David Henderson (henderson-d)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Fricker, Miranda, Graham, Peter J., Henderson, David, Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding and Wyatt, Jeremy, eds. 2020. The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Goldberg, Sanford C. and Henderson, David. 2006. “Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 600–617.
Henderson, David. 1988. “Wittgenstein’s Descriptivist Approach to Understanding: Is There a Place of Explanation in Interpretive Accounts?” Dialectica 42(2): 105–116.
Henderson, David. 1994. “Conceptual Schemes after Davidson.” in Language, Mind and Epistemology. On Donald Davidson’s Philosophy, edited by Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt, and Alexander Ulfig, pp. 171–198. Synthese Library n. 241. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Henderson, David. 1996. “Simulation Theory versus Theory Theory: A Difference without a Difference in Explanations.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34: 65–93.
Henderson, David. 2007. “Language and Translation.” in Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology, edited by Stephen P. Turner and Mark W. Risjord, pp. 607–638. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 15. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Henderson, David. 2009. “Motivated Contextualism.” Philosophical Studies 142(1): 119–131.
Henderson, David. 2011. “Gate-Keeping Contextualism.” Episteme 8(1): 83–98.
Henderson, David. 2012. “Norms.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Harold Kincaid, pp. 409–435. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392753.001.0001.
Henderson, David. 2013. “Conceptual Schemes.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 300–313. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
Henderson, David. 2017. “Explanation.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Lee McIntyre and Alexander Rosenberg, pp. 101–112. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Henderson, David. 2020a. “Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?” Episteme 17(3): 281–300.
Henderson, David. 2020b. “On the Background of Social Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt, pp. 3–9. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Henderson, David. 2020c. “Overview: On Science and Social Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt, pp. 211–219. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Henderson, David and Graham, Peter J. 2020. “Epistemic Norms as Social Norms.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt, pp. 425–436. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Henderson, David and Greco, John, eds. 2015a. Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Greco, John. 2015b. “Introduction: The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation.” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 1–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2001a. “Practicing Safe Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 102(3): 227–258.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2001b. “The A Priori Isn’t All That It Is Cracked to Be, but It Is Something.” Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 219–250.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2006. “Transglobal Reliabilism.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(2): 171–195.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2007. “Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism.” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 100–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2009. “Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions.” in Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, edited by Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten R. Stueber, pp. 296–319. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2011. The Epistemological Spectrum. At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2013a. “Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge [on Sosa (2011)].” Philosophical Studies 166(3): 599–608.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2013b. “On the Armchair Justification of Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths.” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 111–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2014a. “Replies to our Critics [Casullo (2014), Graham (2014) and Lyons (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 549–564.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2014b. “Virtue and the Fitting Culturing of the Human Critter.” in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan Jr., pp. 197–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2015. “What’s the Point?” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 87–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence E. 2016. “Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources.” Res Philosophica 93(3): 567–584.
Henderson, David, Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2007. “Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.” Acta Analytica 22(4): 281–300.
Henderson, David, Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2017. “Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 94(1–2): 194–225.

Further References

Casullo, Albert. 2014. “Uncovering Buried Treasure: Henderson and Horgan on Conceptual Analysis [on Henderson and Horgan (2014a)].” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 509–523.
Graham, Peter J. 2014. “Against Transglobal Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 525–535.
Lyons, Jack C. 2014. “The Epistemological Import of Morphological Content.” Philosophical Studies 169(3): 537–547.
Sosa, Ernest. 2011. Knowing Full Well. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.001.0001.