Neil Feit (feit)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Feit, Neil. 1996. “On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz’s Law.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 381–386.
Feit, Neil. 2001a. “The Structure of Higher Goods.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 39: 47–57. Reprinted in Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005, 281–290).
Feit, Neil. 2001b. “Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 29–55.
Feit, Neil. 2003. “Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions.” Philosophical Studies 115(2): 99–122.
Feit, Neil. 2006. “The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience.” Philosophical Studies 131(2): 447–457.
Feit, Neil. 2008. Belief About the Self. A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001.
Feit, Neil. 2012. “Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness.” in Consciousness and Subjectivity, edited by Sofia Miguens and Gerhard Preyer, pp. 213–230. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 47. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Feit, Neil. 2023. Bad Things: The Nature and Normative Role of Harm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197660447.001.0001.
Feit, Neil and Cullison, Andrew. 2011. “When does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 283–304.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, Howard-Snyder, Frances and Feit, Neil. 2003. “Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(2): 304–327.

Further References

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael J., eds. 2005. Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy n. 17. Berlin: Springer.