Jeremy Goodman (goodman-j)
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Bibliography
Dorr, Cian and Goodman, Jeremy. 2020. “Diamonds Are Forever.” Noûs 54(3): 632–665, doi:10.1111/nous.12271.
Dorr, Cian, Goodman, Jeremy and Hawthorne, John. 2014. “Knowing against the Odds.” Philosophical Studies 170(2): 277–287.
Fritz, Peter and Goodman, Jeremy. 2016a. “Counterfactuals and Propositional Contingentism.” Unpublished manuscript, dated February 7, 2016.
Fritz, Peter and Goodman, Jeremy. 2016b. “Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 1: Closure and Generation.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 45(6): 645–695.
Goodman, Jeremy. 2013. “Inexact Knowledge without Improbable Knowing [on Williamson (2013)].” Inquiry 56(1): 30–53.
Goodman, Jeremy. 2015a. “Knowledge, Counterfactuals, and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 172(9): 2275–2278.
Goodman, Jeremy. 2016a. “Williamson on Necessitism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 613–639. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Goodman, Jeremy. 2016b. “An Argument for Necessitism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 30: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 160–182. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Goodman, Jeremy. 2017. “Reality is Not Structured.” Analysis 77(1): 43–53, doi:10.1093/analys/anw002.
Goodman, Jeremy. 2023. “The Myth of Full Belief.” in Philosophical Perspectives 37: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 164–171. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12185.
Goodman, Jeremy. 2024. “Higher-Order Logic as Metaphysics.” in Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones, pp. 73–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0003.
Further References
Williamson, Timothy. 2013. “Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 1–14.
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and McCullagh, Mark, eds. 2019. Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315184074.