David Hugh Mellor (mellor-dh)

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Bibliography

Le Poidevin, Robin and Mellor, David Hugh. 1997. “Time, Change, and the ‘Indexical Fallacy’ .” Mind 106: 534–538.
Lillehammer, Hallvard and Mellor, David Hugh, eds. 2005. Ramsey’s Legacy. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1966. “Inexactness and Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 33: 345–359.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1967. “Imprecision and Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 34: 1–9.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1968. “On Literary Truth.” Ratio 10: 150–168.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1969a. “Chance.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 43: 11–36.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1969b. “God and Probability.” Religious Studies 5: 223–234.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1971. The Matter of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1973. “Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 47: 107–119.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1974a. “In Defense of Dispositions.” The Philosophical Review 83(2): 157–181. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 104–122), doi:10.2307/2184136.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1974b. “Special Relativity and Present Truth.” Analysis 34: 74–77.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1975. “Comment on Salmon (1975).” in Explanation: Papers and Discussions, edited by Stephan Körner, pp. 146–151. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1976. “Probable Explanation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54: 231–241.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1977. “Natural Kinds.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28: 299–312. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 123–135).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1978. “Conscious belief.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78: 87–101.
Mellor, David Hugh, ed. 1980a. Science, Belief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R.B. Braithwaite. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh, ed. 1980b. Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F.P. Ramsey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1980c. “Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws.” in Science, Belief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R.B. Braithwaite, edited by David Hugh Mellor, pp. 105–126. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 136–153).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1980d. “Consciousness and Degrees of Belief.” in Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F.P. Ramsey, edited by David Hugh Mellor, pp. 139–173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 30–60).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1980e. “On Things and Causes in Spacetime.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31: 282–288.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1980f. “The Self from Time to Time.” Analysis 40: 59–62.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1981a. Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1981b. “McTaggart, Fixity and Coming True.” in Reduction, Time, and Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences, edited by Richard A. Healey, pp. 79–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 183–200).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1981c. “Thank Goodness That’s Over.” Ratio 23: 20–30. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 293–304).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1981d. “Some Problems about Solving Problems.” in PSA 1978: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Ian Hacking, pp. 522–529. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1981e. “The Possibility of Prediction.” Proceedings of the British Academy 65: 207–223.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1982a. “Chances and Degrees of Belief.” in What? Where? When? Why? Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 49–68. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 235–253).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1982b. “Counting Corners Correctly.” Analysis 42: 96–97.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1982c. “Theoretically structured time [review of Newton-Smith (1980)].” Philosophical Books 23(2): 65–69.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1983a. “Objective Decision Making.” Social Theory and Practice 9: 289–309. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 269–287).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1983b. “MacBeath’s Soluble Aspirin [reply to Macbeath (1983)].” Ratio 25: 89–92. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 312–315).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1984. “What is Computational Psychology?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 58: 37–53.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1986. “Tense’s Tenseless Truth Conditions.” Analysis 46: 167–172.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1987a. “The Singularly Affecting Facts of Causation.” in Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart, edited by Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan, and Jean Norman, pp. 111–136. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 201–224).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1987b. “Fixed Past, Unfixed Future.” in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, edited by Barry Taylor, pp. 166–186. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series n. 25. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1988a. “Crane’s Waterfall Illusion.” Analysis 48: 147–150.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1988b. “On Raising the Chances of Effects.” in Probability and Causality. Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon, edited by James H. Fetzer, pp. 229–239. Synthese Library n. 192. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 225–234).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1989a. “I and Now.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89: 79–97. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 17–29).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1989b. “Induction is Warranted.” Analysis 49: 5–7. Reprinted as “The Warrant of Induction” in Mellor (1991a, 254–268).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1989c. “How much of the Mind is a Computer?” in Computers, Brains and Minds. Essays in Cognitive Science, edited by Peter Slezák and W. R. Albury, pp. 47–69. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 7. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 61–81).
Mellor, David Hugh, ed. 1990a. Ways of Communicating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1990b. “Introduction.” in Philosophical Papers, pp. xi–xxiii. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by D.H. Mellor.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1990c. “Telling the Truth.” in Ways of Communicating, edited by David Hugh Mellor, pp. 81–95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1990d. “Laws, Chances and Properties.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4: 159–170. Reprinted in revised form in Mellor (1991a, 154–169).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991a. Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991b. “Causation and the Direction of Time.” Erkenntnis 35: 191–203.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991c. “Analytic Philosophy and the Self.” in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 1–16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991d. “Properties and Predicates.” in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 170–182. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Bacon, Campbell and Reinhardt (1993, 101–112) and Mellor and Oliver (1997a).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991e. “The Warrant of Induction.” in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 254–268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inaugural Lecture.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991f. “Probability and the Evidence of our Senses.” in A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays, edited by A. Phillips Griffiths, pp. 117–128. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991g. “Dispositions.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1992. “There are no Conjunctive Universals.” Analysis 52: 97–103.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1993a. “How to Believe a Conditional.” The Journal of Philosophy 90(5): 233–248.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1993b. “Supervenience? No Chance! Reply to Menuge.” Analysis 53: 97–103.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1993c. “Nothing Like Experience.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 1–16.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1994a. “The Need for Tense.” in The New Theory of Time, pp. 23–37. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Originally published as part of Mellor (1981a).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1994b. “The Unreality of Tense.” in The New Theory of Time, pp. 163–175. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Originally published as part of Mellor (1981a).
Mellor, David Hugh. 1995. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1998a. Real Time II. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1998b. “Transcendental Tense.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72: 29–44.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2000a. “Probability, Chance and Necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 16–27.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2000b. “The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions.” Mind 109(436): 757–780, doi:10.1093/mind/109.436.757.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2000c. “Equally Effective Causes.” Analysis 60: 71–73.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2000d. “The Point of Refinement.” Analysis 60: 243–246.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2001a. “The Time of Our Lives.” in Philosophy at the New Millenium, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 45–59. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2001b. “Transparent and Opaque Causation.” in Current Issues in Causation, edited by Wolfgang Spohn, Marion Ledwig, and Michael Esfeld, pp. 9–20. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2001c. “Real Time II: Replies to Hinchliff (2001), Paul (2001) and Perry (2001).” in The Importance of Time – Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society 1995–2000, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, pp. 95–102. Philosophical Studies Series n. 87. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2002. “Time Travel.” in Time, edited by Katinka Ridderbos, pp. 46–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2003a. “Real Metaphysics – Replies.” in Real Metaphysics – Essays in honour of D.H. Mellor, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, pp. 212–238. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 15. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2003b. “Too Many Universes.” in God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science, edited by Neil A. Manson, pp. 221–228. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2004a. “Dispositions.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 315–326. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2004b. “For Facts as Causes and Effects.” in Causation and Counterfactuals, edited by John David Collins, Ned Hall, and Laurie A. Paul, pp. 309–324. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1752.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2005a. “What does Subjective Decision Theory Tell Us?” in Ramsey’s Legacy, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and David Hugh Mellor, pp. 137–148. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2005b. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2005c. “Time.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 615–635. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2006a. “Wholes and Parts: The Limits of Composition.” South African Journal of Philosophy / Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif Vir Wysbegeerte 25(2): 138–145.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2006b. “Levi’s Chances.” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 111–124. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2008a. “Truthmakers for What?” in From Truth to Reality. New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 272–290. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2008b. “Micro-Composition.” in Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, pp. 65–80. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2009. “The Direction of Time.” in The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, Peter M. Simons, Andrew McGonigal, and Ross P. Cameron, pp. 449–458. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203879306.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2011. “Contingent Facts: A Reply to Cresswell and Rini (2011).” Analysis 71(1): 62–69.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2012. Mind, Meaning, and Reality. Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645084.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2013. “Probability in the Philosophy of Religion.” Analysis 73(3): 548–554.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2016. “From Translations to Truthmakers.” in Metaphysics and Scientific Realism. Essays in Honor of David Malet Armstrong, edited by Francesco Federico Calemi, pp. 219–232. EIDE – Foundations of Ontology n. 9. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110455915.
Mellor, David Hugh and Crane, Tim. 1990. “There is No Question of Physicalism.” Mind 99: 185–206. Reprinted in Mellor (1991a, 82–102).
Mellor, David Hugh and Crane, Tim. 1995. “Postscript to Mellor and Crane (1990).” in Contemporary Materialism. A Reader, edited by Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout, pp. 90–95. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh and Oliver, Alex, eds. 1997a. Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mellor, David Hugh and Oliver, Alex. 1997b. “Introduction.” in Properties, edited by David Hugh Mellor and Alex Oliver, pp. 1–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Bacon, John, Campbell, Keith and Reinhardt, Loyd R., eds. 1993. Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cresswell, Maxwell J. and Rini, Adriane A. 2011. “Contingent Facts: Comments on Mellor’s Reply [Mellor (2011)].” Analysis 71(1): 69–72.
Hinchliff, Mark. 2001. “McTaggart, Change and Real Tense: A Critical Notice of Mellor (1998a).” in The Importance of Time – Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society 1995–2000, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, pp. 59–67. Philosophical Studies Series n. 87. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Macbeath, Murray. 1983. “Mellor’s Emeritus Headache [on Mellor (1981c)].” Ratio 25: 81–88. Reprinted in Oaklander and Smith (1994, 305–311).
Newton-Smith, William H. 1980. The Structure of Time. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Oaklander, L. Nathan and Smith, Quentin. 1994. The New Theory of Time. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Paul, Laurie A. 2001. “Comments on Mellor (1998a).” in The Importance of Time – Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society 1995–2000, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, pp. 69–80. Philosophical Studies Series n. 87. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Perry, John R. 2001. “Time, Consciousness and the Knowledge Argument [on Mellor (1998a)].” in The Importance of Time – Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society 1995–2000, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, pp. 81–93. Philosophical Studies Series n. 87. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Salmon, Wesley C. 1975. “Theoretical Explanation.” in Explanation: Papers and Discussions, edited by Stephan Körner, pp. 118–145. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.