Cette page en françaisQuesta pagina in italianoThis page in English
Kein Profilbild | No profile picture | Utilisateur n'as pas d'image
https://philosophie.ch/profil/byerly-tr

T. Ryan Byerly (byerly-tr)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

No contributions yet

Bibliography

    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2010. “The Ontomystical Argument Revisited.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67(2): 95–105.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2012a. “It Seems Like There Aren’t Any Seemings.” Philosophia 40(4): 771–782.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2012b. “Faith as an Epistemic Disposition.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4(1): 109–128.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2012c. “Infallible Divine Foreknowledge Cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, But Its Mechanics Might.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4(4): 73–93.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2013. “Explanationism and Justified Beliefs about the Future.” Erkenntnis 78(1): 229–243.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2014a. The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence. A Time-Ordering Account. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2014b. “The Values and Varieties of Humility.” Philosophia 42(4): 889–910.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2014c. “Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75(2): 137–154.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2014d. “God Knows the Future by Ordering the Times.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume V, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 22–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704768.001.0001.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2015. “Do God’s Beliefs Depend on the Future? On the Importance of the Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge.” The Journal of Analytic Theology 3: 124–129.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2017a. “The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume VIII, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 16–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198806967.001.0001.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2017b. “Virtues of Repair in Paradise.” in Paradise Understood. New Philosophical Essays about Heaven, edited by T. Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman, pp. 136–157. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2017c. “The Indirect Response to the Foreknowledge Argument [on Fischer (2016)].” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(4): 3–12.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2018. Putting Others First. The Christian Ideal of Others-Centeredness. London: Routledge.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2019. “From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being.” Analysis 79(1): 10–17.
    Byerly, T. Ryan. 2024. “The Evidential Support Relation of Evidentialism.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 63–73. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
    Byerly, T. Ryan and Byerly, Meghan. 2016. “The Special Value of Others-Centeredness.” Res Philosophica 93(1): 63–78.
    Byerly, T. Ryan and Martin, Kraig. 2015. “Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides.” Erkenntnis 80(4): 773–791.
    Byerly, T. Ryan and Silverman, Eric J., eds. 2017a. Paradise Understood. New Philosophical Essays about Heaven. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Byerly, T. Ryan and Silverman, Eric J. 2017b. “Introduction.” in Paradise Understood. New Philosophical Essays about Heaven, edited by T. Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Padgett, Daniel and Byerly, T. Ryan. 2014. “Reconstituting Ersatzer Presentism.” Res Philosophica 91(3): 491–502.

Further References