James Dreier (dreier-j)
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Bibliography
Dreier, James. 1992. “The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 30: 13–38.
Dreier, James. 1993. “Structures of Normative Theories.” The Monist 76(1): 22–40.
Dreier, James. 1996a. “Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.” Philosophical Studies 83(1): 29–51.
Dreier, James. 1996b. “Projectivism.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Dreier, James. 1997. “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality.” in Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, pp. 81–100. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236467.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2000. “Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(3): 619–638.
Dreier, James. 2001. “Charles Stevenson (1908–1979).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 175–180. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Dreier, James. 2002a. “Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 241–263. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Dreier, James. 2002b. “The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment [on Blackburn (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 136–143.
Dreier, James. 2003. “Gibbard and Moore.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(suppl.): 158–164.
Dreier, James. 2004a. “Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 23–44. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Dreier, James. 2004b. “Decision Theory and Morality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, edited by Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling, pp. 156–181. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2005. “Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties [on Pettit (2002)].” Philosophical Studies 124(2): 199–219.
Dreier, James. 2006a. “Was Moore a Moorean?” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 191–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2006b. “Negation for Expressivists: a Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for their Solution.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 217–234. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dreier, James, ed. 2006c. Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 6. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Dreier, James. 2006d. “Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp, pp. 240–264. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195147790.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2006e. “Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism [on Gibbard (2003)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 714–721.
Dreier, James. 2008. “Shallow, Deeper, Deep: A Few Thoughts on a Small Piece of Sinnott-Armstrong (2006).” Philosophical Books 49(3): 197–206.
Dreier, James. 2009a. “Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 79–110. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Dreier, James. 2009b. “Practical Conditionals.” in Reasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall, pp. 116–133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreier, James. 2010. “When do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume V, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 153–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dreier, James. 2011. “In Defense of Consequentializing.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume I, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 97–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2015a. “Explaining the Quasi-Real.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume X, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 273–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2015b. “Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?” in Motivational Internalism, edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Sixten Strandberg, Ragnar Francén, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Bjorklund, pp. 167–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published under the name “Ragnar Francén Olinder”, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001.
Dreier, James. 2015c. “Another World: The Metaethics and Metametaethics of Reasons Fundamentalism.” in Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, edited by Robert N. Johnson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 155–171. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.001.0001.
Further References
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198247852.001.0001.
Gibbard, Allan F. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctv1pncqb8.
Pettit, Philip. 2002. Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251878.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195187725.001.0001.