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John P. Burgess (burgess-jp)

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Bibliography

    Boolos, George, Burgess, John P. and Jeffrey, Richard C. 2002. Computability and Logic. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First edition: Boolos and Jeffrey (1974).
    Boolos, George, Burgess, John P. and Jeffrey, Richard C. 2007. Computability and Logic. 5th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First edition: Boolos and Jeffrey (1974), doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804076.
    Burgess, Alexis and Burgess, John P. 2011. Truth. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691144016.001.0001.
    Burgess, John P. 1977. Forcing.” in Handbook of Mathematical Logic, edited by Jon K. Barwise, pp. 403–452. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 90. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
    Burgess, John P. 1978. The Unreal Future.” Theoria 44: 157–179.
    Burgess, John P. 1979. Logic and Time.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 44: 566–582.
    Burgess, John P. 1980. Decidability and Branching Time.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 39: 203–218.
    Burgess, John P. 1981a. The Completeness of Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus for Its Intended Interpretation.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22(1): 17–28.
    Burgess, John P. 1981b. Quick Completeness Proofs for Some Logics of Conditionals.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22(1): 76–84.
    Burgess, John P. 1981c. Relevance: A Fallacy? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22(2): 97–104. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 246–255).
    Burgess, John P. 1982. Axioms for Tense Logic I: ‘Since’ and ‘Until’ .” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23(4): 367–383.
    Burgess, John P. 1983a. Why I Am Not a Nominalist.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24(1): 93–105. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 31–45).
    Burgess, John P. 1983b. Common Sense and ‘Relevance’ .” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24(1): 41–53.
    Burgess, John P. 1984a. Basic Tense Logic.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II: Extensions of Classical Logic, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, pp. 89–133. Synthese Library n. 165. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in revised form as Burgess, J. P. (2002a).
    Burgess, John P. 1984b. Beyond Tense Logic [review of van Benthem (1983)].” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 13(3): 235–248.
    Burgess, John P. 1984c. Synthetic Mechanics.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 13(4): 379–395, doi:10.1007/bf00247712.
    Burgess, John P. 1984d. Dummett’s Case for Intuitionism.” History and Philosophy of Logic 5: 177–194. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 256–276).
    Burgess, John P. 1984e. Review of Wright (1983).” The Philosophical Review 93: 638–640.
    Burgess, John P. 1985. Review of Boolos (1971) et al. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 50: 544–547.
    Burgess, John P. 1986. The Truth is Never Simple.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 51(3): 663–681, doi:10.2307/2274021.
    Burgess, John P. 1988. Addendum to Burgess, J. P. (1986).” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 53: 390–392.
    Burgess, John P. 1989a. Vague Identity: Evans Misrepresented.” Analysis 49: 112–119.
    Burgess, John P. 1989b. Sets and Point-Sets: Five Grades of Set-Theoretic Involvement in Geometry.” in PSA 1988: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Arthur I. Fine and Jarrett Leplin, pp. 456–463. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
    Burgess, John P. 1990a. Phenomenal Qualities and the Nontransitivity of Matching.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68.
    Burgess, John P. 1990b. The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness.” Synthese 84(3): 417–474.
    Burgess, John P. 1990c. Vague Objects and Indefinite Identity.” Philosophical Studies 59: 253–287.
    Burgess, John P. 1990d. Epistemology & Nominalism.” in Physicalism in Mathematics, edited by Andrew David Irvine, pp. 1–16. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 45. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0.
    Burgess, John P. 1991a. Synthetic Mechanics Revisited.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 20(2): 121–130.
    Burgess, John P. 1991b. Synthetic Physics and Nominalist Realism.” in Philosophical and Foundational Issues in Measurement Theory, edited by C. Wade Savage and Philip Ehrlich, pp. 119–138. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
    Burgess, John P. 1992a. Proofs about Proofs: A Defense of Classical Logic. Part I: The Aims of Classical Logic.” in Proof, Logic and Formalization, edited by Michael Detlefsen, pp. 1–7. London: Routledge.
    Burgess, John P. 1992b. Review of Chihara (1990).” The Philosophical Review 101: 916–918.
    Burgess, John P. 1993a. How Foundational Work in Mathematics Can Be Relevant to Philosophy of Science.” in PSA 1992: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by David L. Hull, Micky Forbes, and Kathleen Okruhlik, pp. 433–441. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
    Burgess, John P. 1993b. Review of Field (1989).” Philosophia Mathematica 1(2): 180–188.
    Burgess, John P. 1993c. Hintikka et Sandu versus Frege in re Arbitrary Functions.” Philosophia Mathematica 1(1): 50–65. Revised version: Burgess, J. P. (1995).
    Burgess, John P. 1994. Non-Classical Logic and Ontological Non-Commitment: Avoiding Abstract Objects through Modal Operators.” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX: Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Swede, August 7-14, 1991, edited by Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms, and Dag Westerståhl, pp. 287–305. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 134. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
    Burgess, John P. 1995. Frege and Arbitrary Functions.” in Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by William Demopoulos, pp. 89–107. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Revised version of Burgess, J. P. (1993c).
    Burgess, John P. 1996. Marcus, Kripke, and Names.” Philosophical Studies 84(1): 1–47. Reprinted in Humphreys and Fetzer (1998, 89–124).
    Burgess, John P. 1997a. Quinus Ab Omni Naevo Vindicatus.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27(suppl. 23): 25–65. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 203–235).
    Burgess, John P. 1997b. Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 26(1): 103–119.
    Burgess, John P. 1997c. What is Minimalism about Truth? Analysis 57(4): 259–267.
    Burgess, John P. 1998a. Occam’s Razor and Scientific Method.” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 195–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
    Burgess, John P. 1998b. In Defense of an Indeterminist Theory of Vagueness.” The Monist 81(2): 233–252.
    Burgess, John P. 1998c. How Not to Write History of Philosophy: A Case Study.” in The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins, edited by Paul Humphreys and James H. Fetzer, pp. 125–136. Synthese Library n. 270. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Burgess, John P. 1999a. Which Modal Logic Is the Right One? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40: 81–93. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 169–184).
    Burgess, John P. 1999b. Review of Shapiro (1997).” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40(2): 283–291.
    Burgess, John P. 2001a. Vagueness, Epistemicism, and Response-Dependence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(4): 507–524.
    Burgess, John P. 2001b. Set Theory.” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, edited by Lou F. Goble, pp. 55–71. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164801.
    Burgess, John P. 2001c. Nominalist Paraphrase and Ontological Commitment.” in Logic, Meaning and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church, edited by Curtis Anthony Anderson and Michael Zelëny, pp. 429–444. Synthese Library n. 304. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Burgess, John P. 2002a. Basic Tense Logic.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume VII, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 1–42. Dordrecht: Springer. First publication as Burgess (2002).
    Burgess, John P. 2002b. Is there a Problem About the Deflationary Theory of Truth? in Principles of Truth, edited by Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten, pp. 37–55. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. Second edition, with small corrections: Halbach and Horsten (2004).
    Burgess, John P. 2002c. Review of Field (2001).” The Philosophical Review 111(4): 603–604.
    Burgess, John P. 2003a. Which Modal Models are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)? Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 18(47): 145–158.
    Burgess, John P. 2003b. A Remark on Henkin Sentences and Their Contraries.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44(3): 185–188.
    Burgess, John P. 2003c. Review of Fine (2002).” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44(4): 227–251.
    Burgess, John P. 2003d. Numbers and Ideas.” Richmond Journal of Philosophy 1: 12–17. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 23–30).
    Burgess, John P. 2004a. Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54(214): 38–55. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 66–84).
    Burgess, John P. 2004b. Mathematics and Bleak House.” Philosophia Mathematica 12(1): 18–36. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 46–65).
    Burgess, John P. 2004c. E Pluribus Unum: Plural Logic and Set Theory.” Philosophia Mathematica 12(3): 193–221. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 104–134).
    Burgess, John P. 2005a. Fixing Frege. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2005b. On Anti-Anti-Realism.” Facta Philosophica 7(2): 145–165.
    Burgess, John P. 2005c. Review of Chihara (2004).” Philosophia Mathematica 13(1): 78–90.
    Burgess, John P. 2005d. Review of Tennant (1997).” Philosophia Mathematica 13(2): 202–215.
    Burgess, John P. 2005e. No Requirement of Relevance.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 727–750. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
    Burgess, John P. 2005f. Being Explained Away.” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13: 41–56. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 85–103).
    Burgess, John P. 2005g. Translating Names.” Analysis 65: 96–104. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 236–245).
    Burgess, John P. 2006a. Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity.” in Central Works of Philosophy volume 5: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After, edited by John Shand, pp. 166–186. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
    Burgess, John P. 2006b. Soames on Empiricism [on Soames (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 129(3): 619–626.
    Burgess, John P. 2008a. Mathematics, Models, and Modality. Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2008b. Introduction.” in Mathematics, Models, and Modality. Selected Philosophical Essays, pp. 1–19. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2008c. Logicism: A New Look.” in Mathematics, Models, and Modality. Selected Philosophical Essays, pp. 135–145. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2008d. Tarski’s Tort.” in Mathematics, Models, and Modality. Selected Philosophical Essays, pp. 149–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2008e. Cats, Dogs, and so on.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume IV, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 56–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199542987.001.0001.
    Burgess, John P. 2009a. Philosophical Logic. Princeton Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2009b. Can Truth Out? in, pp. 147–162. Reprinted in Burgess, J. P. (2008a, 185–202).
    Burgess, John P. 2009c. Protocol Sentences for Lite Logicism.” in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. What Has Become of Them?, edited by Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, and Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, pp. 27–46. Synthese Library n. 341. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Burgess, John P. 2009d. Putting Structuralism in Its Place.” Unpublished manuscript.
    Burgess, John P. 2010a. On the Outside Looking In: A Caution about Conservativeness.” in Kurt Gödel. Essays for his Centennial, edited by Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons, and Stephen G. Simpson, pp. 128–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2010b. Against Ethics.” in A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, pp. 1–16. Philosophical Studies Series n. 114. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Burgess, John P. 2011a. Kripke Models.” in Saul Kripke, edited by Alan Berger, pp. 119–140. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2011b. Kripke on Truth.” in Saul Kripke, edited by Alan Berger, pp. 141–159. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2011c. Review of Weir (2010).” Philosophia Mathematica 19(2): 213–219.
    Burgess, John P. 2011d. The Logic of Necessity.” in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Richard Pettigrew and Leon Horsten, pp. 299–323. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
    Burgess, John P. 2012. Model Theory: What it Is and What it Isn’t.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 569–578. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Burgess, John P. 2013. Saul Kripke: Puzzles and Mysteries. Cambridge: Polity Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2014a. Madagascar Revisited.” Analysis 74(2): 195–201.
    Burgess, John P. 2014b. On a Derivation of the Necessity of Identity.” Synthese 191(7): 1567–1585.
    Burgess, John P. 2014c. Intuitions of three Kinds in Gödel’s Views on the Continuum.” in Interpreting Gödel. Critical Essays, edited by Juliette Kennedy, pp. 11–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Burgess, John P. 2014d. Quine’s Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics.” in A Companion to W.v.O. Quine, edited by Gilbert H. Harman and Ernest LePore, pp. 281–295. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118607992.
    Burgess, John P. 2015a. Rigor and Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722229.001.0001.
    Burgess, John P. 2015b. Lewis on Mereology and Set Theory.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 459–469. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
    Burgess, John P. 2015c. Modal Logic in the Modal Sense of Modality.” in Logic without Borders. Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Åsa Hirvonen, Juha Kontinen, Roman Kossak, and Andrés Villaveces, pp. 51–72. Ontos Mathematical Logic n. 5. Berlin: de Gruyter.
    Burgess, John P. 2016a. Kripke on Functionalism.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 48(144): 3–18.
    Burgess, John P. 2016b. Logic and Philosophical Methodology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 607–621. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
    Burgess, John P. 2018. Putnam on Foundations: Models, Modals, Muddles.” in Hilary Putnam on Logic and Mathematics, edited by Geoffrey Hellman and Roy T. Cook, pp. 129–144. Outstanding Contributions to Logic n. 9. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96274-0.
    Burgess, John P. 2021. Kripke on Modality.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 400–408. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Burgess, John P. and Hazen, Allen Patterson. 1998. Predicative Logic and Formal Arithmetic.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39(1): 1–17.
    Burgess, John P., Hazen, Allen Patterson and Lewis, David. 1991. Appendix on Pairing.” in Parts of Classes, pp. 121–150. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Burgess, John P. and Humberstone, I. Lloyd. 1987. Natural Deduction Rules for a Logic of Vagueness.” Erkenntnis 27: 197–229.
    Burgess, John P. and Rosen, Gideon. 1997. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretations of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250126.001.0001.
    Rosen, Gideon and Burgess, John P. 2005. Nominalism Reconsidered.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 515–535. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.

Further References

    van Benthem, Johan. 1983. The Logic of Time. A Model-Theoretic Investigation into the Varieties of Temporal Ontology and Temporal Discourse. Synthese Library n. 156. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Second edition: van Benthem (1991).
    van Benthem, Johan. 1991. The Logic of Time. A Model-Theoretic Investigation into the Varieties of Temporal Ontology and Temporal Discourse. 2nd ed. Synthese Library n. 156. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. First edition: van Benthem (1983).
    Boolos, George. 1971. The Iterative Conception of a Set.” The Journal of Philosophy 68: 215–232. Reprinted in Boolos (1998, 13–29).
    Boolos, George. 1998. Logic, Logic, and Logic. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Introductions and afterword by John P. Burgess; edited by Richard Jeffrey, doi:10.1080/01445340051095856.
    Boolos, George and Jeffrey, Richard C. 1974. Computability and Logic. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Chihara, Charles S. 1990. Constructibility and Mathematical Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198239750.001.0001.
    Chihara, Charles S. 2004. A Structural Account of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Field, Hartry. 1989. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Field, Hartry. 2001. Truth and the Absence of Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
    Fine, Kit. 2002. The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199246182.001.0001.
    Humphreys, Paul and Fetzer, James H., eds. 1998. The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Synthese Library n. 270. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Shapiro, Stewart. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195139305.001.0001.
    Soames, Scott. 2003. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    Tennant, Neil W. 1997. The Taming of the True. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.001.0001.
    Weir, Alan. 2010. Truth Through Proof. A Formalist Foundation of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.001.0001.
    Wright, Crispin. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.