Mark Jago (jago)

Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Barker, Stephen J. and Jago, Mark. 2012. “Being Positive About Negative Facts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(1): 117–138.
Barker, Stephen J. and Jago, Mark. 2014. “Monism and Material Constitution.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95(1): 189–204.
Barker, Stephen J. and Jago, Mark. 2018. “Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory.” Philosophical Studies 175(12): 2969–2986.
Berto, Francesco and Jago, Mark. 2018. “Impossible Worlds.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/impossible-worlds/.
Berto, Francesco and Jago, Mark. 2019. Impossible Worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198812791.001.0001.
Berto, Francesco and Jago, Mark. 2023. “Impossible Worlds.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/impossible-worlds/.
Briggs, Rachael A. and Jago, Mark. 2012. “Propositions and Same-Saying: Introduction.” Synthese 189(1): 1–10.
Fine, Kit and Jago, Mark. 2019. “Logic for Exact Entailment.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 12(3): 536–556.
Jago, Mark. 2006a. “Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 15(4): 325–354.
Jago, Mark. 2006b. “Imagine the Possibilities. Information without Overload.” Logique et Analyse 49(196): 345–370.
Jago, Mark. 2007. Formal Logic. What makes an Argument valid? Tirril, Penrith: Humanities-Ebooks.
Jago, Mark. 2008. “Narrow Content and Rationality.” in The Logica Yearbook 2007, edited by Michal Peliš. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
Jago, Mark. 2009. “The Conjunction and Disjunction Theses.” Mind 118(470): 411–415.
Jago, Mark. 2010. “Closure on Knowability.” Analysis 70(4): 648–659.
Jago, Mark. 2011. “Setting the Facts Straight.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 40(1): 33–54.
Jago, Mark. 2012a. “The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist’s Dilemma.” Mind 121(484): 903–918.
Jago, Mark. 2012b. “The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism.” Thought 1(4): 320–329.
Jago, Mark. 2012c. “Constructing Worlds.” Synthese 189(1): 59–74.
Jago, Mark. 2013a. “The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43(4): 460–474.
Jago, Mark. 2013b. “The Content of Deduction.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 42(2): 317–334.
Jago, Mark. 2013c. “Against Yagisawa’s Modal Realism.” Analysis 73(1): 10–17.
Jago, Mark. 2013d. “Are Impossible Worlds Trivial?” in The Logica Yearbook 2012, edited by Vı́t Punčochář and Petr Švarný, pp. 37–54. London: College Publications.
Jago, Mark. 2014a. The Impossible. An Essay on Hyperintensionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709008.001.0001.
Jago, Mark. 2014b. “The Problem of Rational Knowledge.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 6): 1151–1168.
Jago, Mark. 2015a. “Hyperintensional Propositions.” Synthese 192(3): 585–601.
Jago, Mark. 2015b. “Impossible Worlds.” Noûs 49(4): 713–728.
Jago, Mark, ed. 2016a. Reality Making. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709008.001.0001.
Jago, Mark. 2016b. “Reality-Making: Introduction.” in Reality Making, edited by Mark Jago, pp. 1–10. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709008.001.0001.
Jago, Mark. 2016c. “Essence and the Grounding Problem.” in Reality Making, edited by Mark Jago, pp. 99–120. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709008.001.0001.
Jago, Mark. 2016d. “Alethic Undecidability Doesn’t Solve the Liar.” Analysis 76(3): 278–283.
Jago, Mark. 2016e. “Advanced Modalizing Problems.” Mind 125(499): 627–642.
Jago, Mark. 2018a. What Truth Is. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823810.001.0001.
Jago, Mark. 2018b. “From Nature to Grounding.” in Reality and its Structure. Essays in Fundamentality, edited by Ricki Leigh Bliss and Graham Priest, pp. 199–216. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755630.001.0001.
Jago, Mark. 2020. “A Short Argument for Truthmaker Maximalism.” Analysis 80(1): 40–44.
Mackie, Penelope and Jago, Mark. 2013. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/identity-transworld/.
Mackie, Penelope and Jago, Mark. 2017. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/identity-transworld/.
Mackie, Penelope and Jago, Mark. 2022. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/identity-transworld/.
Noonan, Harold W. and Jago, Mark. 2012. “The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties.” Thought 1(2): 134–140.
Noonan, Harold W. and Jago, Mark. 2017. “Modal Realism, Still at Your Convenience.” Analysis 77(2): 299–303.