Michael Williams (williams-mi)
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Bibliography
Gross, Steven A., Tebben, Nicholas and Williams, Michael, eds. 2015. Meaning without Representation. Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 1977. Groundless Belief. An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williams (1999a).
Williams, Michael. 1986a. “Do we (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?” Philosophical Topics 14(1): 223–242.
Williams, Michael. 1986b. “Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt.” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 117–139. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. Reprinted in Cottingham (1998, 28–49), doi:10.1525/9780520907836.
Williams, Michael. 1988a. “Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism.” Mind 97: 415–439.
Williams, Michael. 1988b. “Scepticism and Charity.” Ratio 1: 176–194.
Williams, Michael. 1990. “Externalism and the Philosophy of Mind.” The Philosophical Quarterly 40(160): 352–380.
Williams, Michael. 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williams (1996).
Williams, Michael. 1993. “Realism and Scepticism.” in Reality, Representation & Projection, edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright, pp. 193–214. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, Michael. 1996. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Second edition: Williams (1991).
Williams, Michael. 1999a. Groundless Belief. An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Second edition: Williams (1977).
Williams, Michael. 1999b. “Skepticism.” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa, pp. 35–69. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164863.
Williams, Michael. 1999c. “Meaning and Deflationary Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(11): 545–564. Reprinted in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, 301–320).
Williams, Michael. 1999d. “Fogelin’s Neo-Pyrrhonism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7(2): 141–158.
Williams, Michael. 1999e. “The Philosophy of Economic Modelling: A Critical Survey.” South African Journal of Philosophy / Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif Vir Wysbegeerte 18(2): 223–236.
Williams, Michael. 2000a. “Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature.” in Rorty and His Critics, edited by Robert B. Brandom, pp. 191–212. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williams, Michael. 2000b. “Is Contextualism Statable? [on Fogelin (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 80–85. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williams, Michael. 2000c. “Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement [on Dretske (2000)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 607–612.
Williams, Michael. 2001a. Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, Michael. 2001b. “Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards.” Philosophical Studies 103(1): 1–23.
Williams, Michael. 2001c. “Richard Rorty (1931– ).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 428–433. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Williams, Michael. 2002. “On some Critics of Deflationism.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 146–158. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Williams, Michael. 2003a. “Are there Two Grades of Knowledge?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77: 91–112.
Williams, Michael. 2003b. “Skeptizismus und der Kontext der Philosophie.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51(6): 973–991.
Williams, Michael. 2003c. “Nozick on Knowledge and Skepticism.” in Robert Nozick, edited by David Schmidtz, pp. 131–154. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Michael. 2003d. “Rorty on Knowledge and Truth.” in Richard Rorty, edited by Charles B. Guignon and David R. Hiley, pp. 61–80. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Michael. 2004a. “Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 456–474. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Translation of Williams (2003b).
Williams, Michael. 2004b. “Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses.” Erkenntnis 61(2–3): 315–343. Reprinted in Brendel and Jäger (2005, 173–202).
Williams, Michael. 2004c. “The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism.” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 121–145. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195169727.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2004d. “Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon?” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 193–211. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Williams, Michael. 2004e. “The Unity of Hume’s Philosophical Project [on Loeb (2002)].” Hume Studies 30(2): 265–296.
Williams, Michael. 2004f. “Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism.” in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, edited by Denis McManus, pp. 76–96. London: Routledge.
Williams, Michael. 2004g. “Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars, and the Task of Epistemology.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 174–189. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
Williams, Michael. 2004h. “Wittgenstein, Truth and Certainty.” in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, edited by Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss, pp. 249–284. London: Routledge.
Williams, Michael. 2004i. “Context, Meaning, and Truth.” Philosophical Studies 117(1–2): 107–129.
Williams, Michael. 2005a. “Doing without Immediate Justification.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 394–420. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Williams, Michael. 2005b. “Why Wittgenstein Isn’t a Foundationalist.” in Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, edited by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, pp. 47–58. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Williams, Michael. 2006a. “Science and Sensibility: McDowell and Sellars on Perceptual Experience.” European Journal of Philosophy 14(2): 302–325. Reprinted in Lindgaard (2008, 152–175).
Williams, Michael. 2006b. “Realism: What’s Left?” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 77–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2007a. “Meaning, Truth and Normativity.” in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, pp. 377–395. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. London: Routledge.
Williams, Michael. 2007b. “Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism.” Episteme 4(1): 93–114.
Williams, Michael. 2007c. “Naturalism, Realism and Pragmatism.” Philosophic Exchange 37: 57–71.
Williams, Michael. 2008. “Hume’s Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 80–107. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2009. “The Tortoise and the Serpent: Sellars on the Structure of Empirical Knowledge.” in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism. Essays on Wilfrid Sellars, edited by Willem A. de Vries, pp. 147–186. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2010a. “Descartes’ Transformation of the Sceptical Tradition.” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, edited by Richard Bett, pp. 288–313. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Michael. 2010b. “Pragmatism, Minimalism, Expressivism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18(3): 317–330.
Williams, Michael. 2012a. “Wright Against the Sceptics.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 352–375. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2012b. “External World Skepticism and the Structure of Epistemic Entitlement.” in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong, pp. 43–61. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2013a. “Knowledge, Ascriptivism and Defeasible Concepts.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 87: 9–36. “Defeasibility in Philosophy. Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law,” ed. by Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen and Marcus Willaschek.
Williams, Michael. 2013b. “How Pragmatists Can Be Local Expressivists.” in Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism, pp. 128–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Michael. 2014. “Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes: Sellars and Skepticism.” in Varieties of Skepticism. Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, edited by James Conant and Andrea Kern, pp. 59–80. Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research n. 5. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Williams, Michael. 2015a. “Knowledge in Practice.” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 161–185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Williams, Michael. 2015b. “What’s so Special About Human Knowledge?” Episteme 12(2): 249–268.
Williams, Michael. 2016. “Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 3–21. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Williams, Michael. 2021. “No Shadow of a Doubt.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45: Doubt, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 179–208. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp2021111220.
Further References
Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C., eds. 2005. Deflationary Truth. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Cottingham, John G., ed. 1998. Descartes. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, Fred I. 2000. “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 591–606.
Fogelin, Robert J. 2000. “Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for Another.” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 43–57. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lindgaard, Jakob, ed. 2008. John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature. European Journal of Philosophy Book Series. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444306736.
Loeb, Louis E. 2002. Stability, and Justification in Hume’s Treatise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195146581.001.0001.