Phil Dowe (dowe-p)

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Bibliography

Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2003. “Paradoxes of Multi-Location.” Analysis 63(2): 106–114.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2005. “Endurance Is Paradoxical.” Analysis 65(1): 69–74.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2008. “What is Endurance?” in Persistence, edited by Christian Kanzian, pp. 5–18. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 21. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Dowe, Phil. 1992. “Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory.” Philosophy of Science 59: 195–216.
Dowe, Phil. 1995. “Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon.” Philosophy of Science 62: 321–333.
Dowe, Phil. 1996a. “Backwards Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes.” Mind 105.
Dowe, Phil. 1996b. “Causal Processes.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1997/entries/causation-process/.
Dowe, Phil. 1998. “Review of Mellor (1995).” Philosophy of Science 65(1): 162–170.
Dowe, Phil. 1999. “Good Connections: Causation and Causal Processes.” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 247–264. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Dowe, Phil. 2000a. Physical Causation. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction,and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dowe, Phil. 2000b. “The Case for Time Travel.” Philosophy 75(3): 441–451.
Dowe, Phil. 2000c. “Is Causation Influence?” Unpublished manuscript, http://fitelson.org/269/Dowe_ICI.pdf.
Dowe, Phil. 2001a. “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79.
Dowe, Phil. 2001b. “Promoting, Causing, Hindering, Preventing.” in Current Issues in Causation, edited by Wolfgang Spohn, Marion Ledwig, and Michael Esfeld, pp. 68–84. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Dowe, Phil. 2004a. Science, Reason and Religion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Dowe, Phil. 2004b. “Prévention et omission.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 479–494. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Dowe, Phil. 2004c. “Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, edited by Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 189–196. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 2. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Dowe, Phil. 2004d. “Chance-Lowering Causes.” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, edited by Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof, pp. 28–38. London: Routledge.
Dowe, Phil. 2004e. “Causal Processes.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/causation-process/.
Dowe, Phil. 2007. “Causal Processes.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/causation-process/.
Dowe, Phil. 2009a. “Review of Bourne (2006).” Mind 118(469): 156–160.
Dowe, Phil. 2009b. “Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality.” The Monist 92(1): 23–40.
Dowe, Phil. 2009c. “Causal Process Theories.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 213–233. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Dowe, Phil. 2009d. “Common Sense, Relativity and Theories of Time.” in Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective – Proceedings of the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop, Ghent, Belgium, 2-3 June 2005, edited by Robrecht Vanderbeeken and Bart D’Hooge, pp. 32–43. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.
Dowe, Phil. 2010. “Proportionality and Omissions.” Analysis 70(3): 446–451.
Dowe, Phil. 2011a. “Darwin, God, and Chance.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume III, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 55–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001.
Dowe, Phil. 2011b. “The Causal-Process-Model Theory of Mechanisms.” in Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson, pp. 865–879. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dowe, Phil and Noordhof, Paul, eds. 2004a. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. London: Routledge.
Dowe, Phil and Noordhof, Paul. 2004b. “Introduction.” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, edited by Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof, pp. 1–11. London: Routledge.

Further References

Bourne, Craig. 2006. A Future for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1995. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.