Matthew McGrath (mcgrath-m)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Comesaña, Juan Manuel and McGrath, Matthew. 2014. “Having False Reasons.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 59–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel and McGrath, Matthew. 2016. “Perceptual Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 991–1006.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.” The Philosophical Review 111(1): 67–94.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2007. “On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(3): 558–589.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2009a. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2009b. “Critical Study of Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005).” Noûs 43(1): 178–192.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2009c. “Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work.” Philosophical Studies 142(1): 55–66.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2011. “Pragmatic Encroachment.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 558–568. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2012a. “Arguing for Shifty Epistemology.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 55–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2012b. “Pragmatic Encroachment: It’s Not Just About Knowledge.” Episteme 9(1): 27–42.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2014. “Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 84–94. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2019. “Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Anderson and Hawthorne (2019).” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 258–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
Kim, Brian and McGrath, Matthew, eds. 2018. Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. London: Routledge.
McGrath, Matthew. 1997. “Weak Deflationism.” Mind 106(421): 69–98.
McGrath, Matthew. 1998a. “Van Inwagen’s Critique of Universalism.” Analysis 58(2): 116–121.
McGrath, Matthew. 1998b. “Proportionality and Mental Causation: A Fit?” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 167–176. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McGrath, Matthew. 2001. “Review of Balaguer (1998).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 239–242.
McGrath, Matthew. 2002. “Critical Notice of Soames (1999).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 410–417.
McGrath, Matthew. 2003a. “What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 666–688.
McGrath, Matthew. 2003b. “Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth.” Philosophical Studies 112(1): 47–67.
McGrath, Matthew. 2005a. “No Objects, No Problem?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(4): 457–486.
McGrath, Matthew. 2005b. “Lynch on the Value of Truth [on Lynch (2004)].” Philosophical Books 46(4): 302–310.
McGrath, Matthew. 2005c. “Critical Notice of Kölbel (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 491–494.
McGrath, Matthew. 2005d. “Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/propositions/.
McGrath, Matthew. 2007a. “Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume III, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 143–176. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199218394.001.0001.
McGrath, Matthew. 2007b. “Temporal Parts.” Philosophy Compass 2(5): 730–748.
McGrath, Matthew. 2007c. “Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/propositions/.
McGrath, Matthew. 2008. “Conciliatory Metaontology and the Vindication of Common Sense.” Noûs 42(3): 482–508.
McGrath, Matthew. 2010. “Contextualism and Intellectualism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 383–405. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
McGrath, Matthew. 2012. “Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/propositions/.
McGrath, Matthew. 2013a. “Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism.” Philosophical Studies 162(3): 723–732.
McGrath, Matthew. 2013b. “Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The ‘Bad Basis’ Counterexamples.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 225–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
McGrath, Matthew. 2015. “Two Purposes of Knowledge-Attribution and the Contextualism Debate.” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 138–159. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
McGrath, Matthew. 2016a. “Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 897–905.
McGrath, Matthew. 2016b. “Hill on Epistemology [on Hill (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 841–849.
McGrath, Matthew. 2016c. “The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 69–87. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
McGrath, Matthew. 2017. “Knowing What Things Look Like.” The Philosophical Review 126(1): 1–41.
McGrath, Matthew. 2018. “Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems Are Your Problems!” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 162–178. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McGrath, Matthew. 2019. “Perceptual Capacities: Questions for Schellenberg [on Schellenberg (2018)].” Analysis 79(4): 730–739.
McGrath, Matthew and Fantl, Jeremy. 2013. “Truth and Epistemology.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 127–146. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
McGrath, Matthew and Frank, Devin. 2018. “Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/.
McGrath, Matthew and Frank, Devin. 2023. “Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/propositions/.
McGrath, Matthew and Schellenberg, Susanna, eds. 2020. Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Sosa, Ernest, Kim, Jaegwon, Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew, eds. 2008. Epistemology. An Anthology. 2nd ed. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

Anderson, Charity and Hawthorne, John. 2019. “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 234–257. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
Balaguer, Mark. 1998. Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. 2014. Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.001.0001.
Kölbel, Max. 2002. Truth without Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lynch, Michael Patrick. 2004. True to Life. Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Schellenberg, Susanna. 2018. The Unity of Perception. Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198827702.001.0001.
Soames, Scott. 1999. Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195123352.001.0001.
Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001.