Stephen J. Barker (barker-s)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Barker, Stephen J. 1991. “ ‘Even,’ ‘Still’ and Counterfactuals.” Linguistics and Philosophy 14(1): 1–38.
Barker, Stephen J. 1993. “Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion and Only If.” Analysis 53: 254–261.
Barker, Stephen J. 1994a. “Causation, Truth and Coherence.” Analysis 54: 179–182.
Barker, Stephen J. 1994b. “The Consequent-Entailment Problem for Even If.” Linguistics and Philosophy 17: 249–260, doi:10.1007/BF00985037.
Barker, Stephen J. 1995. “Towards a Pragmatic Theory of ‘If’ .” Philosophical Studies 79(2): 185–211.
Barker, Stephen J. 1996. “Parsing If-Sentences and the Conditions of Sentencehood.” Analysis 56(4): 210–218.
Barker, Stephen J. 1997a. “E-Type Pronouns, DRT, Dynamic Semantics and the Quantifier-Variable Binding Model.” Linguistics and Philosophy 20(2): 195–228.
Barker, Stephen J. 1997b. “Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals.” The Philosophical Quarterly 47(187): 195–211.
Barker, Stephen J. 1998. “Predetermination and Tense Probabilism.” Analysis 58(4): 290–296.
Barker, Stephen J. 1999. “Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation.” Mind 108(431): 427–470.
Barker, Stephen J. 2000. “Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?” Analysis 60(3): 268–279.
Barker, Stephen J. 2002a. “Troubles with Horgan and Timmons’ Nondescriptivist Cognitivism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 235–256. “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Barker, Stephen J. 2002b. “Review of Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning.” Mind 111: 633–639.
Barker, Stephen J. 2003a. “Counterfactual Analyses of Causation: The Problem of Effects and Epiphenomena Revisited.” Noûs 37(1): 133–150.
Barker, Stephen J. 2003b. “Truth and Conventional Implicature.” Mind 112(445): 1–33.
Barker, Stephen J. 2003c. “A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(1): 62–77.
Barker, Stephen J. 2003d. “The Experiential Thesis: Audi on Intrinsic Value.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(suppl.): 57–61.
Barker, Stephen J. 2004a. Renewing Meaning. A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199263663.001.0001.
Barker, Stephen J. 2004b. “Analysing Chancy Causation Without Appeal to Chance-Raising.” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, edited by Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof, pp. 120–137. London: Routledge.
Barker, Stephen J. 2006a. “Wettstein’s Prism [on Wettstein (2004)].” Philosophical Books 47(1): 15–24.
Barker, Stephen J. 2006b. “Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism.” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 299–318. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0014.
Barker, Stephen J. 2007a. “Semantics without the Distinction Between Sense and Force.” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language. Force, Meaning and Mind, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 190–210. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barker, Stephen J. 2007b. “Global Expressivism: Language Agency Without Semantics, Reality Without Metaphysics.” Nottingham: Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/704320.
Barker, Stephen J. 2009a. “Dispositional Monism, Relational Constitution and Quiddities.” Analysis 69(2): 242–250.
Barker, Stephen J. 2009b. “Leaving Things to Take their Chances: Cause and Disposition Grounded in Chance.” in Dispositions and Causes, edited by Toby Handfield, pp. 100–126. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barker, Stephen J. 2009c. “Indefinite Descriptions as Referring Terms.” Organon F 16(4): 569–586.
Barker, Stephen J. 2010a. “Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(2): 183–199.
Barker, Stephen J. 2010b. “Expressivism about Truth-Making.” Unpublished manuscript.
Barker, Stephen J. 2011a. “Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?” Noûs 45(3): 557–576.
Barker, Stephen J. 2011b. “Bearers of Truth and the Unsaid.” in Making Semantics Pragmatic, edited by Ken Turner, pp. 81–102. Current Research in the Semantics / Pragmatics Interface n. 24. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.
Barker, Stephen J. 2012a. “Truth-Making and the Alethic Undecidability of the Liar.” Discusiones Filosóficas 13(21): 13–31.
Barker, Stephen J. 2012b. “Expressivism about Making and Truth-Making.” in Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder, pp. 272–293. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139149136.
Barker, Stephen J. 2013a. “The Emperor’s New Metaphysics of Powers.” Mind 122(487): 605–653.
Barker, Stephen J. 2013b. “Hybrid Theories of Moral Statements.” in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Hugh LaFollette. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444367072.
Barker, Stephen J. 2014a. “Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability.” Analysis 74(2): 201–209.
Barker, Stephen J. 2014b. “Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 199–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Barker, Stephen J. 2015a. “Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics.” Erkenntnis 80(suppl., 2): 215–234.
Barker, Stephen J. 2015b. “Performatives and the Role of Truth in Semantics.” Organon F 22(suppl., 1): 74–95.
Barker, Stephen J. 2017. “Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics.” Philosophical Studies 174(1): 123–140.
Barker, Stephen J. 2021. “Global Expressivism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, edited by Ricki Leigh Bliss and J. T. M. Miller, pp. 270–283. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315112596.
Barker, Stephen J. 2022. “Global Expressivism and the Puzzle of Truth-Apt Sentences.” in Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition, edited by Gabriele M. Mras and Michael Schmitz, pp. 157–175. London: Routledge.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2003. “Paradoxes of Multi-Location.” Analysis 63(2): 106–114.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2005. “Endurance Is Paradoxical.” Analysis 65(1): 69–74.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2008. “What is Endurance?” in Persistence, edited by Christian Kanzian, pp. 5–18. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 21. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Barker, Stephen J. and Jago, Mark. 2012. “Being Positive About Negative Facts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(1): 117–138.
Barker, Stephen J. and Jago, Mark. 2014. “Monism and Material Constitution.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95(1): 189–204.
Barker, Stephen J. and Jago, Mark. 2018. “Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory.” Philosophical Studies 175(12): 2969–2986.
Barker, Stephen J. and Popa-Wyatt, Mihaela. 2015. “Irony and the Dogma of Fforce and Sense.” Analysis 75(1): 9–16.
Barker, Stephen J. and Smart, Benjamin T. H. 2012. “The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Account of Laws.” Analysis 72(4): 714–722, doi:10.1093/analys/ans114.

Further References

Wettstein, Howard K. 2004. The Magic Prism: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195160525.001.0001.