Sanford C. Goldberg (goldberg-sc)

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Bibliography

Goldberg, Sanford C. 1997. “Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument.” Analysis 57: 211–219.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 1999a. “The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.” Synthese 118: 165–201.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 1999b. “The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80: 136–156.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2000. “Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy.” Philosophical Studies 100: 51–79.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2002. “Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agents’ Conceptions?” Noûs 36(4): 597–621.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2003a. “On our Alleged a Priori Knowledge That Water Exists.” Analysis 63(1): 38–41.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2003b. “Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism.” Philosophical Studies 116(1): 57–78.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2005a. “The Dialectical Context of Boghossian’s Memory Argument.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(1).
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2005b. “An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for ‘Empty’ Natural Kind Terms.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 70: 147–168.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2005c. “(Nonstandard) Lessons of World-Switching Cases.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 32(1–4): 93–129.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2006. “Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge.” in The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, pp. 127–144. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C., ed. 2007a. Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2007b. “Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions.” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 235–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2007c. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2008a. “Metaphysical Realism and Thought.” American Philosophical Quarterly 45(2): 149–163.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2008b. “Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 1–36.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2009a. “The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 60–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2009b. “Experts, Semantic and Epistemic.” Noûs 43(4): 581–598.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2009c. “The Social Virtues: Two Accounts.” Acta Analytica 24(4): 237–248.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2009d. “Reliabilism in Philosophy.” Philosophical Studies 142(1): 105–117.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2009e. “On the Epistemic Utility of What is Said.” in Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values. Essays in Honour of Ernie Lepore, edited by Christopher Viger and Robert J. Stainton, pp. 61–78. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 85. Dordrecht: Springer.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2010a. “The Epistemology of Silence.” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 243–261. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2010b. “Comments on Fricker (2007).” Episteme 7(2): 138–150.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2010c. “Assertion, Testimony, and the Epistemic Significance of Speech.” Logos & Episteme 1(1): 59–65.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2011a. “The Metasemantics of Memory [on Bernecker (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(1): 95–107.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2011b. “Self-Knowledge.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 305–315. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2011c. “Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: The Case of Testimony.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 175–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2011d. “The Division of Epistemic Labor.” Episteme 8(1): 112–125.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012a. Relying on Others. An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012b. “A Novel (and Surprising) Argument against Justification Internalism.” Analysis 72(2): 239–243.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012c. “A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism.” Erkenntnis 77(2): 187–196.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012d. “Epistemic Extendedness, Testimony, and the Epistemology of Instrument-Based Belief.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 15(2): 181–197.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012e. “Sensitivity from Others.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 43–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2013a. “Inclusiveness in the Face of Anticipated Disagreement.” Synthese 190(7): 1189–1207.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2013b. “Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.” in Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 277–294. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2013c. “Norms of Trust, De Re Trust, and the Epistemology of Testimony.” in Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011, edited by Christoph Jäger and Winfried Löffler, pp. 229–256. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 19. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110329018.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2013d. “Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 167–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2013e. “Anonymous Assertions.” Episteme 10(2): 135–151.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2013f. “Self-Trust and Extended Trust.” Res Philosophica 90(2): 277–292.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2014a. “Interpersonal Epistemic Entitlements.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 159–183. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2014b. “Does Externalist Epistemology Rationalize Religious Commitment?” in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, edited by Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 279–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2014c. “Assertion and the Ethics of Belief.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 261–283. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2014d. “Reliabilism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 121–141. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Goldberg, Sanford C., ed. 2015a. Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2015b. Assertion. On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732488.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2015c. “Introduction.” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2015d. “Anti-Individualism, Comprehension, and Self-Knowledge.” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107478152.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2015e. “What is the Subject-Matter of the Theory of Epistemic Justification?” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 205–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2015f. “Recent Work on Assertion.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52(4): 365–380.
Goldberg, Sanford C., ed. 2016a. The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2016b. “The Cost of Demon-Proof Justification.” in Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, edited by Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann, pp. 165–182. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2016c. “Introduction: Putnam’s Reflections on the Brain in a Vat.” in The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 1–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2016d. “Mutuality and Assertion.” in The Epistemic Life of Groups. Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael Sean Brady and Miranda Fricker, pp. 11–32. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759645.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2016e. “On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You should Have Had.” Episteme 13(4): 449–470.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2017a. “Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker’s Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 157–170.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2017b. “Should Have Known.” Synthese 194(8): 2863–2894.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2017c. “Social Epistemology and Epistemic Injustice.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., pp. 213–222. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2018a. To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198793670.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2018b. “Reasons and Testimony.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 662–684. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2019a. “Some Notes on the Possibility of Foundationalist Justification.” in Themes from Klein. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification, edited by Branden Fitelson, Rodrigo Martins Borges, and Cherie Braden, pp. 197–212. Synthese Library n. 404. Dordrecht: Springer.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2019b. “Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 267–278. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2019c. “A Normative Account of Epistemic Luck.” in Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology, edited by Lisa Miracchi, pp. 97–109. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12143.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2020a. Conversational Pressure. Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856436.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C., ed. 2020b. The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2020c. “Introduction: Assertion Among the Speech Acts.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. xiii–. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2020d. “Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program.” Episteme 17(3): 364–383.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2020e. “Social Epistemology: Descriptive and Normative.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt, pp. 417–424. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2020f. “Trust and Reliance.” in The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy, edited by Judith Simon, pp. 97–108. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2021. Foundations and Applications of Social Epistemology: Collected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856443.001.0001.
Goldberg, Sanford C. and Henderson, David. 2006. “Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 600–617.
Goldberg, Sanford C. and Pessin, Andrew. 1997. Gray Matters: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Armouk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Khalifa, Kareem and Goldberg, Sanford C. 2022. “Socio-Functional Foundations in Science: The Case of Measurement.” in Philosophical Issues 32: Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Deborah Perron Tollefsen, pp. 382–397. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12218.
O’Connor, Cailin, Goldberg, Sanford C. and Goldman, Alvin I. 2023. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/epistemology-social/.
O’Connor, Cailin, Goldberg, Sanford C. and Goldman, Alvin I. 2024. “Social Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/epistemology-social/.

Further References

Bernecker, Sven. 2009. Memory. A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.001.0001.
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001.