Jeremy Fantl (fantl)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Fantl, Jeremy. 2003a. “An Analysis of the A Priori and A Posteriori.” Acta Analytica 18(30–31): 43–69.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2003b. “Modest Infinitism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33(4).
Fantl, Jeremy. 2008a. “Knowing-How and Knowing-That.” Philosophy Compass 3(3): 451–470.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2008b. “Critical Notice of Rosenberg (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 228–231.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2011a. “Ryle’s Regress Defended.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 121–130.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2011b. “Infinitism and Practical Conditions on Justification.” Logos & Episteme 2(2): 191–209.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2012. “Knowledge How.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-how/.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2013. “A Defense of Dogmatism.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 34–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2015a. “What is it to be Happy that \(p\)?” Ergo 2(12): 267–297.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2015b. “Human Knowledge/Human Knowers: Comments on Williams (2015).” Episteme 12(2): 269–273.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2018. The Limitations of the Open Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198807957.001.0001.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.” The Philosophical Review 111(1): 67–94.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2007. “On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(3): 558–589.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2009a. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2009b. “Critical Study of Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005).” Noûs 43(1): 178–192.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2009c. “Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work.” Philosophical Studies 142(1): 55–66.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2011. “Pragmatic Encroachment.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 558–568. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2012a. “Arguing for Shifty Epistemology.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 55–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2012b. “Pragmatic Encroachment: It’s Not Just About Knowledge.” Episteme 9(1): 27–42.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2014. “Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 84–94. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2019. “Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Anderson and Hawthorne (2019).” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 258–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
McGrath, Matthew and Fantl, Jeremy. 2013. “Truth and Epistemology.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 127–146. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Sosa, Ernest, Kim, Jaegwon, Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew, eds. 2008. Epistemology. An Anthology. 2nd ed. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

Anderson, Charity and Hawthorne, John. 2019. “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 234–257. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001.
Rosenberg, Jay F. 2002. Thinking about Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251339.001.0001.
Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2015. “What’s so Special About Human Knowledge?” Episteme 12(2): 249–268.