Michael Detlefsen (detlefsen-m)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Detlefsen, Michael. 1979. “On Interpreting Gödel’s Second Theorem.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 8(3): 297–313.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1986. Hilbert’s Program: An essay on mathematical instrumentalism. Synthese Library n. 182. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1990. “On the Alleged Refutation of Hilbert’s Program Using Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 19(4): 343–377. Reprinted in Detlefsen (1992a, 199–235).
Detlefsen, Michael, ed. 1992a. Proof, Logic and Formalization. London: Routledge.
Detlefsen, Michael, ed. 1992b. Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics. London: Routledge.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1992c. “Brouwerian intuitionism.” in Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics, edited by Michael Detlefsen, pp. 208–250. London: Routledge.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1993a. “Poincaré vs. Russell on the Role of Logic in Mathematics.” Philosophia Mathematica 1(1): 24–49.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1993b. “Hilbert’s Work on the Foundations of Geometry in Relation to His Work on the Foundations of Arithmetic.” Acta Analytica 8(11).
Detlefsen, Michael. 1993c. “The Concept of Logical Consequence [review of Etchemendy (1990)].” Philosophical Books 34(1): 1–10.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1995a. “The Mechanization of Reason.” Philosophia Mathematica 3(1): 3–4.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1995b.“Wright (1995) on the Non-Mechanizability of Intuitionist Reasoning.” Philosophia Mathematica 3(1): 103–119.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1998. “Constructive Existence Claims.” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 307–335. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2000. “Review of Burgess and Rosen (1997).” Philosophical Books 41(3): 153–163.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2001a. “What does Gödel’s Second Theorem Say?” Philosophia Mathematica 9(1): 37–71.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2001b. “Peace, Justice and Computation: Leibniz’s Program and the Moral and Political Significance of Church’s Theorem.” in Logic, Meaning and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church, edited by Curtis Anthony Anderson and Michael Zelëny, pp. 445–468. Synthese Library n. 304. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2005. “Formalism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 236–317. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2008a. “Proof: Its Nature and Significance.” in Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy, edited by Bonnie Gold and Roger A. Simons, pp. 3–32. Washington, D.C.: Mathematical Association of America.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2008b. “Purity as an Ideal of Proof.” in The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, edited by Paolo Mancosu, pp. 179–197. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296453.001.0001.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2011a. “Comment [on Penrose (2011)].” in Meaning in Mathematics, edited by John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 46–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2011b. “Comment [on Leng (2011)].” in Meaning in Mathematics, edited by John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 70–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2011c. “Discovery, Invention and Realism: Gödel and others on the Reality of Concepts.” in Meaning in Mathematics, edited by John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 73–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2014. “Completeness and the Ends of Axiomatization.” in Interpreting Gödel. Critical Essays, edited by Juliette Kennedy, pp. 59–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Detlefsen, Michael. 2018. “Abstraction, Axiomatization and Rigor: Pasch and Hilbert.” in Hilary Putnam on Logic and Mathematics, edited by Geoffrey Hellman and Roy T. Cook, pp. 161–178. Outstanding Contributions to Logic n. 9. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96274-0.
Detlefsen, Michael and Arana, Andrew. 2011. “Purity of Methods.” Philosophers' imprint 11(2).
Detlefsen, Michael and Gandon, Sébastien. 2011. “Poincaré versus Russell sur le rôle de la logique dans les mathématiques.” Les Études Philosophiques 65(2): 153–178.

Further References

Burgess, John P. and Rosen, Gideon. 1997. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretations of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250126.001.0001.
Etchemendy, John. 1990. The Concept of Logical Consequence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Leng, Mary. 2011. “Creation and Discovery in Mathematics.” in Meaning in Mathematics, edited by John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 61–69. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Penrose, Roger. 2011. “Mathematics, the Mind, and the Physical World.” in Meaning in Mathematics, edited by John C. Polkinghorne, pp. 41–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1995. “Intuitionists Are Not (Turing) Machines.” Philosophia Mathematica 3(1): 86–102.