Anandi Hattiangadi (hattiangadi-a)

Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Besson, Corine and Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2014. “The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion.” Philosophical Studies 167(2): 251–271.
Besson, Corine and Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2020. “Assertion and the Future.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 481–504. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Bykvist, Krister and Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2007. “Does Thought Imply Ought?” Analysis 67(4): 277–285.
Bykvist, Krister and Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2014. “Belief, Truth, and Blindspots.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 100–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2003. “Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(2): 419–431.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2007. Oughts and Thoughts. Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2009. “Some More Thoughts on Semantic Oughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting (2007).” Analysis 69(1): 54–63.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2010a. “Semantic Normativity in Context.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Language, edited by Sarah Sawyer, pp. 87–107. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2010b. “The Love of Truth.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41(4): 422–432.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2015a. “Metasemantics out of Economics?” in Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, edited by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, pp. 52–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2015b. “The Limits of Expressivism.” in Meaning without Representation. Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism, edited by Steven A. Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, pp. 224–243. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.001.0001.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2017. “The Normativity of Meaning.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 2nd ed., pp. 649–669. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2018a. “Moral Supervenience.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 592–615.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2018b. “Logical Disagreement.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 88–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2018c. “Normativity and Intentionality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 1040–1064. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2019. “In Defence of Narrow Content [critical notice of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018)].” Analysis 79(3): 539–550.

Further References

Whiting, Daniel. 2007. “The Normativity of Meaning Defended.” Analysis 67(2): 133–140.
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. 2018. Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198785965.001.0001.