Philip Clark (clark-ph)
Adresse email :
philip.clark(at)projet-socrate.com
Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes
PhilExpo22: Its History, Projet Socrate, Qui a peur des théories du complot ?, Geschichte des Portals, Historique du portail, History of the Portal, La storia del portaleContributions à Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Baker, Judith and Clark, Philip. 2018. “Epistemic Buck-Passing and the Interpersonal View of Testimony.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(2): 178–199.
Clark, Philip. 2000. “What goes without Saying in Metaethics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(2): 357–379.
Clark, Philip. 2002. “The Meaning of ‘Good’ and the Possibility of Value.” Philosophical Studies 108(1–2): 31–38.
Clark, Philip. 2004. “Kantian Morals and Humean Motives.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 109–126.
Clark, Philip. 2007. “How can a Reason Be Practical: A Reply to Hume.” in Moral Psychology, edited by Sergio Tenenbaum, pp. 213–230. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 94. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Clark, Philip. 2009. “Mackie’s Motivational Argument.” in Reasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall, pp. 200–218. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, Philip. 2010. “Aspects, Guises, Species, and Knowing Something to Be Good.” in Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, edited by Sergio Tenenbaum, pp. 234–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.001.0001.
Clark, Philip. 2014. “Inescapability and the Analysis of Agency [on Velleman (2009)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(7): 3–15.
Further References
Velleman, David J. 2009. How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.