Don Fallis (fallis-d)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Arico, Adam J. and Fallis, Don. 2013. “Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Lying.” Philosophical Psychology 26(6): 790–816, doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.725977.
Fallis, Don. 2002a. “Goldman on Probabilistic Inference.” Philosophical Studies 109(3): 223–240.
Fallis, Don. 2002b. “What do Mathematicians Want? Probabilistic Proofs and the Epistemic Goals of Mathematicians.” Logique et Analyse 45(179–180): 373–388.
Fallis, Don. 2002c. “Response to ‘What is the Goal of Proof?’ [to Lercher (2002)].” Logique et Analyse 45(179–180): 397–398.
Fallis, Don. 2005. “Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation.” Episteme 2(1): 39–55.
Fallis, Don. 2006. “Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology.” Episteme 2(3): 177–188.
Fallis, Don. 2009. “What is Lying?” The Journal of Philosophy 106(1): 29–56, doi:10.5840/jphil200910612.
Fallis, Don. 2010. “Lying and Deception.” Philosophers' imprint 10(11).
Fallis, Don. 2012. “Lying as a Violation of Grice’s First Maxim of Quality.” Dialectica 66(4): 563–581, doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12007 .
Fallis, Don. 2013a. “Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 337–353, doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.688980.
Fallis, Don. 2013b. “Privacy and Lack of Knowledge.” Episteme 10(2): 153–166.
Fallis, Don. 2014a. “Epistemic Values and Disinformation.” in Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Abrol Fairweather, pp. 159–180. Synthese Library n. 366. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fallis, Don. 2014b. “The Varieties of Disinformation.” in The Philosophy of Information Quality, edited by Luciano Floridi and Phyllis Illari, pp. 135–162. Synthese Library n. 358. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fallis, Don. 2015a. “Skyrms on the Possibility of Universal Deception.” Philosophical Studies 172(2): 375–397.
Fallis, Don. 2015b. “Are Bald-Faced Lies Deceptive after All?” Ratio 28(1): 81–96, doi:10.1111/rati.12055.
Fallis, Don. 2016. “Mis- and Dis-Information.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Information, edited by Luciano Floridi, pp. 332–346. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Fallis, Don. 2018. “What is Deceptive Lying?” in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, edited by Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke, pp. 25–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198743965.001.0001.
Fallis, Don. 2019a. “Adversarial Epistemology on the Internet.” in The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, edited by David Coady and James Kennedy Chase, pp. 54–68. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Fallis, Don. 2019b. “Lying and Omissions.” in The Oxford Handbook of Lying, edited by Jörg Meibauer, pp. 183–192. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.001.0001.
Fallis, Don and Lewis, Peter J. 2016. “The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(3): 576–590.
Stokke, Andreas and Fallis, Don. 2017. “Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth.” Ergo 4(10): 277–309.

Further References

Lercher, Aaron. 2002. “What is the Goal of Proof?” Logique et Analyse 45(179–180): 389–395.