Robert C. Stalnaker (stalnaker-rc)
Mentioned on the following portal pages
Naturalismus und menschliche NaturCited in the following articles
The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory, Lying, Tell-Tale Signs, and Intending to Deceive, Gruesome Counterfactuals, Assumptions, Hypotheses, and AntecedentsContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Block, Ned and Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999. “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.” The Philosophical Review 108(1): 1–46.
Byrne, Alex, Stalnaker, Robert C. and Wedgwood, Ralph, eds. 2001. Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysic for Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harper, William L., Stalnaker, Robert C. and Pearce, Glenn, eds. 1981. Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 15. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1967. “Events, Periods and Institutions in Historian’s Language.” History and Theory 6: 159–179.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1968. “A Theory of Conditionals.” in Studies in Logical Theory, edited by Nicholas Rescher, pp. 98–112. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series n. 2. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce (1981, 41–56), doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_2.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1969. “Wallace on Propositional Attitudes.” The Journal of Philosophy 66: 803–806.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1970a. “Pragmatics.” Synthese 22(1–2): 272–289. Reprinted in Davidson and Harman (1972, 380–397) and in Stalnaker (1999a, 31–46).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1970b. “Notes on ‘A Semantic Theory of Adverbs’ .” Unpublished manuscript, Yale University.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1970c. “Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.” Philosophy of Science 37(1): 64–80. Reprinted in Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce (1981, 107–128).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1971. “Acceptance Concepts.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois at Urbana.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1972. “Review of Hintikka (1969).” The Journal of Philosophy 69(15): 456–460.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1973a. “Presuppositions.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 2(4): 447–457. Reprinted in Hockney, Harper and Freed (1975, 31–41).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1973b. “Some Structural Analogies Between Tenses and Pronouns in English.” The Journal of Philosophy 70(18): 601–609.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1974. “Pragmatic Presuppositions.” in Semantics and Philosophy, edited by Milton K. Munitz and Peter Unger. New York: New York University Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 47–62).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1975. “Indicative Conditionals.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 5(3): 269–286, doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_9.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1976a. “Possible Worlds.” Noûs 10: 65–75. Reprinted in Loux (1979, 225–234), in a revised form as chapter 3 of Stalnaker (1984) and in Stalnaker (2003a, 26–39).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1976b. “Propositions.” in Issues in the Philosophy of Language: Proceedings of the 1972 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, edited by Alfred F. MacKay and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 79–91. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Reprinted in Garfield and Kiteley (1991, 467–477).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1976c. “Letter to W.L. Harper.” in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume 1. Foundations and Philosophy of Epistemic Applications of Probability Theory, edited by William L. Harper and Clifford A. Hooker, pp. 113–116. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 6a. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1977. “Complex Predicates.” The Monist 60(3): 327–339.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1978. “Assertion.” in Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics, edited by Peter Cole, pp. 315–332. New York: Academic Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 78–95).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1979. “Anti-Essentialism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: Studies in Metaphysics, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 343–355. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 71–85)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1980. “Logical Semiotic.” in Modern Logic. A Survey: Historical, Philosophical and Mathematical Aspects of Modern Logic, edited by Evandro Agazzi, pp. 439–456. Synthese Library n. 149. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1981a. “Indexical Belief.” Synthese 49(1): 129–151. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 130–149).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1981b. “A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.” in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, edited by William L. Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, pp. 87–104. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 15. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1981c. “Letter to David Lewis.” in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, edited by William L. Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce, pp. 151–152. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 15. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1985. “An Autoepistemic Language Game.” Unpublished manuscript, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1986a. “Possible Worlds and Situations.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 15(1): 109–123.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1986b. “Counterparts and Identity.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 121–140. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 111–132).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1986c. “Replies to Schiffer (1986) and Field (1986).” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67(2): 113–123.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1987. “Semantics for Belief.” Philosophical Topics 15(1): 177–190. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 117–129).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1988a. “Belief Attribution and Context.” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 140–155. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 150–166).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1988b. “Vague Identity.” in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example, edited by David F. Austin, pp. 249–360. Philosophical Studies Series n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 133–143)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1988c. “Critical Notice of Lewis (1986).” Mind 97: 117–128.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1989. “On What’s in the Head.” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 287–316. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 169–193).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1990a. “Narrow Content.” in Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, edited by Curtis Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, pp. 131–146. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 20. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 194–209).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1990b. “Mental Content and Linguistic Form.” Philosophical Studies 58: 129–146. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 225–240).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1990c. “Semantics for Conditionals.” in TARK 1990. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference, edited by Rohit Parikh, pp. 137–138. San Francisco, California: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. This is an abstract for a tutorial session.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1991a. “How to Do Semantics for the Language of Thought.” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. 229–238. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1991b. “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I.” Synthese 85: 425–440. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 241–254).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1992a. “Notes on Conditional Semantics.” in TARK 1992. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference, edited by Yoram Moses, pp. 316–327. San Francisco, California: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1992b. “Critical Notice of Sanford (1989).” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33: 291–297.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1993a. “Twin Earth Revisited.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 297–311. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 210–222).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1993b. “A Note on Non-Monotonic Modal Logic.” Artificial Intelligence 64(2): 183–196. Widely circulated in manuscript form, 1980 to 1992.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1993c. “Narrow Context.” Unpublished manuscript, Philosophy Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1993d. “What is the Representational Theory of Thinking? A Comment on William G. Lycan.” Mind and Language 8: 423–430.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1994a. “On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts.” Theory and Decision 37: 49–73. Reprinted in Bacharach et al. (1997, 345–361).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1994b. “Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.” in Proceedings of the Second Castiglioncello Conference, edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1994c. “What is a Non-Monotonic Consequence Relation?” Fundamenta Informaticae 21: 7–21.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1994d. “Letter to Brian Skyrms.” in Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision, edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms, pp. 27–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1995a. “Modality and Possible Worlds.” in A Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, 1st ed., pp. 45–55. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Page references are to the second edition.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1995b. “The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity.” in Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, and Nicholas Asher, pp. 12–28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 144–161)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1996a. “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be.” in Benacerraf and His Critics, edited by Adam Morton and Stephen P. Stich, pp. 103–118. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 40–54)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1996b. “Impossibilities.” Philosophical Topics 24(1): 193–204. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 55–67)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1996c. “Varieties of Supervenience.” in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 221–241. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 86–108)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1996d. “Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.” Economics and Philosophy 12(2): 133–162.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1996e. “On a Defence of the Hegemony of Representation [on Lycan (1996)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 101–108. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1997. “Reference and Necessity.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 534–554. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 165–187) and in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017, 902–919).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1998a. “On the Representation of Context.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 7(1): 3–19. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a, 96–114).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1998b. “Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction.” Mathematical Social Sciences 36: 31–56.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1998c. “What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 339–352. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1998d. “Replies to Comments [Neale (1998), Acero (1998), Gómez-Torrente (1998), Piñeda (1998)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 389–395. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1998e. “Los nombres y la referencia: semántica y metasemántica.” Teorema 17(1): 7–19.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999a. Context and Content: Essays on Intensionality, Speech and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198237073.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999b. “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, II.” in Context and Content: Essays on Intensionality, Speech and Thought, pp. 255–273. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198237073.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999c. “Extensive and Strategic Forms: Games and Models for Games.” Research in Economics 53: 293–319.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999d. “Introduction.” in Context and Content: Essays on Intensionality, Speech and Thought, pp. 1–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198237073.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999e. “Comparing Qualia Across Persons.” Philosophical Topics 26(1–2): 385–405. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 219–238)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2000. “On Moore’s Paradox.” in Believing and Accepting, edited by Pascal Engel, pp. 93–100. Philosophical Studies Series n. 83. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2001a. “On Considering a Possible World as Actual.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 75: 141–156. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 188–200)].
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2001b. “Metaphysics without Conceptual Analysis [on Jackson (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 631–636.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2001d. “David Lewis (1941– ).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 478–488. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2002a. “What is it like to be a Zombie?” in Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 385–400. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003a, 239–252)], doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2002b. “Common Ground.” Linguistics and Philosophy 25(4–5): 701–721, doi:10.1023/a:1020867916902.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2002c. “Epistemic Consequentialism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 76: 153–168.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003a. Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003b. “Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity.” in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, pp. 201–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003c. “On Thomas Nagel’s Objective Self.” in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, pp. 253–273. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003d. “Introduction.” in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, pp. 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2004a. “Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics.” Philosophical Studies 118(1–2): 299–322. Reprinted in Garcı́a-Carpintero and Macià (2006, 293–309).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2004b. “Lewis on Intentionality.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 199–212. Reprinted in Jackson and Priest (2004, 231–244).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2004c. “Message to Harold Hodes.” Unpublished message to Harold Hodes, April 20, 2004.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2004d. “Comments on Schaffer (2004).” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 105–117.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2005. “On What There Isn’t (But Might Have Been).” Unpublished manuscript of a talk at the MITing of Minds 2005, January 20-21, 2005, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2006a. “Responses.” in Content and Modality. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, edited by Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, pp. 251–295. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2006b. “On Logics of Knowledge and Belief.” Philosophical Studies 128(1): 169–199.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2007a. “Précis of Stalnaker (2003a).” Philosophical Studies 133(3): 439–441.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2007b. “Responses [to King (2007), Nelson (2007) and Lycan (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 133(3): 481–491.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2007c. “Critical Notice of Soames (2005).” The Philosophical Review 116(2): 251–266.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2008a. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2008b. “A Response to Abbott on Presupposition and Common Ground [on Abbott (2008)].” Linguistics and Philosophy 31(5): 539–544.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2009a. “On Hawthorne and Magidor (2009) on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.” Mind 118(470): 399–409.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2009b. “What is De Re Belief?” in The Philosophy of David Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi, pp. 233–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2009c. “Another Attempt to Put Sleeping Beauty to Rest.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(suppl. 1): 25–39.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2010a. “Merely Possible Propositions.” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, edited by Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann, pp. 21–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2010b. “The Metaphysical Conception of Analyticity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 507–514.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2010c. “Responses to Stanley (2010) and Schlenker (2010).” Philosophical Studies 151(1): 143–157.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2011a. “Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 227–248. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2011b. “Précis [of Stalnaker (2008a)].” Philosophical Studies 155(3): 433–435.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2011c. “Responses to [Stoljar (2011), Weatherson (2011) and Boghossian (2011)].” Philosophical Studies 155(3): 467–479.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2011d. “Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical Foundations.” in Saul Kripke, edited by Alan Berger, pp. 100–117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2011e. “The Essential Contextual.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 137–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2012. Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691147123.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2014. Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645169.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2015a. “Luminosity and the KK thesis.” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2015b. “Counterfactuals and Humean Reduction.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 411–424. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2016a. “Modeling a Perspective on the World.” in About Oneself. De Se Thought and Communication, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Stephan Torre, pp. 121–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2016b. “Models and Reality.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 709–726. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2017a. “Précis of Stalnaker (2014).” Philosophical Studies 174(6): 1583–1585.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2017b. “Responses [to Green (2017), Szabó (2017) and Camp (2017)].” Philosophical Studies 174(6): 1629–1639.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2018a. “Dynamic Pragmatics, Static Semantics.” in New Work on Speech Acts, edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris, and Matt Moss, pp. 384–399. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198738831.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2018b. “Game Theory and Decision Theory (Causal and Evidential).” in Newcomb’s Problem, edited by Arif Ahmed, pp. 180–200. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316847893.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2019. Knowledge and Conditionals. Essays on the Structure of Inquiry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198810346.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2021. “Counterfactuals and Probability.” in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability. Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, edited by Lee Walters and John Hawthorne, pp. 100–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712732.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2022. Propositions: Ontology and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197647035.001.0001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. and Jeffrey, Richard C. 1994. “Conditionals as Random Variables.” in Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision, edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms, pp. 31–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomason, Richmond H. and Stalnaker, Robert C. 1968b. “Abstraction in First-Order Modal Logic.” Theoria 34: 203–207.
Further References
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Bacharach, Michael O. L., Gérard-Varet, L. A., Mongin, Philippe and Shin, Hyun Song, eds. 1997. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2011. “The Transparency of Mental Content Revisited [on Stalnaker (2008a)].” Philosophical Studies 155(3): 457–465.
Camp, Elisabeth. 2017. “Pragmatic Force in Semantic Context.” Philosophical Studies 174(6): 1617–1627.
Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert H., eds. 1972. Semantics of Natural Language. Synthese Library n. 40. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7.
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