Timothy Williamson (williamson-t)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Andjelkovic, Miroslava and Williamson, Timothy. 2000. “Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 211–244.
Berman, David and Williamson, Timothy. 1988. “Locke on Particles: A Reply to Nuchelmans (1986).” Logique et Analyse 31(123–124): 213–215.
Boghossian, Paul Artin and Williamson, Timothy. 2020. Debating the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851707.001.0001.
Crivelli, Paolo and Williamson, Timothy. 1998. “Review of Cresswell and Hughes (1996).” The Philosophical Review 107(3): 471.
Douven, Igor and Williamson, Timothy. 2006. “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(4): 755–779.
Fara, Delia Graff and Williamson, Timothy, eds. 2002. Vagueness. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Fara, Michael and Williamson, Timothy. 2005. “Counterparts and Actuality.” Mind 114(453): 1–30.
Humberstone, I. Lloyd and Williamson, Timothy. 1997. “Inverses for Normal Modal Operators.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 59(1): 33–64.
Pizzi, Claudio and Williamson, Timothy. 1997. “Strong Boethius’ Thesis and Consequential Implication.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 26(3): 569–588.
Rayo, Agustı́n and Williamson, Timothy. 2003. “A completeness theorem for unrestricted first-order languages.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 331–356. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark and Williamson, Timothy. 1997. “Sorites.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 458–485. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017, 734–757).
Shin, Hyun Song and Williamson, Timothy. 1997. “Representing the Knowledge of Turing Machines.” in Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions, edited by Michael O. L. Bacharach, L. A. Gérard-Varet, Philippe Mongin, and Hyun Song Shin, pp. 169–190. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Shin, Hyun Song and Williamson, Timothy. 1999. “How much Common Belief is Necessary for a Convention?” in The Logic of Strategy, edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, pp. 119–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, Jason and Williamson, Timothy. 1995. “Quantifiers and Context Dependence.” Analysis 55: 291–295.
Stanley, Jason and Williamson, Timothy. 2001. “Knowing How.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(5): 411–444.
Trajkovski, Miroslava and Williamson, Timothy. 2021. “Abduction, Perception, Emotion, Feeling: Body Maps and Pattern Recognition.” in Philosophical Perspectives 35: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 404–418. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12142.
Williamson, Timothy. 1982. “Intuitionism Disproved?” Analysis 42: 203–207.
Williamson, Timothy. 1984. “The Infinite Commitment of Finite Minds.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14: 235–255.
Williamson, Timothy. 1985. “Converse Relations.” The Philosophical Review 94(2): 249–262, doi:10.2307/2185430.
Williamson, Timothy. 1986a. “The Contingent A Priori: Has it Anything to Do with Indexicals?” Analysis 46: 113–117.
Williamson, Timothy. 1986b. “Realism and the Burden of Proof.” Irish Philosophical Journal 3: 42–57.
Williamson, Timothy. 1987a. “On the Paradox of Knowability.” Mind 96.
Williamson, Timothy. 1987b. “On Knowledge of the Unknowable.” Analysis 47: 154–158.
Williamson, Timothy. 1987c. “Invertible Definitions.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28: 244–258.
Williamson, Timothy. 1988a. “Assertion, Denial and Some Cancellation Rules in Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 17(3): 299–318.
Williamson, Timothy. 1988b. “On Rigidity and Persistence.” Logique et Analyse 31(121–122): 89–91.
Williamson, Timothy. 1988c. “The Contingent A Priori: A Reply.” Analysis 48: 218–220.
Williamson, Timothy. 1988d. “Review of Hale (1987).” Mind 97: 487–490.
Williamson, Timothy. 1988e. “First-Order Logic for Comparative Similarity.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29(4): 457–488.
Williamson, Timothy. 1988f. “Equivocation and Existence.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88: 109–127.
Williamson, Timothy. 1989. “Being and Being So.” Acta Analytica 3(4).
Williamson, Timothy. 1990a. Identity and Discrimination. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Revised edition: Williamson (2013b).
Williamson, Timothy. 1990b. “Two Incomplete Anti-Realist Modal Epistemic Logics.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 55: 297–314.
Williamson, Timothy. 1990c. “Review of Appiah (1986).” Linguistics and Philosophy 13(1): 129–135.
Williamson, Timothy. 1990d. “Verification, Falsification, and Cancellation in KT.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 31: 286–290.
Williamson, Timothy. 1990e. “Review of Cocchiarella (1986).” Linguistics and Philosophy 13(2): 265–271.
Williamson, Timothy. 1990f. “Necessary Identity and Necessary Existence.” in Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation. Volume I, edited by Rudolf Haller and Johannes L. Brandl, pp. 168–175. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 19/1. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Williamson, Timothy. 1990g. “Review of Simons (1987).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 38: 201–210.
Williamson, Timothy. 1991a. “Fregean Directions.” Analysis 51: 194–195.
Williamson, Timothy. 1991b. “Abstract / Concrete.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Williamson, Timothy. 1992a. “Inexact Knowledge.” Mind 101: 217–242.
Williamson, Timothy. 1992b. “On Intuitionistic Modal Epistemic Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 21(1): 63–79.
Williamson, Timothy. 1992c. “Vagueness and Ignorance.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 66: 145–162. Reprinted in Keefe and Smith (1996, 265–280).
Williamson, Timothy. 1992d. “An Alternative Rule of Disjunction in Modal Logic.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33(1): 89–100.
Williamson, Timothy. 1993. “Verificationism and Non-Distributive Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 78–86.
Williamson, Timothy. 1994a. Vagueness. Problems of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 1994b. “Non-Genuine MacIntosh Logics.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 23(1): 87–101.
Williamson, Timothy. 1994c. “Critical Study of Wright (1992).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(2): 130–144.
Williamson, Timothy. 1995a. “Is Knowing a State of Mind?” Mind 104: 533–563.
Williamson, Timothy. 1995b. “Does Assertibility Satisfy the S4 Axiom?” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 27(81): 3–25.
Williamson, Timothy. 1995c. “Definiteness and Knowability.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33(suppl.): 171–191.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996a. “Cognitive Homelessness.” The Journal of Philosophy 93: 554–573.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996b. “The Necessity and Determinateness of Distinctness.” in Essays for David Wiggins – Identity, Truth and Value, edited by Sabina Lovibond and Stephen G. Williams, pp. 1–17. Aristotelian Society Series n. 16. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996c. “What Makes It a Heap?” Erkenntnis 44: 327–339.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996d. “Self-Knowledge and Embedded Operators.” Analysis 56: 202–209.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996e. “Wright on the Epistemic Conception of Vagueness [on Wright (1995)].” Analysis 56(1): 39–45.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996f. “Putnam on the Sorites Paradox.” Philosophical Papers 25(1): 47–56.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996g. “Unreflective Realism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 905–909.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996h. “Reference.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Williamson, Timothy. 1996i. “Sense.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Williamson, Timothy. 1997a. “Knowledge as Evidence?” Mind 106: 717–741.
Williamson, Timothy. 1997b. “Replies to Commentators [Horgan (1997), Gómez-Torrente (1997) and Tye (1997)].” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 255–265. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Williamson, Timothy. 1997c. “Précis [of Williamson (1994a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(4): 921–928.
Williamson, Timothy. 1997d. “Imagination, Stipulation, and Vagueness.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 215–228. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Williamson, Timothy. 1997e. “Reply to Commentators [of Williamson (1994a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(4): 921–928.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998a. “Bare Possibilia.” Erkenntnis 48: 257–273.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998b. “Conditionalizing on Knowledge.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49: 89–121.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998c. “Indefinite Extensibility.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 55: 1–24. “New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett“,” ed. Johannes Brandl and Peter Sullivan.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998d. “Iterated Attitudes.” Proceedings of the British Academy 95: 85–133.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998e. “Continuum Many Maximal Consistent Normal Bimodal Logics with Inverses.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39: 128–134.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998f. “The Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 389–410. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williamson, Timothy. 1998g. “Review of Usberti (1995).” Dialectica 52(1): 63–69.
Williamson, Timothy. 1999a. “Schiffer on the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness [reply to Schiffer (1999)].” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 505–517. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williamson, Timothy. 1999b. “A Note on Satisfaction, Truth and the Empty Domain.” Analysis 59: 3–8.
Williamson, Timothy. 1999c. “On the Structure of Higher-Order Vagueness.” Mind 108(429): 127–143.
Williamson, Timothy. 1999d. “Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula.” Dialectica 53(3–4): 253–270.
Williamson, Timothy. 1999e. “Existence and Contingency.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 181–203, doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00054.
Williamson, Timothy. 1999f.“Andjelkovic (1999) on Bivalence: A Reply.” Acta Analytica 14(23).
Williamson, Timothy. 1999g. “Rational Failures of the KK-Principle.” in The Logic of Strategy, edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, pp. 101–118. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000a. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000b. “Scepticism and Evidence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 613–628.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000c. “Tennant on Knowable Truth.” Ratio 13(2): 99–114.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000d. “Margins for Error: A Reply.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50.
Williamson, Timothy. 2001a. “Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences [on Jackson (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 625–630.
Williamson, Timothy. 2001b. “Comments on Williams (2001).” Philosophical Studies 103(1): 25–33.
Williamson, Timothy. 2001c. “Vagueness, Indeterminacy and Social Meaning.” Critical Studies 16: 61–76.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002a. “Necessary Existents.” in Logic, Thought and Language, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 233–251. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002b. “Peacocke’s Theory of Modality [on Peacocke (1999)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 649–654.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002c. “Epistemicist models: Comments on Gómez-Torrente (2002) and Fara, D. G. (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 143–150.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002d. “Horgan on Vagueness.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 63: 273–286. “Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,” ed. by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002e. “Soames on Vagueness [on Soames (1999)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 422–428.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002f. “Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 273–304. Topoi Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
Williamson, Timothy. 2002g. “Reply to Deutsch and Machina (2002).” Acta Analytica 17(29): 47–61.
Williamson, Timothy. 2003a. “Vagueness in Reality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 690–715. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2003b. “Everything.” in Philosophical Perspectives 17: Language and Philosophical Linguistics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 415–465. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2003.00017.x.
Williamson, Timothy. 2003c. “Understanding and Inference.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77: 249–293.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004a. “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement.” Dialectica 58(1): 109–154.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004b. “Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy. A Reply to McGee and McLaughlin (1998).” Linguistics and Philosophy 27(1): 113–122.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004c. “Summary [of Williamson (2000a)].” Philosophical Books 45(4): 283–285.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004d. “Replies to Commentators [Heathcote (2004; Joyce 2004; Owens 2004)].” Philosophical Books 45(4): 313–323.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004e. “Tarski and Primitivism about Truth.” in The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter, pp. 106–128. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199247288.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004f. “Sosa on Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 263–272. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004g. “Some Computational Constraints in Epistemic Logic.” in Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, volume 1, edited by Shahid Rahman, John Symons, Dov M. Gabbay, and Jean Paul van Bendegem, pp. 437–455. Dordrecht: Springer.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004h. “Truth and Borderline Cases.” in Truth, Rationality, Cognition, and Music, edited by Kepa Korta and Jesús M. Larrazabal, pp. 45–66. Philosophical Studies Series n. 102. Dordrecht: Springer.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005a. “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219): 213–235, doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00396.x.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005b. “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 1–23.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005c. “Précis of Williamson (2000a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(2): 431–435.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005d. “Replies to Commentators [Brueckner (2005), Conee (2005), Hawthorne (2005) and Yablo (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(2): 468–491.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005e. “Knowledge, Context, and the Agent’s Point of View.” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, pp. 91–114. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267408.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2005f. “Knowledge and Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 681–700. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2006a. “Must Do Better.” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 177–187. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2006b. “Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality.” in Absolute Generality, edited by Agustı́n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, pp. 369–390. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2006c. “Conceptual Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80: 1–41.
Williamson, Timothy. 2006d. “Stalnaker on the Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity.” in Content and Modality. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, edited by Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, pp. 123–147. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2006e. “Indicative versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts.” in Philosophical Issues 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest Sosa, pp. 310–333. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williamson, Timothy. 2006f. “Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components?” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 291–306. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007a. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williamson (2021a), doi:10.1002/9780470696675.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007b. “How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?” Analysis 67(3): 173–180.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007c. “On Being Justified in One’s Head.” in Rationality and the Good. Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, edited by Mark Timmons, John Greco, and Alfred R. Mele, pp. 106–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007d. “Knowledge within the Margin for Error.” Mind 116(463): 723–726.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007e. “Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 89–123. “Philosophical Knowledge. Its Possibility and Scope,” ed. by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri.
Williamson, Timothy. 2008. “Why Epistemology Cannot be Operationalized.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 277–300. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009a. “Tennant’s Troubles.” in, pp. 183–204.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009b. “Williamson (2007a): Summary.” Analysis 69(1): 99–100.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009c. “Replies to Jackson (2009), Kornblith (2009) and Moore (2009).” Analysis 69(1): 125–135.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009d. “Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives.” in The Philosophy of David Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi, pp. 137–158. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.003.0009.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009e. “Reply to Critics.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 279–384. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0017.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009f. “Knowledge of Counterfactuals.” in Epistemology, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 45–64. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009g. “Précis of Williamson (2007a).” Philosophical Studies 145(3): 431–434.
Williamson, Timothy. 2009h. “Replies to Ichikawa (2009), Martin (2009) and Weinberg (2009).” Philosophical Studies 145(3): 465–476.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010a. “Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic.” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, edited by Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann, pp. 81–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010b. “Précis of Williamson (2007a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 470–471.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010c. “Reply to Peacocke (2010).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 481–487.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010d. “Reply to Boghossian (2010).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 498–506.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010e. “Reply to Stalnaker (2010).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 515–523.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010f. “Reply to Horwich (2010).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 534–542.
Williamson, Timothy. 2010g. “Necessitism, Contingentism, and Plural Quantification.” Mind 119(475): 657–748.
Williamson, Timothy. 2011a. “Improbable Knowing.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 147–164. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2011b. “Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof.” Metaphilosophy 42(3): 215–229.
Williamson, Timothy. 2011c. “Knowledge First Epistemology.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 208–218. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 2012a. “Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference [on Boghossian (2012)].” Dialectica 66(2): 237–247.
Williamson, Timothy. 2012b. “Wright and Casalegno on Meaning and Assertability [on Wright (2012)].” Dialectica 66(2): 267–271.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013a. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552078.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013b. Identity and Discrimination. 2nd ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Williamson (1990a), doi:10.1002/9781118503591.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013c. “Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 1–14.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013d. “Response to Cohen and Comesaña (2013), Goodman (2013), Nagel (2013) and Weatherson (2013) on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 77–96.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013e. “How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 291–312. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014a. “What is Naturalism?” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 29–31. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014b. “The Unclarity of Naturalism.” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 36–38. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014c. “Very Improbable Knowing.” Erkenntnis 79(5): 971–999.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014d. “Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 2): 211–231.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014e. “Knowledge First.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 1–9. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014f. “Knowledge Still First [reply to Dougherty and Rysiew (2014)].” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 22–24. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Williamson, Timothy. 2015a. Tetralogue. I’m Right, You’re Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2015b. “Knowledge and Belief.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 124–129. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 149–154).
Williamson, Timothy. 2015c. “Review of Unger (2014).” The Times Literary Supplement 5833: 22–23.
Williamson, Timothy. 2015d. “Laudatio: Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921–2012).” in Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas. Themes from Barcan Marcus, edited by Michael Frauchiger, pp. 11–16. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Williamson, Timothy. 2015e. “Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic.” in Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas. Themes from Barcan Marcus, edited by Michael Frauchiger, pp. 51–74. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Williamson, Timothy. 2015f. “A Note on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Philosophical Studies 172(1): 129–140.
Williamson, Timothy. 2016a. “Modal Science.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 453–492. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016b. “Reply to Bacon, Hawthorne and Uzquiano (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 542–547. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016c. “Reply to Fine (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 571–583. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016d. “Reply to Fritz (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 610–612. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016e. “Reply to Goodman (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 640–653. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016f. “Reply to Linnebo (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 677–682. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016g. “Reply to Sider (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 699–708. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016h. “Reply to Stalnaker (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 727–734. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016i. “Reply to Sullivan (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 759–765. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016j. “Reply to Vetter (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 796–802. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016k. “Reply to Yli-Vakkuri (2016).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 839–851. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Williamson, Timothy. 2016l. “Knowing by Imagining.” in Knowledge Through Imagination, edited by Amy Kind and Peter Kung, pp. 113–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2016m. “Précis of Williamson (2013a).” Analysis 76(2): 153–155.
Williamson, Timothy. 2016n. “Replies to King (2016), deRosset (2016) and Kment (2016).” Analysis 76(2): 201–222.
Williamson, Timothy. 2017a. “Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 325–346. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0013.
Williamson, Timothy. 2017b. “Acting on Knowledge.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 163–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2017c. “Ambiguous Rationality.” Episteme 14(3): 263–274.
Williamson, Timothy. 2017d. “Modality as a Subject for Science.” Res Philosophica 94(3): 415–436.
Williamson, Timothy. 2018a. Doing Philosophy. From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2018b. “Spaces of Possibility.” in Metaphysics, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 189–204. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2018c. “Knowledge, Action, and the Factive Turn.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 125–141. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Williamson, Timothy. 2018d. “Alternative Logics and Applied Mathematics.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 399–424. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12131.
Williamson, Timothy. 2019. “Evidence of Evidence in Epistemic Logic.” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 265–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2020a. Suppose and Tell. The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198860662.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2020b. Philosophical Method. A Very Short Introduction. Very Short Introductions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021a. The Philosophy of Philosophy. 2nd ed. The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Williamson (2007a), doi:10.1002/9781119616702.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021b. “The Counterfactual-Based Approach to Modal Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 188–197. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021c. “Edgington on Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth.” in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability. Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, edited by Lee Walters and John Hawthorne, pp. 195–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712732.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2022. “Idealized Rationality in Models of Knowledge and Probability.” in Human Rationality: Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, edited by Boran Berčić, Aleksandra Golubović, and Majda Trobok, pp. 273–290. Rijeka: Faculty of Humanities; Social Sciences, University of Rijeka.
Williamson, Timothy. 2024a. “E = K, but What About R?” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 30–39. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Williamson, Timothy. 2024b. “Menzel on Pure Logic and Higher-Order Metaphysics.” in Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones, pp. 460–471. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0014.
Williamson, Timothy. 2024c. “Pickel Against Second-Order Primitivism [on Pickel (2024)].” in Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones, pp. 504–513. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0016.
Williamson, Timothy, Bonino, Guido, Osherson, Daniel N. and Viale, Riccardo. 2000. “On the Psychology of Vague Predicates.” Mind and Language 14.

Further References

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