Kenneth Aizawa (aizawa)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 1992. “ ‘X’ Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style.” Minds and Machines 2: 175–183.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 1993. “Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies and ‘Block’s Problem’ .” Minds and Machines 3: 97–104.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 1994. “ ‘X’ Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics.” Minds and Machines 4: 215–231.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 1997a. “Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 433–437.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 1997b. “Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back.” Analysis 57: 273–281.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 2002. “The Bounds of Cognition.” Philosophical Psychology 14: 43–64.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 2009. “Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, pp. 193–213. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 2010. “Causal Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/content-causal/.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 2017. “Causal Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/content-causal/.
Adams, Frederick and Aizawa, Kenneth. 2021. “Causal Theories of Mental Content.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/content-causal/.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 1994a. “Lloyd’s Dialectical Theory of Representation.” Mind and Language 9: 9–24.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 1994b. “Representations without Rules, Connectionism, and the Syntactic Argument.” Synthese 101: 465–492.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 1997a. “Exhibiting Verses Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward.” Minds and Machines 7: 39–55.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 1997b. “Explaining Systematicity.” Mind and Language 12: 115–136.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 1997c. “The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism.” in Two Sciences of Mind, edited by Seán Ó Nualláin, Paul McKevitt, and Eoghan Mac Aogáin, pp. 197–218. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 9. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 1999. “Connectionist Rules – A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson (1996).” Acta Analytica 13(22).
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2003. “Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive Representations.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 172–189. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2010a. “Consciousness: Don’t Give Up on the Brain.” in The Metaphysics of Consciousness, edited by Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein, and Pauline Phemister, pp. 263–284. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2010b. “Computation in Cognitive Science: It is Not All about Turing-Equivalent Computation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41(3): 227–236.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2012. “Distinguishing Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 15(2): 91–106.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2014. “Extended Cognition.” in The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, edited by Lawrence A. Shapiro, pp. 31–38. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2016. “Compositional Explanation: Dimensioned Realization, New Mechanism, and Ground.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 75–90. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2017a. “Cognition and Behavior.” Synthese 194(11): 4269–4288.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2017b. “Multiple Realization, Autonomy, and Integration.” in Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, edited by David Michael Kaplan, pp. 215–235. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199685509.001.0001.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2019a. “Clark on Language, Cognition, and Extended Cognition.” in Andy Clark and His Critics, edited by Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvinie, and Mog Stapleton, pp. 32–43. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190662813.001.0001.
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2019b. “Turing-Equivalent Computation at the ‘Conception’ of Cognitive Science.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by Mark Sprevak and Matteo Colombo, pp. 65–75. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl. 2009. “Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, edited by John Bickle, pp. 539–581. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.001.0001.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl. 2011. “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience.” in Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson, pp. 202–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl, eds. 2016a. Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl. 2016b. “Introduction: Vertical Relations in Science, Philosophy, and the World: Understanding the New Debates over Verticality.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 1–37. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.

Further References

Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1996. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.