Eli Hirsch (hirsch-e)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Hirsch, Eli. 1971. “Essence and Identity.” in Identity and Individuation, edited by Milton K. Munitz, pp. 31–50. New York: New York University Press.
Hirsch, Eli. 1976. “Physical Identity.” The Philosophical Review 85: 357–389.
Hirsch, Eli. 1978. “A Sense of Unity.” The Journal of Philosophy 74.
Hirsch, Eli. 1982a. The Concept of Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirsch, Eli. 1982b. “Review of Brody (1980).” The Philosophical Review 91(3): 497–499.
Hirsch, Eli. 1983. “Hume’s Distinction between Genuine and Fictitious Identity.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: Contemporary perspectives on the history of philosophy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 321–338. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Hirsch, Eli. 1986. “Metaphysical Neccesity and Conceptual Truth.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 243–256. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Hirsch, Eli. 1988a. “Rules for a Good Language.” The Journal of Philosophy 85(12): 694–717.
Hirsch, Eli. 1988b. “Strange Thoughts of the Third Kind.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12: Realism and Antirealism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 3–24. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Hirsch, Eli. 1991a. “Divided Minds.” The Philosophical Review 100: 3–30.
Hirsch, Eli. 1991b. “Unity.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Hirsch, Eli. 1993a. Dividing Reality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hirsch, Eli. 1993b. “Reply to van Inwagen (1990).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 687–691.
Hirsch, Eli. 1997a. “Complex Kinds.” Philosophical Papers 26(1): 47–70.
Hirsch, Eli. 1997b. “Basic Objects: A Reply to Xu (1997).” Mind and Language 12.
Hirsch, Eli. 1999a. “The Vagueness of Identity.” Philosophical Topics 26(1–2): 139–158.
Hirsch, Eli. 1999b. “Identity in the Talmud.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23: New Directions in Philosophy, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 166–180. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Hirsch, Eli. 2000. “The Rational Physician.” Philosophic Exchange 30: 19–33.
Hirsch, Eli. 2001. “Review of Denkel (1996).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(1): 238–240.
Hirsch, Eli. 2002a. “Quantifier Variance and Realism.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 51–73. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2002.tb00061.x.
Hirsch, Eli. 2002b. “Against Revisionary Ontology.” Philosophical Topics 30(1): 103–127.
Hirsch, Eli. 2004a. “Comments on Sider (2001).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(3): 658–664.
Hirsch, Eli. 2004b. “Sosa’s Existential Relativism.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 224–232. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
Hirsch, Eli. 2005. “Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(1): 67–97.
Hirsch, Eli. 2006. “Rashi’s View of the Open Future: Indeterminateness and Bivalence.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume II, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 111–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199290581.001.0001.
Hirsch, Eli. 2007. “Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance.” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 367–381. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 10. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hirsch, Eli. 2008. “Language, Ontology, and Structure.” Noûs 42(3): 509–528.
Hirsch, Eli. 2009a. “Ontology and Alternative Languages.” in Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, pp. 231–259. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.003.0008.
Hirsch, Eli. 2009b. “Diabolical Mysticism, Death, and Skepticism.” Philosophic Exchange 39: 18–33.
Hirsch, Eli. 2010. “Kripke’s Argument Against Materialism.” in The Waning of Materialism, edited by Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, pp. 115–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.001.0001.
Hirsch, Eli. 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199732111.001.0001.
Hirsch, Eli. 2013. “The Metaphysically Best Language [on Sider (2011)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87(3): 709–716.
Hirsch, Eli. 2016. “Three Degrees of Carnapian Tolerance.” in Ontology after Carnap, edited by Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe, pp. 105–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661985.003.0006.
Hirsch, Eli. 2017. Radical Skepticism and the Shadow of Doubt. A Philosophical Dialogue. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Hirsch, Eli and Warren, Jared. 2020. “Quantifier Variance.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 349–357. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.

Further References

Brody, Baruch A. 1980. Identity and Essence. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Denkel, Arda. 1996. Object and Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, doi:10.7591/9781501713033.
Sider, Theodore. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019924443X.001.0001.
Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001.
Xu, Fei. 1997. “From Lot’s Wige to a Pillar of Salt: Evidence That Physical Object is a Sortal Concept.” Mind and Language 12: 365–392.