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Kelly Becker (becker-k)

Cited in the following articles

Sensitivity and Inductive Knowledge Revisited

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Bibliography

    Becker, Kelly. 1998. “On the Perfectly General Nature of Instability in Meaning Holism.” The Journal of Philosophy 95: 635–640.
    Becker, Kelly. 2002a. “Kuhn’s Vindication of Quine and Carnap.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 19(2): 217–235.
    Becker, Kelly. 2002b. “Individualism and Self-Knowledge: Tu Quoque.” American Philosophical Quarterly 39(3): 289–295.
    Becker, Kelly. 2004. “Knowing and Possessing Knowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41(1): 21–36.
    Becker, Kelly. 2006a. “Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge?” Dialectica 60(1): 79–84.
    Becker, Kelly. 2006b. “Reliabilism and Safety.” Metaphilosophy 37(5): 691–704.
    Becker, Kelly. 2007. Epistemology Modalized. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 5. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203940341.
    Becker, Kelly. 2008. “Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem.” Philosophical Studies 139(3): 353–366.
    Becker, Kelly. 2009. “Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said.” Acta Analytica 24(1): 17–31.
    Becker, Kelly. 2012a. “Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding.” Acta Analytica 27(2): 145–161.
    Becker, Kelly. 2012b. “Methods and How to Individuate Them.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 81–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
    Becker, Kelly. 2013. “Why Reliabilism Does Not Permit Easy Knowledge.” Synthese 190(17): 3751–3775.
    Becker, Kelly. 2014. “Review of Zalabardo (2012).” The Philosophical Review 123(2): 241–244.
    Becker, Kelly. 2016. “BIVs, Sensitivity, Discrimination, and Relevant Alternatives.” in The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 111–128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
    Becker, Kelly. 2018. “The Sensitivity Response to the Gettier Problem.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 108–124. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
    Becker, Kelly and Black, Tim, eds. 2012a. The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
    Becker, Kelly and Black, Tim. 2012b. “The Resilience of Sensitivity.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 1–8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
    Becker, Kelly and Thomson, Iain D., eds. 2019. The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316779651.

Further References