Gail Fine (fine-g)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Fine, Gail. 1977. “Plato on Naming.” The Philosophical Quarterly 27(109): 289–301.
Fine, Gail. 1978. “Knowledge and Belief in Republic V.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60(2): 121–139.
Fine, Gail. 1979. “False Belief in the Theaetetus.” Phronesis 24(1): 70–80.
Fine, Gail. 1980. “The One Over Many.” The Philosophical Review 89: 197–240.
Fine, Gail. 1981. “Armstrong on Relational and Nonrelational Realism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62: 262–271.
Fine, Gail. 1982. “Aristotle and the More Accurate Arguments.” in Language and Logos: Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G.E.L. Owen, edited by Malcolm Schofield and Martha Craven Nussbaum, pp. 155–178. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1983. “Relational Entities.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65(3): 225–249.
Fine, Gail. 1984a. “Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione 9.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1(1): 23–47.
Fine, Gail. 1984b. “Separation.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 2, edited by Julia Annas, pp. 31–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1985. “Separation: A Reply to Morrison (1985).” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 3, edited by Julia Annas, pp. 159–165. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1986. “Immanence.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 4, edited by Michael J. Woods, pp. 71–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A Festschrift for J.L. Ackrill.
Fine, Gail. 1987. “Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle.” in Mathematik und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles / Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Akten des X. Symposium Aristotelicum, Sigriswil, 6.-12. September 1984, edited by Andreas Graeser, pp. 69–112. Bern: Paul Haupt Verlag.
Fine, Gail. 1988a. “The Object of Thought Argument: Forms and Thoughts.” Apeiron 21(3): 105–145.
Fine, Gail. 1988b. “Plato on Perception: A Reply to Turnbull (1988).” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume supplementary volume, edited by Julia Annas and Robert H. Grimm, pp. 15–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1989. “Commentary on Sedley (1989).” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5: 384–398.
Fine, Gail. 1990. “Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII.” in Epistemology, edited by Stephen Everson, pp. 85–115. Companions to Ancient Thought n. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1991. “Piecemeal Realism.” Philosophical Studies 61: 79–96.
Fine, Gail. 1992. “Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato.” in Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues, edited by James C. Klagge and Nicholas D. Smith, pp. 13–41. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supplementary volume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1993a. On Ideas. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198235496.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 1993b. “Inquiry in the Meno.” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut, pp. 200–226. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1993c. “Vlastos on Socratic and Platonic Forms.” Apeiron 26(3–4): 67–83.
Fine, Gail. 1994. “Protagorean Relativisms.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 10: 211–243.
Fine, Gail. 1996a. “Conflicting Appearances: Theatetus 153d–154b.” in Form and Argument in Late Plato, edited by Christopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabe, pp. 105–134. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1996b. “Scepticism, Existence, and Belief: A Discussion of Hankinson (1995).” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 14, edited by C. C. W. Taylor, pp. 273–290. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 1998. “Relativism and Self-Refutation: Plato, Protagoras, and Burnyeat.” in Method in Ancient Philosophy, pp. 137–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail, ed. 1999a. Plato I. Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail, ed. 1999b. Plato II. Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2000. “Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage ?” The Philosophical Review 109(2): 195–234.
Fine, Gail. 2003a. Plato on Knowledge and Forms. Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2003b. “Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes.” in Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Jon A. Miller and Brad Inwood, pp. 192–231. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2003c. “Sextus and External World Scepticism.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 24, edited by David Sedley, pp. 341–385. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2004a. “Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 27, edited by David Sedley, pp. 41–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2004b. “The Subjective Appearance of Cyrenaic Pathē.” in Socrates: 2400 Years since his Death, edited by Vassilis Karasmanis, pp. 383–394. Delphi: European Cultural Center of Delphi.
Fine, Gail. 2007. “Enquiry and Discovery: A Discussion of Scott (2005).” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 32, edited by David Sedley, pp. 331–367. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail, ed. 2008a. The Oxford Handbook of Plato. 1st ed. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195182903.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 2008b. “Does Socrates Claim to Know that He Knows Nothing?” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 35, edited by Brad Inwood, pp. 49–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Gail. 2010a. “Aristotle’s Two Worlds: Knowledge and Belief in Posterior Analytics 1.33.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110(3): 323–346.
Fine, Gail. 2010b. “Sceptical Enquiry.” in Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by David Charles, pp. 493–526. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564453.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 2010c. “Aristotle and the aporēma of the Meno.” in Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato, edited by Verity Harte, Mary Margaret McCabe, Robert W. Sharples, and Anne D. R. Sheppard. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement n. 107. London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London.
Fine, Gail. 2011. “Concepts and Inquiry: Sextus and the Epicureans.” in Episteme, etc. Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes, edited by Benjamin Morison and Katerina Ierodiakonou, pp. 90–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 2014. The Possibility of Inquiry. Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577392.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 2016. “The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24(4): 557–572.
Fine, Gail. 2017. “Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184-186 and the Phaedo.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 53, edited by Victor Caston, pp. 65–110. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815655.001.0001.
Fine, Gail, ed. 2019a. The Oxford Handbook of Plato. 2nd ed. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190639730.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 2019b. “Introduction.” in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, edited by Gail Fine, 2nd ed., pp. 1–40. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190639730.001.0001.
Fine, Gail. 2021. Essays in Ancient Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746768.001.0001.

Further References

Hankinson, R. James. 1995. The Sceptics. The Arguments of the Philosophers. London: Routledge.
Morrison, Donald R. 1985. “Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 3, edited by Julia Annas, pp. 125–157. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, Dominic. 2005. Plato’s Meno. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sedley, David. 1989. “Teleology and Myth in the Phaedo.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5: 359–383.
Turnbull, Robert G. 1988. “Becoming and Intelligibility.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume supplementary volume, edited by Julia Annas and Robert H. Grimm, pp. 1–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.