Phil Dowe (dowe-p)
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Bibliography
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2003. “Paradoxes of Multi-Location.”
Analysis 63(2): 106–114.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2005. “Endurance Is
Paradoxical.” Analysis 65(1): 69–74.
Barker, Stephen J. and Dowe, Phil. 2008. “What is Endurance?” in
Persistence, edited by Christian Kanzian, pp. 5–18. Philosophische Analyse
/ Philosophical Analysis n. 21. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos
Verlag.
Dowe, Phil. 1992. “Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the
Conserved Quantity Theory.” Philosophy of Science
59: 195–216.
Dowe, Phil. 1995. “Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to
Salmon.” Philosophy of Science 62: 321–333.
Dowe, Phil. 1996a. “Backwards Causation and the Direction of Causal
Processes.” Mind 105.
Dowe, Phil. 1996b. “Causal
Processes.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1997/entries/causation-process/.
Dowe, Phil. 1998. “Review of Mellor (1995).”
Philosophy of Science 65(1): 162–170.
Dowe, Phil. 1999. “Good Connections: Causation and Causal
Processes.” in Causation and the
Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 247–264. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Dowe, Phil. 2000a. Physical
Causation. Cambridge Studies in
Probability, Induction,and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dowe, Phil. 2000b. “The Case for Time Travel.”
Philosophy 75(3): 441–451.
Dowe, Phil. 2000c. “Is
Causation Influence?” Unpublished manuscript,
http://fitelson.org/269/Dowe_ICI.pdf.
Dowe, Phil. 2001a. “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and
‘Causation’ by Omission.” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 79.
Dowe, Phil. 2001b.
“Promoting, Causing, Hindering, Preventing.”
in Current Issues in Causation,
edited by Wolfgang Spohn, Marion Ledwig, and Michael Esfeld, pp. 68–84. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Dowe, Phil. 2004a. Science, Reason and Religion. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Dowe, Phil. 2004b.
“Prévention et omission.” in
La structure du monde: objets,
propriétés, états de
choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans
l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by
Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 479–494.
Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris:
Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Dowe, Phil. 2004c. “Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why
Preventers and Omissions are not Causes.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of
Science, edited by Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 189–196. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 2. Boston,
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Dowe, Phil. 2004d.
“Chance-Lowering Causes.” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic
World, edited by Phil Dowe
and Paul Noordhof, pp. 28–38. London:
Routledge.
Dowe, Phil. 2004e. “Causal
Processes.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/causation-process/.
Dowe, Phil. 2007. “Causal
Processes.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/causation-process/.
Dowe, Phil. 2009a. “Review of Bourne (2006).”
Mind 118(469): 156–160.
Dowe, Phil. 2009b. “Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of
Non-Locality.” The Monist 92(1): 23–40.
Dowe, Phil. 2009c. “Causal
Process Theories.” in The Oxford
Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 213–233. Oxford
Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Dowe, Phil. 2009d. “Common Sense, Relativity and Theories of
Time.” in Worldviews, Science and
Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics from a
Methodological Perspective – Proceedings of the 5th Metaphysics of
Science Workshop, Ghent, Belgium, 2-3 June 2005, edited by
Robrecht Vanderbeeken and Bart D’Hooge, pp. 32–43. Singapore: World Scientific
Publishing Co.
Dowe, Phil. 2010. “Proportionality and Omissions.”
Analysis 70(3): 446–451.
Dowe, Phil. 2011a. “Darwin, God, and Chance.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion,
volume III, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 55–66. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001.
Dowe, Phil. 2011b. “The Causal-Process-Model Theory of
Mechanisms.” in Causality in the
Sciences, edited by Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson, pp. 865–879. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Dowe, Phil and Noordhof, Paul, eds. 2004a. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic
World. London: Routledge.
Dowe, Phil and Noordhof, Paul. 2004b.
“Introduction.” in Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic
World, edited by Phil Dowe
and Paul Noordhof, pp. 1–11. London:
Routledge.
Further References
Bourne, Craig. 2006. A Future for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1995. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.