Alan Weir (weir-a)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Shapiro, Stewart and Weir, Alan. 1999. “New V, ZF and Abstraction.” Philosophia Mathematica 7(3): 293–321.
Shapiro, Stewart and Weir, Alan. 2000. “ ‘Neo-Logicist’ Logic is not Epistemically Innocent.” Philosophia Mathematica 8(2): 293–321, doi:10.1093/philmat/8.2.160.
Weir, Alan. 1983. “Truth Conditions and Truth Values.” Analysis 43: 176–180.
Weir, Alan. 1985a. “Against Holism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 35(140): 225–244.
Weir, Alan. 1985b. “Rejoinder to Tennant.” Analysis 45: 68–72.
Weir, Alan. 1986a. “Realism and Behaviourism.” Dialectica 40(3): 167–200.
Weir, Alan. 1986b. “Classical Harmony.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27: 459–482.
Weir, Alan. 1991. “An Instructive Nominalism [Review of Field (1980)].” Philosophical Books 32(1): 17–26.
Weir, Alan. 1993. “Putnam, Gödel and Mathematical Realism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1(2): 255–285.
Weir, Alan. 1996. “On an Argument for Irrationalism.” Philosophical Papers 25(2): 95–114.
Weir, Alan. 1998a. “Naı̈ve Set Theory is Innocent!” Mind 107: 763–798.
Weir, Alan. 1998b. “Dummett on Impredicativity.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 55: 65–101.  “New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett“,” ed. Johannes Brandl and Peter Sullivan.
Weir, Alan. 1998c. “Naı̈ve Set Theory, Paraconsistency and Indeterminacy: Part I.” Logique et Analyse 41(161–163): 219–266.
Weir, Alan. 1999. “Naı̈ve Set Theory, Paraconsistency and Indeterminacy: Part II.” Logique et Analyse 42(167–168): 283–340.
Weir, Alan. 2000a. “Token Relativism and the Liar.” Analysis 60(2): 156–170.
Weir, Alan. 2000b. “The Force of Reason: Why is Logic Compelling?” in The Logica Yearbook 1999, edited by Timothy Childers, pp. 37–52. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
Weir, Alan. 2001. “More Trouble for Functionalism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 267–293.
Weir, Alan. 2002. “Rejoinder to Laurence Goldstein on the Liar [on Goldstein (2001)].” Analysis 62(1): 26–34.
Weir, Alan. 2003a. “Objective Content.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77: 47–72.
Weir, Alan. 2003b. “Neo-Fregeanism: An Embarrassment of Riches.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44(1): 13–48. Reprinted in Cook (2007, 383–420).
Weir, Alan. 2004a. “There are no True Contradictions.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 385–417. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.003.0023.
Weir, Alan. 2004b. “Naive Truth and Sophisticated Logic.” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 218–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Weir, Alan. 2004c. “An Ultra-Realist Theory of Perception.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12(2): 105–128.
Weir, Alan. 2005a. “Critical Notice of Fine (2002).” Philosophical Studies 122(3): 333–348.
Weir, Alan. 2005b. “Naturalism Reconsidered.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 460–482. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Weir, Alan. 2006a. “Is it too much to Ask, to Ask for Everything?” in Absolute Generality, edited by Agustı́n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, pp. 333–368. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weir, Alan. 2006b. “Indeterminacy of Translation.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 233–249. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Weir, Alan. 2007. “Honest Toil or Sheer Magic?” Dialectica 61(1): 89–115.
Weir, Alan. 2010. Truth Through Proof. A Formalist Foundation of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.001.0001.
Weir, Alan. 2011. “Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/formalism-mathematics/.
Weir, Alan. 2014. “Quine’s Naturalism.” in A Companion to W.v.O. Quine, edited by Gilbert H. Harman and Ernest LePore, pp. 114–147. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118607992.
Weir, Alan. 2015. “Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/formalism-mathematics/.
Weir, Alan. 2019. “Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/formalism-mathematics/.
Weir, Alan. 2024. “Formalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/formalism-mathematics/.

Further References

Cook, Roy T., ed. 2007. The Arché Papers on the Mathematics of Abstraction. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 71. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-4265-2.
Field, Hartry. 1980. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Field (2016), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2016. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First edition: Field (1980), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Fine, Kit. 2002. The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199246182.001.0001.
Goldstein, Laurence. 2001. “Truth-Bearers and the Liar – A Reply to Alan Weir (2000a).” Analysis 61(2): 115–126.