Sungho Choi (choi-s)
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Bibliography
Choi, Sungho. 2002. “Causation and Gerrymandered World Lines: A Critique of Salmon.” Philosophy of Science 69(1): 105–117.
Choi, Sungho. 2003. “Improving Bird’s Antidotes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(4): 573–590.
Choi, Sungho. 2005a. “Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals?” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(220): 495–503.
Choi, Sungho. 2005b. “Dispositions and Mimickers.” Philosophical Studies 122(2): 183–188.
Choi, Sungho. 2005c. “Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens [of Strevens (2003)].” Erkenntnis 63(1): 101–118, doi:10.1007/s10670-005-0607-x.
Choi, Sungho. 2006. “The Simple vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions.” Synthese 148(2): 369–379.
Choi, Sungho. 2007. “Causes and Probability-Raisers of Processes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(1): 81–91.
Choi, Sungho. 2008. “Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals.” Mind 117(468): 795–841.
Choi, Sungho. 2009a. “The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3): 568–590.
Choi, Sungho. 2009b. “Purely Dispositional Worlds.” in Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective – Proceedings of the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop, Ghent, Belgium, 2-3 June 2005, edited by Robrecht Vanderbeeken and Bart D’Hooge, pp. 44–63. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.
Choi, Sungho. 2010. “Dispositions and Bogus Counterexamples: Reply to Lee (2010).” Philosophia 38(4): 579–588.
Choi, Sungho. 2011a. “Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism.” The Monist 94(1): 103–120.
Choi, Sungho. 2011b. “What is a Dispositional Masker?” Mind 120(480): 1159–1171.
Choi, Sungho. 2012. “Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction.” Noûs 46(2): 289–325.
Choi, Sungho. 2013. “Can Opposing Dispositions be Co-instantiated?” Erkenntnis 78(1): 161–182.
Choi, Sungho. 2019. “Reverse-Cycle Intrinsic Finks.” Dialectica 73(3): 429–455.
Choi, Sungho and Fara, Michael. 2012. “Dispositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/dispositions/.
Choi, Sungho and Fara, Michael. 2018. “Dispositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/dispositions/.
Further References
Lee, Jaeho. 2010. “Disposition, Explanation, and Causation – A Defense of the Reformed Conditional Analysis of Disposition.” Philosophia 38(3): 569–577.
Strevens, Michael. 2003. “Against Lewis’s New Theory of Causation: A Story with Three Morals.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84(4): 398–412, doi:10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00182.x.