M. Frances Egan (egan-mf)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Egan, M. Frances. 1988. “Comments on Horgan and Tienson (1988).” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 115–117.
Egan, M. Frances. 1989. “What’s Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind.” Philosophy of Science 56: 664–674.
Egan, M. Frances. 1991a. “Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21: 379–388.
Egan, M. Frances. 1991b. “Must Psychology Be Individualistic?” The Philosophical Review 100: 179–203.
Egan, M. Frances. 1992. “Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content.” Mind 101: 443–459.
Egan, M. Frances. 1995a. “Computation and Content.” The Philosophical Review 104(2): 181–203.
Egan, M. Frances. 1995b. “Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture.” Philosophy of Science 62: 179–196.
Egan, M. Frances. 1996. “Intentionality and the Theory of Vision.” in Perception, edited by Kathleen A. Akins, pp. 232–247. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Egan, M. Frances. 1998. “Review of Cummins (1996).” The Philosophical Review 107(1): 118–120.
Egan, M. Frances. 1999a. “In Defence of Narrow Mindedness.” Mind and Language 14: 177–194.
Egan, M. Frances. 1999b. “Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination.” in Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, edited by Denis Fisette, pp. 217–228. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 62. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5.
Egan, M. Frances. 2003. “Naturalistic Inquiry: Where does Mental Representation Fit in?” in Chomsky and His Critics, edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert H. Hornstein, pp. 89–104. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470690024.
Egan, M. Frances. 2008. “The Content of Colour Experience [on Matthen (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(2): 407–414.
Egan, M. Frances. 2009a. “Wide Content.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 351–366. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Egan, M. Frances. 2009b. “Is there a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology?” in Stich and His Critics, edited by Dominic Murphy and Michael A. Bishop, pp. 14–29. Philosophers and Their Critics. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444308709.
Egan, M. Frances. 2010. “Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41(3): 253–259.
Egan, M. Frances. 2014a. “Explaining Representation: A Reply to Matthen.” Philosophical Studies 170(1): 137–142.
Egan, M. Frances. 2014b. “How to Think about Mental Content.” Philosophical Studies 170(1): 115–135.
Egan, M. Frances. 2017. “Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms.” in Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, edited by David Michael Kaplan, pp. 145–163. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199685509.001.0001.
Egan, M. Frances. 2019. “The Nature and Function of Content in Computational Models.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by Mark Sprevak and Matteo Colombo, pp. 247–258. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Egan, M. Frances. 2020. “A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.” in What are Mental Representations?, edited by Joulia Smortchkova, Krzystof Dolega, and Tobias Schlicht, pp. 26–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190686673.001.0001.

Further References

Cummins, Robert. 1996. Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/5887.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1988. “Settling into a New Paradigm.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 97–113. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 241–260).
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L., eds. 1991. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Matthen, Mohan. 2005. Seeing, Doing, and Knowing. A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001.