Katalin Farkas (farkas-k)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Budek, Tomasz and Farkas, Katalin. 2014. “Which Causes of an Experience Are Also Objects of the Experience?” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 351–370. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Crane, Tim and Farkas, Katalin, eds. 2004. Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Farkas, Katalin. 2003a. “Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake?” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3(2): 155–169.
Farkas, Katalin. 2003b. “What is Externalism?” Philosophical Studies 112(3): 187–208.
Farkas, Katalin. 2005. “The Unity of Descartes’s Thought.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 22(1): 17–30.
Farkas, Katalin. 2006a. “Indiscriminality and the Sameness of Appearance.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 205–225.
Farkas, Katalin. 2006b. “Semantic Internalism and Externalism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 323–340. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Farkas, Katalin. 2008a. The Subject’s Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.001.0001.
Farkas, Katalin. 2008b. “Time, Tense, Truth.” Synthese 160(2): 269–284.
Farkas, Katalin. 2008c. “Phenomenal Intentionality without Compromise.” The Monist 91(2): 273–293.
Farkas, Katalin. 2009. “Not Every Feeling is Intentional.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5(2): 39–52.
Farkas, Katalin. 2012. “Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis.” Philosophia 40(3): 435–447.
Farkas, Katalin. 2013a. “Constructing a World for the Senses.” in Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 99–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001.
Farkas, Katalin. 2013b. “A Sense of Reality.” in Hallucination. Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias, pp. 399–416. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.001.0001.
Farkas, Katalin. 2015. “Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.” Erkenntnis 80(1): 185–200.
Farkas, Katalin. 2016. “Know-Wh Does Not Reduce to Know-That.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(2): 109–122.
Farkas, Katalin. 2018. “Know-How and Non-Propositional Intentionality.” in Non-Propositional Intentionality, edited by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague, pp. 95–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.
Farkas, Katalin. 2019. “Extended Mental Features.” in Andy Clark and His Critics, edited by Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvinie, and Mog Stapleton, pp. 44–55. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190662813.001.0001.