Graeme [R.] Forbes (forbes-g)
My contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1980a. “Relative Identity and Anti-Essentialism.”
in Proceedings of the 4th International
Wittgenstein Symposium: Language, Logic, and Philosophy,
edited by Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang
Grassl, pp. 490–492. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 4. Wien:
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1980b. “Origin and Identity.” Philosophical
Studies 37(4): 353–362.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1981a. “On the Philosophical Basis of Essentialist
Theories.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic
10(1): 73–99.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1981b. “An Anti-Essentialist Note on Substances.”
Analysis 41(1): 32–37.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1981c. “Conditional Obligation and
Counterfactuals.” The Journal of Philosophical
Logic 10(1): 73–99.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1981d. “Review of Brody (1980).” The
Philosophical Quarterly 31(125): 368–369.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1982.
“Canonical Counterpart Theory.”
Analysis 42: 33–37.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1983a. “Thisness and Vagueness.” Synthese
54: 235–259.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1983b. “Actuality and Context Dependence.”
Analysis 43(3): 123–128.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1983c. “More on Counterpart Theory.”
Analysis 43(3): 149–152.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1983d. “Wiggins on Sets and Essence.” Mind
92(365): 114–119.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1983e. “Physicalism, Instrumentalism and the Semantics of Modal
Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 12(3):
271–298.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1984a. “Two Solutions to Chisholm’s Paradox.”
Philosophical Studies 46(2): 171–187.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1984b. “Nozick on Scepticism.” The
Philosophical Quarterly 34(134): 43–52.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1984c. “Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge.”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84: 223–237.
Reprinted in Miller and Wright (2002,
16–27).
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1985a. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1985b. “Response to Mazoue and Brueckner.” The
Philosophical Quarterly 35(139): 196–198.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1985c. “Review of Lewis (1983).” The
Philosophical Review 94(1): 108–111.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1986a. “Truth, Correspondence and Redundancy.” in
Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays On
A.J. Ayer’s “Language, Truth, and
Logic” , edited by Graham F. Macdonald and Crispin Wright, pp. 27–54. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1986b. “In Defense of Absolute Essentialism.” in
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in
Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 3–31. Minneapolis, Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1986c. “Review of Lewis (1986).” The
Times Literary Supplement 31611: 797–798.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1986d. “Response to Garrett (1986).”
Philosophical Books 27(2): 72–77.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1987a. “Free and Classical Counterparts: Response to Lewis
(1986).” Analysis 47: 147–152.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1987b. “Is there a Problem about Persistence?”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
61: 137–155.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1987c. “Indexicals and Intensionality: a Fregean
Perspective.” The Philosophical Review 96(1):
1–31.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1987d.
“A Dichotomy Sustained.” Philosophical
Studies 51: 187–211.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1987e. “Places as Possibilities of Location.”
Noûs 21: 295–318.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1988. “The Plurality of Worlds (Critical Study of Lewis
(1986)).” The Philosophical Quarterly
38(151): 222–240.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1989a. Languages of Possibility: An Essay in Philosophical
Logic. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1989b.
“Indexicals.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV:
Topics in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, pp. 463–490. Synthese
Library n. 167. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Reprinted in revised form as Forbes (2003b), doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1989c. “Cognitive Architecture and the Semantics of
Belief.” in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 14: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language
II, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 84–100. Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1989d. “Biosemantics and the Normative Properties of
Thought.” in Philosophical
Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited
by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 533–547.
Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1989e. “Critical Study of Stalnaker (1984).”
Synthese 79: 171–189.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1990a. “The Indispensibility of Sinn.”
The Philosophical Review 99(4): 535–563.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1990b. “Counterparts, Logic and Metaphysics: Reply to Ramachandran
(1989).” Analysis 50: 167–173.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1991a.
“Artefacts.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited
by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica:
Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language
n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1991b.
“Kripke, Saul A.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited
by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica:
Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language
n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1991c.
“Modal Logic.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited
by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica:
Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language
n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1991d. “States of Affairs, Bedeutung and the contingent
a priori.” in New
Enquiries into Meaning and Truth, edited by Neil Cooper and Pascal Engel, pp. 111–133. Hempel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf. Papers from the Conference on Formal Semantics held at
the University of Grenoble II in Sept. 1987.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1992a. “Worlds and States of Affairs: How Fine-Grained Can They
Be?” in Language, Truth and
Ontology, edited by Kevin Mulligan, pp. 118–132. Philosophical
Studies Series n. 51. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1992b. “Melia on Modalism.” Philosophical
Studies 68: 57–63.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1993a. “Solving the Iteration Problem.”
Linguistics and Philosophy 16(3): 311–330.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1993b. “Time, Events, and Modality.” in The Philosophy of Time, edited by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray Macbeath, pp. 80–95. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1993c. “Reply to Marks.” Philosophical
Studies 69(2–3): 281–295.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1993d.
“ ‘…’ But \(a\) Was Arbitrary.”
Philosophical Topics 21(2): 21–34.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1994a.
Modern Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1994b. “Donnellan on a Puzzle About Belief.”
Philosophical Studies 73: 169–180.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1994c. “Comparatives in Counterpart Theory: Another
Approach.” Analysis 54: 37–42.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1994d. “A New Riddle of Existence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and
Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 415–430. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1995a. “Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat
Revisited.” The Journal of Philosophy 92:
205–222.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1995b. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1996a. “Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying
In.” The Philosophical Review 105(3): 337–372,
doi:10.2307/2185704.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1996b. “Logic, Logical Form, and the Open Future.”
in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics,
edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 73–92.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1997a. “How much Substitutivity?” Analysis
57(2): 109–113.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1997b. “Externalism and Scientific Cartesianism.”
Mind and Language 12: 196–205.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1997c.
“Essentialism.” in A
Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 515–533. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017,
881–896).
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1997d. “Belief Reports and Speech Reports.” in
Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Proposition
Attitudes, edited by Wolfgang Künne, Albert Newman, and Martin Anduschus, pp. 313–331. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1999a.
Modern Logic. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1999b. “Enlightened Semantics for Simple
Sentences.” Analysis 59: 86–91.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2000a. “Prior on Logic, Language, and the World.”
Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical
Review 39: 579–583.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2000b.
“Objectual Attitudes.” Linguistics and
Philosophy 23(2): 141–183.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2000c. “The Logic of Intensional Transitives: Some
Questions.” Unpublished manuscript, Tulane
University.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2000d. “Intensional Transitive Verbs: The Limitations of a
Clausal Analysis.” Unpublished manuscript, Tulane
University.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2001.
“Essentialism Reconsidered.” in Proceedings of the 22nd International Wittgenstein
Symposium: Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age, edited
by Uwe Meixner and Peter M. Simons, pp. 119–129. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 28. Wien:
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2002a. “Origins and Identities.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic
Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 319–340. Topoi
Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2002b.
“Intensionality.” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 76: 75–99.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2003a. “Meaning-Postulates, Inference, and the
Relational/Notional Ambiguity.” Facta
Philosophica 5(1): 91–115.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2003b.
“Indexicals.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume X,
edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 87–120. Dordrecht:
Springer. First publication as Forbes (1989a).
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2004a.
“Intensional Transitive Verbs.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2004b. “Depiction Verbs and the Definiteness
Effect.” in The Logica Yearbook
2003, edited by Libor Běhounek, pp. 11–20. Praha:
Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického
ústavu AV ČR.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2006. Attitude Problems. An Essay on Linguistic
Intensionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199274949.001.0001.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2008. “Critical Notice of Fine (2005).” The
Philosophical Review 117(2): 275–287.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2010a. “Identity and the Facts of the Matter.” in
Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its
Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 419–437. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2010b. “Critical Notice of Zimmerman (2010).”
Analysis 70(3): 571–577.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2010c.
“Intensional Transitive Verbs.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2011a. “The Problem of Factives for Sense
Theories.” Analysis 71(4): 654–662.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2011b. “Context-Dependence and the Sorites.” in
Vagueness in Communication. International
Workshop, ViC 2009, held as part of ESSLLI 2009, Bordeaux, France, July
2009. Revised Selected Papers, edited by Rick W. F. Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland, and Hans-Christian Schmitz, pp. 91–107. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence n. 6517.
Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18446-8.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2012. “On some Examples of Chomsky’s.” in
Prospects for Meaning, edited by
Richard Schantz, pp. 121–142. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3.
Berlin: de Gruyter.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2018. “Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.”
in Non-Propositional Intentionality, edited by
Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague, pp. 114–133. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2020a. “Fine’s New Semantics of Vagueness.” in
Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality. Themes from
the Work of Kit Fine, edited by Mircea Dumitru, pp. 164–181. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199652624.001.0001.
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2020b.
“Intensional Transitive Verbs.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/.
Further References
Brody, Baruch A. 1980. Identity and Essence. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Fine, Kit. 2005. Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199278709.001.0001.
Garrett, Brian John. 1986. “Possible Worlds and Identity [review of Forbes
(1985a)].” Philosophical Books 27(2):
65–72.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1997. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language.
Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Hale, Wright and Miller
(2017).
Hale, Bob, Wright, Crispin and Miller, Alexander, eds. 2017. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language.
2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy.
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997),
doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
Lewis, David. 1983.
Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001.
Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Miller, Alexander and Wright, Crispin, eds. 2002. Rule-Following and Meaning. London:
Routledge.
Ramachandran, Murali. 1989. “An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart
Theory.” Analysis 49: 131–141.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1984.
Inquiry. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
MIT Press.
Zimmerman, Dean W., ed. 2010. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. vol. V. New
York: Oxford University Press.