Laurence Goldstein (goldstein-l)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Goldstein, Laurence. 1978. “A Wittgensteinian Modification of an Austinian Purification.” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought, edited by Elisabeth Leinfellner, Werner Leinfellner, Hal Berghel, and André Hübner, pp. 279–283. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 2. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1981a. “Linguistic Aspects, Meaninglessness and Paradox: A Rejoinder to Stone (1981).” Linguistics and Philosophy 4(4): 579–592.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1981b. “Categories of Linguistic Aspects and Grelling’s Paradox.” Linguistics and Philosophy 4(3): 405–421.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1982. “Why the Liar Cannot Be Said.” in Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Language and Ontology, edited by Werner Leinfellner, Eric Russert Kraemer, and Jeffrey C. Schank. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 8. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1983a. “Scientific Scotism – The Emperor’s New Trousers or Has Armstrong Made Some Real Strides?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 40–57.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1983b. “Wittgenstein and the Logico-Semantical Paradoxes.” Ratio 25(2): 137–153. Reprinted in Canfield (1986).
Goldstein, Laurence. 1984a. “Quotation of Types and Other Types of Quotation.” Analysis 44(1): 1–6.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1984b. “Pure Categorical Principles.” The Monist 67: 410–421.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1985a. “The Paradox of the Liar – A Case of Mistaken Identity.” Analysis 45(1): 9–13.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1985b. “The Title of This Paper is ‘Quotation’ .” Analysis 45(3): 137–140.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1986. “Epimenides and Curry.” Analysis 46(3): 117–121.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1989. “Wittgenstein and Paraconsistency.” in Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, edited by Graham Priest, Richard Sylvan, and Jean Norman. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2x8v8c7.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1992. “ ‘This Statement is Not True’ is Not True.” Analysis 52(1): 1–5.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1993a. “Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions.” Analysis 53: 93–99.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1993b. “The Fallacy of the Simple Question.” Analysis 53(3): 178–181.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1993c. “Wittgenstein on Meaning-Acquisition.” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati and Graham White, pp. 169–174. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Kirchberg am Wechsel: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1994. “A Yabloesque Paradox in Set Theory.” Analysis 54: 223–227.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1995a. “Dying Quickly but Painfully.” Analysis 55: 221–222.
Goldstein, Laurence. 1995b. “ ‘The main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation’ .” in Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein Symposium: The British Tradition in 20th Century Philosophy, edited by Jaakko Hintikka and Klaus Puhl, pp. 171–186. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 22. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2000a. “A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100: 53–74.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2000b. “A Wittgensteinian (not Gricean) Pragmatic Approach to Substitutivity Puzzles.” Talk handout, Wittgenstein Symposium.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2000c. “Moore’s Paradox.” in Believing and Accepting, edited by Pascal Engel, pp. 65–92. Philosophical Studies Series n. 83. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2001. “Truth-Bearers and the Liar – A Reply to Alan Weir (2000).” Analysis 61(2): 115–126.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2004a. “Review of Rescher (2001).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(4): 656–658.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2004b. “The Barber, Russell’s Paradox, Catch-22, God and More: A Defence of a Wittgensteinian Conception of Contradiction.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 295–313. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2004c. “On Failing to Assert: Reply to David Sherry (2004).” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 31(3–4): 579–588.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2004d. “Wittgenstein as Soil.” in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, edited by Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss, pp. 147–178. London: Routledge.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2005. “Introduction.” The Monist 88(1): 3–10.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2006. “A Non-Theistic Cosmology and Natural History.” Analysis 66(3): 256–260.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2008. “Doubting Thomas: From Badwardine Back to Anon.” in Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, edited by Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo, and Emmanuel J. Genot, pp. 65–86. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 8. Berlin: Springer.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2009a. “Pierre and Circumspection in Belief-Formation.” Analysis 69(4): 653–655.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2009b. “A Consistent Way with Paradox.” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 377–389.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2010. “Names, Nonsubstitutivity and the Tanney Puzzle.” in Proceedings of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Language and World. Part Two. Signs, Minds and Actions, edited by Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl, and Joseph Wang, pp. 23–38. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 15. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2012. “The Sorites is Nonsense Disguised by a Fallacy.” Analysis 72(1): 61–65.
Goldstein, Laurence, ed. 2013a. Brevity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2013b. “Paradoxical Partners: Semantical Brides and Set-Theoretical Grooms.” Analysis 73(1): 33–37.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2013c. “To Let: Unsuccessful Stipulation, Bad Proof, and Paradox.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50(1): 93–100.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2013d. “Introduction.” in Kant. Making Reason Intuitive, edited by Kyriaki Goudeli, Pavlos Kontos, and Ioli Patellis, pp. 1–20. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2013e. “Some Consequences of ‘Speaking Loosely’ .” in Kant. Making Reason Intuitive, edited by Kyriaki Goudeli, Pavlos Kontos, and Ioli Patellis, pp. 163–177. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2015. “Wittgenstein’s Most Important Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic.” in Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz, and Annalisa Coliva, pp. 3–20. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 22. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Goldstein, Laurence and Cave, Peter. 2008. “A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, the Surprise Examination, and Newcomb’s Puzzle.” American Philosophical Quarterly 45(4): 365–376.
Goldstein, Laurence and Mannick, Paul. 1978. “The Form of the Third Man Argument.” Apeiron 12(2): 6–13.
Goldstein, Laurence and Slater, B. Hartley. 1998. “Wittgenstein, Semantics and Connectionism.” Philosophical Investigations 21(4): 293–314.

Further References

Canfield, John V., ed. 1986. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein 11: The Philosophy of Mathematics. New York: Garland Publishing Co.
Rescher, Nicholas. 2001. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Sherry, David. 2004. “Unassertion?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 31(3–4): 575–577.
Stone, John David. 1981. “Meaninglessness and Paradox: Some Remarks on Goldstein’s Paper.” Linguistics and Philosophy 4(3): 423–429.
Weir, Alan. 2000. “Token Relativism and the Liar.” Analysis 60(2): 156–170.