264. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Whiting, Daniel. 2020. “Epistemic Worth.” Ergo 7(3): 105–129.
Whiting, Daniel. 2021. The Range of Reasons, in Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.001.0001.
Whiting, Daniel. 2023. “Cavendish’s Aesthetic Realism.” Philosophers' imprint 23(15), doi:10.3998/phimp.1538.
Whiting, Daniel, Ryland, Howard and Fazel, Seena. 2021. “Forensic Mental Health Treatment and Recidivism.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment, edited by Farah Focquaert, Elizabeth Shaw, and Bruce N. Waller, pp. 303–314. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Brown, Jessica A. 2004. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Contemporary Philosophical Monographs n. 4. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.