Tim Crane (crane-t)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Árnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll and Crane, Tim. 2013. “There is no Exclusion Problem.” in Mental Causation and Ontology, edited by Sophie C. Gibb, Edward Jonathan Lowe, and Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson, pp. 248–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 1990a. “An Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions.” Analysis 50: 224–230.
Crane, Tim. 1990b. “The Language of Thought: No Syntax without Semantics.” Mind and Language 5: 187–213.
Crane, Tim. 1991a. “All God Has to Do.” Analysis 51: 235–244.
Crane, Tim. 1991b. “All the Difference in the World.” The Philosophical Quarterly 41(162): 1–25.
Crane, Tim. 1991c. “Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience.” Analysis 51: 32–37.
Crane, Tim, ed. 1992a. The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 1992b. “Mental Causation and Mental Reality.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 185–202.
Crane, Tim. 1992c. “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.” in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, edited by Tim Crane, pp. 136–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 1992d. “Introduction.” in The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, edited by Tim Crane, pp. 1–17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 1993. “A Definition of Physicalism: Reply to Pettit (1993).” Analysis 53: 224–227.
Crane, Tim. 1995a. The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation. 1st ed. London: Penguin Classics.
Crane, Tim. 1995b. “The mental causation debate.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 69: 211–236.
Crane, Tim. 1997. “Reply to Child (1997).” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 103–108.
Crane, Tim. 1998a. “Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental.” in Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 229–252. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 1998b. “How to Define your (Mental) Terms.” Inquiry 41(3): 341–354.
Crane, Tim. 1998c. “The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist Theory.” in Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, edited by Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers, pp. 199–224. Philosophical Studies Series n. 77. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Crane, Tim. 1998d. “Analytic Theories of A Priori Knowledge.” in The Logica Yearbook 1997, edited by Timothy Childers, pp. 89–97. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
Crane, Tim. 2000a. “Review of Bermúdez (1998).” The Philosophical Review 109(4): 624–627.
Crane, Tim. 2000b. “Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 49–68.
Crane, Tim. 2000c. “The Origins of Qualia.” in History of the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson, pp. 169–194. Studies in the History of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2001a. Elements of Mind, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2001b. “The Significance of Emergence.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 207–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2001c.“Jacob (1997) on Mental Causation.” Acta Analytica 16(26): 15–22.
Crane, Tim. 2001d. “Intentional Objects.” Ratio 14(4): 336–349.
Crane, Tim. 2003a. The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2003b. “Subjective Facts.” in Real Metaphysics – Essays in honour of D.H. Mellor, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, pp. 68–83. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 15. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2003c. “Mental Substances.” in Minds and Persons, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 229–250. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2003d. “The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 33–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2004. “Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4(2): 223–240.
Crane, Tim. 2005a. “Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts [on Papineau (2004)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 155–162.
Crane, Tim. 2005b. “The Problem of Perception.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/perception-problem/.
Crane, Tim. 2006a. “Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence.” in The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Mark Textor, pp. 20–35. London Studies in the History of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2006b. “Is there a Perceptual Relation?” in Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 126–146. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2007a. “Wine as an Aesthetic Object.” in Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine, edited by Barry C. Smith, pp. 141–156. Oxford: Signal Books.
Crane, Tim. 2007b. “Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: the Challenge of the Explanatory Gap.” in Explaining the Mental. Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes, edited by Carlo Penco, Michael Beaney, and Massimiliano Vignolo, pp. 192–206. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Reprinted in Macdonald and Macdonald (2010, 22–34).
Crane, Tim. 2008a. “Causation and Determinable Properties: On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size.” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 176–195. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2008b. “Reply to Nes (2008).” Analysis 68(3): 215–218.
Crane, Tim. 2008c.“Sainsbury (2009) on Thinking about an Object.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 40(120): 85–95.
Crane, Tim. 2009a. “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(236): 452–469. Reprinted in Hawley and Macpherson (2011, 83–100).
Crane, Tim. 2009b. “Intentionalism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 474–493. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2011a. “Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Mental Representation.” in Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, edited by Anne Reboul. Genève: Département de philosophie, Université de Genève. Book publication: Reboul (2014), http://kevin.philosophie.ch.
Crane, Tim. 2011b. “The Singularity of Singular Thought.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 21–43.
Crane, Tim. 2011c. “The Problem of Perception.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/perception-problem/.
Crane, Tim. 2012a. “Existence and Quantification Reconsidered.” in Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, edited by Tuomas E. Tahko, pp. 44–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2012b. “What is the Problem of Non-Existence?” Philosophia 40(3): 417–434.
Crane, Tim. 2012c. “Philosophy, Logic, Science, History.” Metaphilosophy 43(1–2): 20–37.
Crane, Tim. 2012d. “Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness [on Tye (2009)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1): 190–198.
Crane, Tim. 2013a. The Objects of Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682744.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2013b. “Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.” in Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 156–173. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2013c. “Philosophie, Logik, Naturwissenschaft, Geschichte.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61(1): 3–19.
Crane, Tim. 2013d. “Human Uniqueness and the Pursuit of Knowledge: A Naturalistic Account.” in Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications, edited by Bana Bashour and Hans D. Muller, pp. 139–154. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 13. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2013e. “The Given.” in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World. The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, edited by Joseph K. Schear, pp. 229–249. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2014. Aspects of Psychologism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2015a. “The Mental States of Persons and their Brains.” in Mind, Self and Person, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 253–270. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2015b. “Understanding the Question: Philosophy and Its History.” in Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method, edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins, pp. 72–84. London: Routledge. Reprinted in Schumann (2019, 72–84), doi:10.4324/9781315714196.
Crane, Tim. 2017a. The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2017b. “Brentano on Intentionality.” in The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 41–48. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim. 2017c. “The Unity of Unconsciousness.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(1): 1–21. Reprinted in Shottenkirk, Curado and Gouveia (2019, 209–226).
Crane, Tim and Farkas, Katalin, eds. 2004. Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crane, Tim and French, Craig. 2015. “The Problem of Perception.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/perception-problem/.
Crane, Tim and French, Craig. 2021. “The Problem of Perception.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/perception-problem/.
Crane, Tim and O’Hear, Anthony, eds. 2022. The Philosophy of Mind. Talking Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781009105262.
Crane, Tim and Patterson, Sarah, eds. 2000a. History of the Mind-Body Problem. Studies in the History of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Crane, Tim and Patterson, Sarah. 2000b. “Introduction.” in History of the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson, pp. 1–12. Studies in the History of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh and Crane, Tim. 1990. “There is No Question of Physicalism.” Mind 99: 185–206. Reprinted in Mellor (1991, 82–102).
Mellor, David Hugh and Crane, Tim. 1995. “Postscript to Mellor and Crane (1990).” in Contemporary Materialism. A Reader, edited by Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout, pp. 90–95. London: Routledge.

Further References

Bermúdez, José-Luis. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Child, William. 1997. “Crane on Mental Causation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 97–102.
Hawley, Katherine and Macpherson, Fiona. 2011. The Admissible Contents of Experience. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444343915.
Jacob, Pierre. 1997. What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-intentional World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F., eds. 2010. Emergence in Mind. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1991. Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nes, Anders. 2008. “Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional?” Analysis 68(3): 205–215.
Papineau, David. 2004. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001.
Pettit, Philip. 1993. “A Definition of Physicalism.” Analysis 53: 213–223.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark. 1988. Paradoxes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark. 2009. Paradoxes. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First edition: Sainsbury (1988).
Schumann, Gunnar, ed. 2019. Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. Causal and Teleological Approaches. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429506048.
Shottenkirk, Dena, Curado, Manuel and Gouveia, Steven S., eds. 2019. Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429462658.
Tye, Michael. 2009. Consciousness Revisited. Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001.