Thomas Grundmann (grundmann)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bernecker, Sven, Floweree, Amy K. and Grundmann, Thomas, eds. 2021. The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001.
Grundmann, Thomas. 1994. Analytische Transzendentalphilosophie. Eine Kritik. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 1996. “Can Science be Likened to a Well-Written Fairy Tale? A Contemporary Reply to Schlick’s Objections to Neurath’s Coherence Theory.” in Encyclopedia and Utopia. The Life and Work of Otto Neurath (1882-1945), edited by Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich Stadler, pp. 127–134. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook n. 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Grundmann, Thomas. 1997. “Die Bedingungen des Verstehens als Bedingungen der Gegenstände des Verstehens.” in Analyomen 2. Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, edited by Georg Meggle, pp. 232–245. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 16. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Grundmann, Thomas. 1998. “Polemic and Dogmatism: The Two Faces of Skepticism in Aenesidemus-Schulze.” in The Skeptical Tradition around 1800. Skepticism in Philosophy, Science, and Society, edited by Johan van der Zande and Richard Henry Popkin, pp. 133–142. Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas n. 155. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Grundmann, Thomas, ed. 2001a. Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart. 2nd ed. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2001b. “Was der erkenntnistheoretische Internalist vergisst.” Logos: Zeitschrift für systematische Philosophie N.F. 7: 361–385.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2002. “Die Struktur des skeptischen Traumarguments.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 64: 57–81.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2003a. Der Wahrheit auf der Spur. Eine Verteidigung des erkenntnistheoretischen Externalismus. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2003b. “Wenn der Determinismus wahr wäre …Über die Möglichkeit von Willensfreiheit in der natürlichen Welt.” in Monism, edited by Andreas Bächli and Klaus Petrus, pp. 293–314. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 9. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2003c. “Die Grenzen des erkenntnistheoretischen Kontextualismus.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51(6): 993–1014.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2004a. “Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams (2004).” Erkenntnis 61(2–3): 345–352. Reprinted in Brendel and Jäger (2005, 203–210).
Grundmann, Thomas. 2004b. “Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 65–76. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2004c. “Perceptual Representations as Basic Reasons.” in Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, edited by Ralph Schumacher, pp. 287–304. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2007. “The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 69–87. “Philosophical Knowledge. Its Possibility and Scope,” ed. by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2009a. “Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 79: 65–76. “Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman,” ed. by Gerhard Schurz and Markus Werning.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2009b. “Ist Wissen erkenntnistheoretisch fundamental? Eine Kritik an Williamson.” in Wissen und Werte, edited by Gerhard Schönrich, pp. 45–71. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2009c. “Die Wahrnehmung kausaler Prozesse.” in Wahrnehmung und Wirklichkeit, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 211–228. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 31. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2011. “Defeasibility Theory.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 156–166. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2013. “Doubts about Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge from Disagreement.” in Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, edited by Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard, pp. 72–98. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 51. London: Routledge.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2015. “How Reliabilism Saves the Apriori/Aposteriori Distinction.” Synthese 192(9): 2747–2768.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2016. “New Lessons from Old Demons: the Case for Reliabilism.” in The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 90–110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2017. “Platonism and the A Priori in Thought Experiments.” in The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments, edited by Michael T. Stuart, Joerg H. Yiftach Fehige, and James Robert Brown, pp. 293–308. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315175027.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2018. Philosophische Wahrheitstheorien. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Grundmann, Thomas. 2019. “How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View.” in Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology, edited by Lisa Miracchi, pp. 129–142. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12144.
Grundmann, Thomas, Hofmann, Frank, Misselhorn, Catrin, Waibel, Violetta L. and Zanetti, Véronique, eds. 2005. Anatomie der Subjektivität. Bewusstsein, Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstgefühl. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Grundmann, Thomas and Horvath, Joachim. 2014. “Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.” Philosophical Studies 170(3): 525–533.
Grundmann, Thomas and Misselhorn, Catrin. 2003. “Transcendental Arguments and Realism.” in Strawson and Kant, edited by Hans-Johann Glock, pp. 205–218. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grundmann, Thomas and Stephan, Achim, eds. 2016. “Welche und wie viele Flüchtlinge sollen wir aufnehmen?” Philosophische Essays. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Horvath, Joachim and Grundmann, Thomas, eds. 2012. Experimental Philosophy and its Critics. London: Routledge.

Further References

Brendel, Elke and Jäger, Christoph, eds. 2005. Contextualisms in Epistemology. Dordrecht: Springer.
Williams, Michael. 2004. “Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses.” Erkenntnis 61(2–3): 315–343. Reprinted in Brendel and Jäger (2005, 173–202).