Tim Black (black-t)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Becker, Kelly and Black, Tim, eds. 2012a. The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
Becker, Kelly and Black, Tim. 2012b. “The Resilience of Sensitivity.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 1–8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
Black, Tim. 2005. “Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219).
Black, Tim. 2007. “The Distinction between Coherence and Constancy in Hume’s Treatise I.iv.2.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(1): 1–25.
Black, Tim. 2008a. “Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(233): 597–617.
Black, Tim. 2008b. “A Warranted-Assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism.” Acta Analytica 23(3): 187–205.
Black, Tim. 2011a. “Hume’s Epistemic Naturalism in the Treatise.” Hume Studies 37(2): 211–242.
Black, Tim. 2011b. “Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 187–198. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Black, Tim. 2019. “Anti-Luck Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman, pp. 284–294. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Black, Tim and Gressis, Robert. 2017. “True Religion in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25(2): 244–264.
Black, Tim and Murphy, Peter. 2005. “Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69: 185–182. “Epistemological Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
Black, Tim and Murphy, Peter. 2007. “In Defense of Sensitivity.” Synthese 154(1): 53–71.
Murphy, Peter and Black, Tim. 2012. “Sensitivity Meets Explanation: An Improved Counterfactual Condition on Knowledge.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 28–42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.