Philip Pettit (pettit-p)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Braithwaite, John and Pettit, Philip. 1990. Not Just Deserts: Republican Theory of Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240563.001.0001.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Pettit, Philip. 2000. “The Hidden Economy of Esteem.” Economics and Philosophy 16(1): 77–98.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Pettit, Philip. 2004a. The Economy of Esteem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Pettit, Philip. 2004b. “Esteem, ldentifiability and the Internet.” Analyse & Kritik 26(1): 139–157.
Brennan, Geoffrey and Pettit, Philip. 2005. “The Feasibility Issue.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 258–281. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Buchak, Lara and Pettit, Philip. 2015. “Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents.” in Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, edited by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, pp. 207–231. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
Delmas-Marty, Mireille and Pettit, Philip. 2005. Vers un droit commun de l’humanité : entretien avec Philipp Pettit. Paris: Textuel.
Goodin, Robert E. and Pettit, Philip, eds. 1997. Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Anthology. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goodin, Robert E., Pettit, Philip and Pogge, Thomas W., eds. 1993a. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy n. 1. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goodin, Robert E., Pettit, Philip and Pogge, Thomas W., eds. 1993b. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy n. 2. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goodin, Robert E., Pettit, Philip and Pogge, Thomas W., eds. 2007a. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. 2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy n. 1. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Goodin, Robert E., Pettit, Philip and Pogge, Thomas W., eds. 2007b. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. 2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy n. 2. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hájek, Alan and Pettit, Philip. 2004. “Desire Beyond Belief.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 77–92. Reprinted in Jackson and Priest (2004, 78–93).
Hawthorne, John and Pettit, Philip. 1996. “Strategies for Free Will Compatibilists.” Analysis 56: 191–201.
Hookway, Christopher and Pettit, Philip, eds. 1978. Action and Interpretation. Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1988. “Functionalism and Broad Content.” Mind 97: 318–400. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 95–118).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1990a. “Causation in the Philosophy of Mind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50: 195–214. Reprinted in Clark and Millican (1996, 75–100) and in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 45–68).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1990b. “In Defense of Folk Psychology.” Philosophical Studies 59: 31–54. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 13–35).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1990c. “Program Explanation: A General Perspective.” Analysis 50: 107–117. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 119–130).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1992. “Structural Explanation in Social Theory.” in Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, edited by David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, pp. 97–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 131–162).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1993a. “Some Content is Narrow.” in Mental Causation, edited by John Heil and Alfred R. Mele, pp. 259–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 69–91).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1993b. “Folk Belief and Commonplace Belief.” Mind and Language 8: 298–305. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 36–44).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1995. “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation.” The Philosophical Quarterly 45(178): 20–40. Elaborated into chapter 5 and 6 of Jackson (1998) and reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 189–210).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 1998. “A Problem for Expressivism.” Analysis 58: 239–251. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 252–265).
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip. 2002. “Response-Dependence without Tears.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 97–117. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Jackson, Frank, Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 2000. “Ethical Particularism and Patterns.” in Moral Particularism, edited by Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little, pp. 79–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 211–232).
Jackson, Frank, Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A., eds. 2004. Mind, Morality, and Explanation. Selected Collaborations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kukathas, Chandran and Pettit, Philip. 1990. Rawls. A Theory of Justice and its Critics. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
List, Christian and Pettit, Philip. 2001. “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.” Economics and Philosophy 18(1): 89–110.
List, Christian and Pettit, Philip. 2008. “Group Agency and Supervenience.” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 75–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
List, Christian and Pettit, Philip. 2011. Group Agency. The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001.
List, Christian and Pettit, Philip. 2012. “Episteme Symposium on List and Pettit (2011): Replies to Gaus (2012), Cariani (2012), Sylvan (2012), and Briggs (2012).” Episteme 9(3): 293–309.
Macdonald, Graham F. and Pettit, Philip. 1981. Semantics and Social Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
McGeer, Victoria and Pettit, Philip. 2015. “The Hard Problem of Responsibility.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume III, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 160–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744832.001.0001.
McGeer, Victoria and Pettit, Philip. 2017. “The Empowering Theory of Trust.” in The Philosophy of Trust, edited by Paul Faulkner and Thomas W. Simpson, pp. 14–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter and Pettit, Philip. 1993. “Found: The Missing Explanation.” Analysis 53(2): 100–109.
Menzies, Peter and Pettit, Philip. 1994. “In Defence of Fictionalism about Possible Worlds.” Analysis 54: 27–36.
Pettit, Philip. 1968. “Parmenides and Sartre.” Philosophical Studies (Maynooth) 17: 161–184.
Pettit, Philip. 1975. The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1977. “The Life-World and Role-Theory.” in Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding, edited by Edo Pivčević, pp. 251–270. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1978. “Rational Man Theory.” in Action and Interpretation. Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, edited by Christopher Hookway and Philip Pettit, pp. 43–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1981. “Reply [to Taylor (1981)]: Evaluative ‘Realism’ and Interpretation.” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, edited by Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich, pp. 211–245. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, doi:10.4324/9781315823249.
Pettit, Philip. 1982. “Habermas on Truth and Justice.” in Marx and Marxisms, edited by George Henry Radcliffe Parkinson, pp. 207–228. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1983. “Wittgenstein, Individualism and the Mental.” in Proceedings of the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Weingartner and Johannes Czermak, pp. 446–455. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 9. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Pettit, Philip. 1984. “Satisficing Consequentialism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 58: 164–176.
Pettit, Philip. 1985a. “Philosophy after Rorty.” in Philosophy: Its History and Historiography, edited by A. J. Holland, pp. 69–84. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Pettit, Philip. 1985b. “Reply to Mary Hesse [on Hesse (1985)].” in Philosophy: Its History and Historiography, edited by A. J. Holland, pp. 91–94. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Pettit, Philip. 1986a. “Social Holism and Moral Theory: A Defence of Bradley’s Thesis.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 173–197.
Pettit, Philip. 1986b. “Broad-Minded Explanation and Psychology.” in Subject, Thought, and Context, edited by Philip Pettit and John Henry McDowell, pp. 17–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1986c. “Preserving the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Synthese 68: 181–184.
Pettit, Philip. 1988a. “The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an Unexploitable Newcomb Problem.” Synthese 76(1): 123–134.
Pettit, Philip. 1988b. “The Strong Sociology of Knowledge Without Relativism.” in Relativism and Realism in Science, edited by Robert Nola, pp. 81–92. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 6. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Pettit, Philip. 1989. “Decision Theory, Political Theory and the Hats Hypothesis.” in Freedom and Rationality. Essays in Honor of John Watkins from his Colleagues and Friends, edited by Fred B. D’Agostino and Ian C. Jarvie, pp. 23–34. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 117. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Pettit, Philip. 1990a. “Virtus normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives.” Ethics 100: 725–755. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 309–343).
Pettit, Philip. 1990b. “The Reality of Rule-Following.” Mind 99: 1–21. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 26–48) and in Miller and Wright (2002, 188–208).
Pettit, Philip. 1991a. “Realism and Response-Dependence.” Mind 100: 587–626. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 49–95).
Pettit, Philip. 1991b. “Decision Theory and Folk Psychology.” in Foundations of Decision Theory: Issues and Advances, edited by Michael O. L. Bacharach and Susan L. Hurley, pp. 147–175. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 192–221).
Pettit, Philip. 1991c. “Consequentialism.” in A Companion to Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, pp. 230–240. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pettit, Philip. 1992a. “The Nature of Naturalism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 66: 245–266.
Pettit, Philip. 1992b. “Instituting a Research Ethic: Chilling and Cautionary Tales.” Bioethics 6(2): 89–112. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 378–402).
Pettit, Philip. 1992c. “Causal Relevance and Event Identity.” Philosophical Studies (Maynooth) 33: 131–141.
Pettit, Philip. 1993a. The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1993b. “A Definition of Physicalism.” Analysis 53: 213–223.
Pettit, Philip. 1993c. “Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican.” European Journal of Philosophy 1(1): 15–38.
Pettit, Philip. 1994a. “Microphysicalism without Contingent Micro-Macro Laws.” Analysis 54: 253–257.
Pettit, Philip. 1994b. “Enfranchising Silence: An Argument for Freedom of Speech.” in Freedom of Communication, edited by Thomas [Tom] Douglas Campbell and Wojciech Sadurski, pp. 45–55. Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 367–377).
Pettit, Philip. 1994c. “Consequentialism and Moral Psychology.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(1): 1–17.
Pettit, Philip. 1995a. “Microphysicalism, Dottism, and Reduction.” Analysis 55: 141–146.
Pettit, Philip. 1995b. “The Virtual Reality of homo Economicus.” The Monist 78(3): 308–329. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 222–244).
Pettit, Philip. 1995c. “The Cunning of Trust.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24: 202–225. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 344–366).
Pettit, Philip. 1996a. The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Second edition, with a new afterword, doi:10.1093/0195106458.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 1996b. “Functional Explanation and Virtual Selection.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47: 291–302. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 245–256).
Pettit, Philip. 1996c. “Realism and Truth: A Comment on Wright (1992).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 883–890.
Pettit, Philip. 1996d. “Three Aspects of Rational Explanation.” Protosociology 8–9: 170–183. Reprinted, in revised form, in Pettit (2002a, 177–191).
Pettit, Philip. 1996e. “Freedom as Antipower.” Ethics 106: 576–604.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1998a. “Practical Belief and Philosophical Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76(1): 15–33.
Pettit, Philip. 1998b. “Noumenalism and Response-Dependence.” The Monist 81(1): 112–132. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 96–115).
Pettit, Philip. 1998c. “Terms, Things and Response-Dependence.” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 61–72. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Pettit, Philip. 1998d. “Rational Choice Regulation: Two Strategies.” in Health Care, Crime and Regulatory Control, edited by Russell G. Smith, pp. 11–25. Leichhardt: Federation Press. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 290–308).
Pettit, Philip. 1999. “A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions.” Philosophical Studies 96: 21–44. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 136–157).
Pettit, Philip. 2000a. “How the Folk Understand Folk Psychology.” Protosociology 14: 26–38.
Pettit, Philip. 2000b. “Le non-conséquentialisme et l’universalisabilité.” Philosophiques 27(2).
Pettit, Philip. 2000c. “Deux sources de moralité.” Philosophiques 28(1).
Pettit, Philip. 2000d. “Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory.” in Designing Democratic Institutions, edited by Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo, pp. 105–144. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 42. New York: New York University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2001a. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2001b. “The Capacity to Have Done Otherwise: An Agent-Centred View.” in Relating to Responsibility. Essays in Honour of Tony Honoré on his 80th Birthday, edited by Peter Cane and John Gardner, pp. 21–35. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Reprinted in Pettit (2002a, 257–273).
Pettit, Philip. 2001c. “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.” in Philosophical Issues 11: Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 268–299. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pettit, Philip. 2001d. “Capability and Freedom: A Defence of Sen.” Economics and Philosophy 17(1): 1–20.
Pettit, Philip. 2002a. Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251878.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2002b. “Rules and Thought. Overview.” in Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays, pp. 3–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251878.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2002c. “Reasons and Choice. Overview.” in Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays, pp. 159–176. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251878.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2002d. “Norms and Regulations. Overview.” in Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays, pp. 275–289. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251878.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2003a. “Republicanism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/republicanism/.
Pettit, Philip. 2003b. “Akrasia, Collective and Individual.” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, pp. 68–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2003c. “Looks as Powers.” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 221–252. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pettit, Philip. 2003d. “Groups with Minds of Their Own.” in Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, edited by Frederick F. Schmitt, pp. 167–194. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pettit, Philip. 2003e. “Non-Consequentialism and Political Philosophy.” in Robert Nozick, edited by David Schmidtz, pp. 83–104. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2004a. Républicanisme : une théorie de la liberté et du gouvernement. NRF Essais. Paris: Gallimard.
Pettit, Philip. 2004b. “Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument.” in There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, edited by Peter J. Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 105–142. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2004c. “Descriptivism, Rigidified and Anchored.” Philosophical Studies 118(1–2): 323–338.
Pettit, Philip. 2004d. Penser en société : essais de métaphysique sociale et de méthodologie. Philosopher en sciences sociales. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Pettit, Philip. 2004e. “Existentialism, Quietism, and the Role of Philosophy.” in The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter, pp. 304–328. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199247288.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2004f. “The Common Good.” in Justice and Democracy. Essays for Brian Barry, edited by Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin, and Carole Pateman, pp. 150–169. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2004g. “Trust, Reliance and the Internet.” Analyse & Kritik 26(1): 108–121.
Pettit, Philip. 2005a. “The Elements of Possibility [on Hurley (2003)].” Philosophical Books 46(3): 210–219.
Pettit, Philip. 2005b. “Construing Sen on Commitment [on Sen (2005)].” Economics and Philosophy 21(1): 15–32.
Pettit, Philip. 2005c. “Précis of Pettit (2002a).” Philosophical Studies 124(2): 181–183.
Pettit, Philip. 2005d. “On Rule-Following, Folk Psychology, and the Economy of Esteem: A Reply to Boghossian (2005), Dreier (2005), and Smith (2005).” Philosophical Studies 124(2): 233–259.
Pettit, Philip. 2005e. “The Domination Complaint.” in Political Exclusion and Domination, edited by Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo, pp. 87–117. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 46. New York: New York University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2005f. “In Reply to Bader and Vatter [on Bader (2005) and Vatter (2005)].” in Political Exclusion and Domination, edited by Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo, pp. 182–188. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 46. New York: New York University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2006a. “Democracy, National and International.” The Monist 89(2): 301–324.
Pettit, Philip. 2006b. “When to Defer to Majority Testimony – And When Not.” Analysis 66: 179–187. Republished, with an additional paragraph, in Rønnow-Rasmussen et al. (2007).
Pettit, Philip. 2006c. “Can Contract Theory Ground Morality.” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, edited by James Dreier, pp. 77–96. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 6. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Pettit, Philip. 2006d. “Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction.” in Preferences and Well-Being, edited by Serena Olsaretti, pp. 131–154. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2006e. “Why and How Philosophy Matters.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly, pp. 35–57. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2006f. “No Testimonial Route to Consensus.” Episteme 3(3): 156–165.
Pettit, Philip. 2007a. “Rationality, Reasoning, and Group Agency.” Dialectica 61(4): 495–519. Reprinted in Macdonald, C. and Macdonald (2010, 252–276).
Pettit, Philip. 2007b. “Joining the Dots.” in Common Minds. Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit, edited by Geoffrey Brennan, Robert E. Goodin, Frank Jackson, and Michael A. Smith, pp. 215–343. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2007c. “Analytical Philosophy.” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas W. Pogge, 2nd ed., pp. 5–35. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy n. 1. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pettit, Philip. 2007d. “Republican Political Theory.” in Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism. Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, edited by Marc Fleurbaey, Maurices Salles, and John A. Weymark, pp. 389–410. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2009a. “Physicalism without Pop-out.” in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, edited by David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, pp. 243–266. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2009b. “Consciousness and the Frustrations of Physicalism.” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 163–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2010a. “Deliberation and Decision.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, pp. 252–258. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444323528.
Pettit, Philip. 2010b. “Freedom in the Spirit of Sen.” in Amartya Sen, edited by Christopher W. Morris, pp. 91–114. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2012a. On the People’s Terms: a Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2012b. “The Inescapability of Consequentialism.” in Luck, Value, and Commitment. Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, edited by Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang, pp. 41–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2012c. “Freedom.” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, edited by David Estlund, pp. 76–92. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376692.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2014a. “Group Agents are Not Expressive, Pragmatic or Theoretical Fictions.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 9): 1641–1662.
Pettit, Philip. 2014b. “Three Issues in Social Ontology.” in Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate. Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Julie Zahle and Finn Collin, pp. 77–96. Synthese Library n. 372. Dordrecht: Springer.
Pettit, Philip. 2014c. “How to Tell if a Group Is an Agent.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 97–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2015a. The Robust Demands of the Good. Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732600.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2015b. “The Asymmetry of Good and Evil.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume V, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 15–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2015c. “Justice: Social and Political.” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume I, edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, pp. 9–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669530.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2016a. “Broome on Reasoning and Rule-Following.” Philosophical Studies 173(12): 3373–3384.
Pettit, Philip. 2016b. “Making up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self-Knowledge, Self-Knowability and Personhood.” European Journal of Philosophy 24(1): 3–26.
Pettit, Philip. 2016c. “Republican Elements in the Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft.” in The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, edited by Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, pp. 135–147. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766841.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2017a. “The Program Model, Difference-Makers, and the Exclusion Problem.” in Making a Difference. Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Huw Price, pp. 232–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746911.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 2017b. “Corporate Agency: The Lesson of the Discursive Dilemma.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, edited by Marija Jankovic and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 249–262. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Pettit, Philip. 2018. The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Kinch Hoekstra.
Pettit, Philip. 2020. “Analyzing Concepts and Allocating Referents.” in Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, pp. 333–357. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip and Hoekstra, Kinch, eds. 2018. The Birth of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190904913.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip and McDowell, John Henry, eds. 1986a. Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip and McDowell, John Henry. 1986b. “Introduction.” in Subject, Thought, and Context, edited by Philip Pettit and John Henry McDowell, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 1990. “Backgrounding Desire.” The Philosophical Review 99: 595–592. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 269–294).
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 1993a. “Practical Unreason.” Mind 102: 53–80. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 322–353).
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 1993b. “Brandt on Self-Control.” in Rationality, Rules and Utility: New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, edited by Brad Hooker, pp. 33–50. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 354–374).
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 1996. “Freedom in Belief and Desire.” The Journal of Philosophy 93(9): 429–449. Reprinted in Bransen and Cuypers (1998, 89–112) and in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 375–396).
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 1997. “Parfit’s P.” in Reading Parfit, edited by Jonathan Dancy, pp. 71–95. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2004, 295–321).
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 2004. “The Truth in Deontology.” in Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by Richard Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael A. Smith, pp. 153–175. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael A. 2006. “External Reasons.” in McDowell and His Critics, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 142–169. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470776254.
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Wallace, Richard Jay, Pettit, Philip, Scheffler, Samuel and Smith, Michael A., eds. 2004. Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Allen, Danielle. 2005. “Invisible Citizens: Political Exclusion and Domination in Arendt and Ellison.” in Political Exclusion and Domination, edited by Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo, pp. 28–76. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 46. New York: New York University Press.
Bader, Veit. 2005. “Against Monism: Pluralist Critical Comments on Danielle Allen and Philip Pettit [on Allen (2005) and Pettit (2005e)].” in Political Exclusion and Domination, edited by Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo, pp. 164–178. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 46. New York: New York University Press.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2005. “Rules, Meaning and Intention [on Pettit (2002a)].” Philosophical Studies 124(2): 185–197.
Bransen, Jan and Cuypers, Stefaan E., eds. 1998. Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series n. 77. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Briggs, Rachael A. 2012. “The Normative Standing of Group Agents.” Episteme 9(3): 283–291.
Cariani, Fabrizio. 2012. “Epistemology in List and Pettit (2011): Six Objections in Search of the Truth.” Episteme 9(3): 255–269.
Clark, Andy and Millican, Peter J. R., eds. 1996. Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume 2. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dreier, James. 2005. “Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties [on Pettit (2002a)].” Philosophical Studies 124(2): 199–219.
Gaus, Gerald F. 2012. “Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality.” Episteme 9(3): 245–254.
Hesse, Mary B. 1985. “Rationality and the Generalization of Scientific Style.” in The Light of Nature. Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science presented to A.C. Crombie, edited by John D. North and J. J. Roche, pp. 365–382. Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées n. 110. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Hurley, Susan L. 2003. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250614.001.0001.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F., eds. 2010. Emergence in Mind. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001.
Miller, Alexander and Wright, Crispin, eds. 2002. Rule-Following and Meaning. London: Routledge.
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, Petersson, Björn, Josefsson, Jonas and Egonsson, Dan, eds. 2007. Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. Lund: Lunds Universitet, Filosofiska Institutionen, http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek.
Sen, Amartya. 2005. “Why Exactly is Commitment Important for Rationality?” Economics and Philosophy 21(1): 5–14.
Smith, Michael A. 2005. “Norms and Regulation: Three Issues [on Pettit (2002a)].” Philosophical Studies 124(2): 221–232.
Sylvan, Kurt L. 2012. “How to Be a Redundant Realist.” Episteme 9(3): 271–282.
Taylor, Charles. 1981. “Understanding and Explanation in the Geisteswissenschaften.” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, edited by Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich, pp. 191–210. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, doi:10.4324/9781315823249.
Vatter, Miguel. 2005. “Pettit and Modern Republican Political Thought [on Pettit (2005e)].” in Political Exclusion and Domination, edited by Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo, pp. 118–163. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 46. New York: New York University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctv1rr6cwg.