Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (sinnottarmstrong)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Alexander, Prescott, Schlegel, Alexander, Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Roskies, Adina L., Tse, Peter Ulric and Wheatley, Thalia. 2014. “Dissecting the Readiness Potential: An Investigation of the Relationship between Readiness Potentials, Conscious Willing, and Action.” in Surrounding Free Will. Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, edited by Alfred R. Mele, pp. 203–230. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333950.001.0001.
Audi, Robert and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, eds. 2002. Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Craig, William Lane and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2004. God? A Debate between a Christian and a Atheist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Henne, Paul, Chituc, Vladimir, De Brigard, Felipe and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2016. “An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ .” Analysis 76(3): 283–290.
Maoz, Uri and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, eds. 2022. Free Will: Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197572153.001.0001.
May, Joshua, Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Hull, Jay G. and Zimmerman, Aaron Z. 2010. “Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study.” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 265–273.
Nadelhoffer, Thomas and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2011. “Experimental Ethics.” in The Continuum Companion to Ethics, edited by Christian B. Miller, pp. 261–274. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Republished as Miller (2015).
Nadelhoffer, Thomas and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2012. “Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perlis.” Philosophy Compass 7(9): 631–642.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1984. “ ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies ‘Can’ .” The Philosophical Review 93(2): 249–261, doi:10.2307/2184585.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1985a. “A Solution to Forrester’s Paradox of Gentle Murder.” The Journal of Philosophy 82(3): 162–168.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1985b. “ ‘Ought to Have’’ and ‘Could Have’ .” Analysis 45: 44–48.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1988. Moral Dilemmas. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1992. “An Argument for Consequentialism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 6: Ethics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 399–421. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1993. “Some Problems for Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism.” Philosophical Studies 69(2–3): 297–313.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1994. “The Truth of Performatives.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(1): 99–107.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1996. “Moral Dilemmas and Rights.” in Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, edited by H. E. Mason, pp. 48–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999. “Begging the Question.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2000. “Expressivism and Embedding.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(3): 677–693.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2001. “R.M. Hare (1919– ).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 326–333. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2002a. “Moral Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/skepticism-moral/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2002b. “Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 305–328. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2003a. “For Goodness’ Sake.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(suppl.): 83–91.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2003b. “Experience and Foundationalism in Audi (2001).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(1): 181–187.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2003c. “Consequentialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/consequentialism/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed. 2004a. Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195169727.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2004b. “Introduction to Pyrrhonian Skepticism.” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 3–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195169727.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2004c. “Classy Pyrrhonism.” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 188–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195169727.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2005. “You Ought to be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation).” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 193–208. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006a. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195187725.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006b. “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.” in Metaethics after Moore, edited by Terence E. Horgan and Mark Timmons, pp. 339–366. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006c. “Consequentialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/consequentialism/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006d. “Moral Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/skepticism-moral/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2007. “Reflections on Reflection in Robert Audi’s Moral Intuitionism.” in Rationality and the Good. Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, edited by Mark Timmons, John Greco, and Alfred R. Mele, pp. 19–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed. 2008a. Moral Psychology, Volume 1. The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed. 2008b. Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed. 2008c. Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008d. “Framing Moral Intuitions.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 47–76. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.003.0004.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008e. “Précis of Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 789–793.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008f. “Replies to Copp (2008), Timmons (2008) and Railton (2008).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 820–830.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008g. “Summary of Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a).” Philosophical Books 49(3): 193–196.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008h. “Replies to Dreier (2008) and McNaughton (2008).” Philosophical Books 49(3): 218–228.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008i. “Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 448–456.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008j. “Replies to Hough (2008), Baumann (2008) and Blaauw (2008).” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 478–488.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008k. “How to Apply Generalities: Reply to Tolhurst (2008) and Shafer-Landau (2008).” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 97–106. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2009a. Morality without God? New York: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2009b. “How Strong is This Obligation? An Argument for Consequentialism from Concomitant Variation.” Analysis 69(3): 438–442.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2009c. “Mixed-Up Meta-Ethics.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 235–256. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2010. “Mackie’s Internalisms.” in A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, pp. 55–70. Philosophical Studies Series n. 114. Dordrecht: Springer.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2011a. “Moral Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/skepticism-moral/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2011b. “Consequentialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/consequentialism/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2012. “A Case Study in Neuroscience and Responsibility.” in Evolution and Morality, edited by James E. Fleming and Sanford Levinson, pp. 194–211. Nomos, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy n. 52. New York: New York University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2013. “Free Contrastivism.” in Contrastivism in Philosophy, edited by Martijn Blaauw, pp. 134–153. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 39. London: Routledge.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed. 2014a. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2014b. “Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths.” in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, pp. 40–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2015a. “Consequentialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2015b. “Moral Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/skepticism-moral/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed. 2016a. Finding Consciousness. The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2016b. “My Brain Made Me Do It – So What?” in Philosophers Take On the World, edited by David Edmonds, pp. 147–149. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2018. Think Again. How to Reason and Argue. London: Penguin Books.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2019a. “Consequentialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/consequentialism/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2019b. “Moral Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/skepticism-moral/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2023. “Consequentialism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consequentialism/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2024. “Moral Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/skepticism-moral/.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Behnke, Stephen. 2000. “Responsibility in Cases of Multiple Personality Disorder.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 301–323. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Malhotra, Amit. 2002. “How to Avoid Deviance (in Logic).” History and Philosophy of Logic 23(3): 215–236.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Moor, James H. and Fogelin, Robert J. 1986. “A Defense of Modus Ponens.” The Journal of Philosophy 83(5): 296–300.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Moor, James H. and Fogelin, Robert J. 1990. “A Defence of Modus Tollens.” Analysis 50(1): 9–16.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Pickard, Hanna. 2013. “What is Addiction?” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, edited by K. W. M. [Bill] Fulford, Martin Kinsey Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton, pp. 851–864. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Raffman, Diana and Asher, Nicholas, eds. 1995. Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Roskies, Adina L., Brown, Teneille and Murphy, Emily. 2008. “Brain Images as Legal Evidence.” Episteme 5(3): 359–373.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Sparrow, David. 2002. “A Light Theory of Color.” Philosophical Studies 110(3): 267–284.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Summers, Jesse S. 2019. “Defining Addiction: A Pragmatic Perspective.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction, edited by Hanna Pickard and Serge H. Ahmed, pp. 123–131. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Timmons, Mark, eds. 1996. Moral Knowledge. New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Wheatley, Thalia. 2012. “The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to Philosophy.” The Monist 95(3): 355–377.
Summers, Jesse S. and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2015. “Scrupulous Judgments.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume V, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 129–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
Summers, Jesse S. and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2017. “Scrupulous Characters and Mental Illness.” in Questions of Character, edited by Iskra Fileva, pp. 283–296. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.001.0001.
Summers, Jesse S. and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2019. Clean Hands. Philosophical Lessons from Scrupulosity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190058692.001.0001.

Further References

Audi, Robert. 2001. The Architecture of Reason. The Structure and Substance of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001.
Baumann, Peter. 2008. “Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong’s Moral Contrastivism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 453–470.
Blaauw, Martijn. 2008. “Contesting Pyrrhonian Contrastivism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 471–477.
Copp, David. 2008. “Do we have Any Justified Moral Beliefs? [on Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 811–819.
Dreier, James. 2008. “Shallow, Deeper, Deep: A Few Thoughts on a Small Piece of Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a).” Philosophical Books 49(3): 197–206.
Hough, Gerry. 2008. “A Dilemma for Sinnott-Armstrong’s Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 457–462.
McNaughton, David. 2008. “A Distinctively Moral Skepticism? [on Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a)].” Philosophical Books 49(3): 207–217.
Railton, Peter. 2008. “Coping with Moral Uncertainty [on Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 794–801.
Shafer-Landau, Russ, ed. 2008. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. vol. III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199542062.001.0001.
Timmons, Mark. 2008. “Contrastivism, Relevance Contextualism, and Meta-Skepticism [on Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 802–810.
Tolhurst, William. 2008. “Moral Intuitions Framed.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 77–82. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.