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Randolph Clarke (clarke-r)

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Bibliography

    Clarke, Randolph. 1992. “Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 66(1): 53–72, doi:10.1007/bf00668395.
    Clarke, Randolph. 1993. “Towards a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will.” Noûs 27(2): 191–203.
    Clarke, Randolph. 1995. “Recent Work on Freedom and Determinism.” Philosophical Books 36(1): 9–18.
    Clarke, Randolph. 1996. “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action.” Philosophical Topics 24(2): 19–48.
    Clarke, Randolph. 1999. “Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 2(1): 20–41.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2000. “Modest Libertarianism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 21–45. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2002. “Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 356–385. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2003a. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019515987X.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2003b. “Freedom of the Will.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 369–404. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2004a. “Reflections on an Argument from Luck.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 47–64.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2004b. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2005. “On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 13–24. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2007a. “The Appearance of Freedom.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(1): 51–57.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2007b. “Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions.” Philosophical Studies 133(3): 391–409.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2008a. “Intrinsic Finks.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 512–518.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2008b. “Autonomous Reasons for Intending.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2): 191–212.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2008c. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.” Mind 118(470): 323–351, doi:10.1093/mind/fzp034.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2010a. “Opposing Powers.” Philosophical Studies 149(2): 153–160.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2010b. “Intentional Omissions.” Noûs 44(1): 158–177. Reprinted in Aguilar and Buckareff (2010, 135–156).
    Clarke, Randolph. 2010c. “Agent Causation.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, pp. 218–226. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444323528.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2010d. “Freedom and responsibility.” in The Routledge Companion to Ethics, edited by John Skorupski, pp. 263–274. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2010e. “Making up One’s Mind.” in Action, Ethics, and Responsibility, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 67–84. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014731.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2010f. “Reply to (sartorio:2010b?).” in Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff, pp. 161–166. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2011. “Alternatives for Libertarians.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 329–348. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2012a. “Absence of Action.” Philosophical Studies 158(2): 361–376.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2012b. “What is an Omission?” in Philosophical Issues 22: Action Theory, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Berit Brogaard, pp. 127–143. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2013. “Some Theses on Desert.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 16(2): 153–164.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2014a. Omissions, Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347520.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2014b. “Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission.” in Surrounding Free Will. Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, edited by Alfred R. Mele, pp. 298–318. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333950.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2014c. “Agency and Incompatibilism [on Steward (2012)].” Res Philosophica 91(3): 519–525.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2015. “Abilities to Act.” Philosophy Compass 10(12): 893–904.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2017. “Ignorance, Revision, and Commonsense.” in Responsibility. The Epistemic Condition, edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, pp. 233–251. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph. 2023. “I Didn’t Think of That.” in Philosophical Issues 33: The Philosophy of Action, edited by Michael McKenna and Carolina Sartorio, pp. 45–57. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12241.
    Clarke, Randolph and Capes, Justin A. 2013. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Clarke, Randolph and Capes, Justin A. 2017. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Clarke, Randolph, Capes, Justin A. and Swenson, Philip. 2021. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
    Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael and Smith, Angela M., eds. 2015a. The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael and Smith, Angela M. 2015b. “Introduction.” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New Essays, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
    Clarke, Randolph and Reed, Thomas A. 2015. “Free Will and Agential Powers.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume III, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 6–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744832.001.0001.

Further References