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Richard Holton (holton-r)

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Bibliography

    Domenicucci, Jacopo and Holton, Richard. 2017. Trust as a Two-Place Relation.” in The Philosophy of Trust, edited by Paul Faulkner and Thomas W. Simpson, pp. 149–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001.
    Holton, Richard. 1991. Intentions, Response-Dependence, and Immunity from Error.” in Response-Dependent Concepts, edited by Peter Menzies. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 1. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
    Holton, Richard. 1992a. Response-Dependence and Infallibility.” Analysis 52: 180–184.
    Holton, Richard. 1992b. Review of Weiner (1990).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70: 238–240.
    Holton, Richard. 1993a. Minimalisms about Truth.” in Themes from Wittgenstein, edited by Brian John Garrett and Kevin Mulligan, pp. 45–61. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 4. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
    Holton, Richard. 1993b. Intention Detecting.” The Philosophical Quarterly 43(172): 298–318.
    Holton, Richard. 1994a. Attitude Ascriptions and Intermediate Scope.” Mind 103: 123–130.
    Holton, Richard. 1994b. Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 63–76.
    Holton, Richard. 1995. Leapfrogging and Scope: Reply to Pickles.” Mind 104: 583–584.
    Holton, Richard. 1996a. Reason, Value and the Muggletonians.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 484–487.
    Holton, Richard. 1996b. Davidson, McFetridge and the Counting Problem.” Analysis 56(1): 46–50.
    Holton, Richard. 1996c. Review of Crimmins (1992).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 210–212.
    Holton, Richard. 1997a. Some Telling Examples: Reply to Tsohatzidis (1993).” The Journal of Pragmatics 28: 625–628.
    Holton, Richard. 1997b. Review of Peacocke (1994).” Philosophical Books 38(2): 125–128.
    Holton, Richard. 1997c. Review of Carl (1994) and Kenny (1995).” The Philosophical Quarterly 47(187): 275–278.
    Holton, Richard. 1998. Positivism and the Internal Point of View.” Law and Philosophy 17: 597–625.
    Holton, Richard. 1999a. Dispositions All the Way Round.” Analysis 59: 9–14.
    Holton, Richard. 1999b. Intention and Weakness of Will.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(5): 263–269.
    Holton, Richard. 2000. Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps.” Philosophical Studies 97: 135–165.
    Holton, Richard. 2001. What is the Role ot the Self in Self-Deception? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 53–69.
    Holton, Richard. 2002. Principles and Particularisms.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 76: 191–209.
    Holton, Richard. 2003a. David Lewis’s Philosophy of Language.” Mind and Language 18: 286–295.
    Holton, Richard. 2003b. How is Strength of the Will Possible? in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, pp. 39–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.
    Holton, Richard. 2004. Rational Resolve.” The Philosophical Review 113(4): 507–535.
    Holton, Richard. 2006. The Act of Choice.” Philosophers' imprint 6(3).
    Holton, Richard. 2007. Freedom, Coercion, and Discursive Control.” in Common Minds. Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit, edited by Geoffrey Brennan, Robert E. Goodin, Frank Jackson, and Michael A. Smith, pp. 104–120. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Holton, Richard. 2008. Partial Belief, Partial Intention.” Mind 117(465): 27–58.
    Holton, Richard. 2009a. Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214570.001.0001.
    Holton, Richard. 2009b. Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will.” Inquiry 52(4): 412–428.
    Holton, Richard. 2010a. Norms and the Knobe Effect.” Analysis 70(3): 417–424.
    Holton, Richard. 2010b. Comments on Wedgwood (2007).” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 449–457.
    Holton, Richard. 2011. Modeling legal rules.” in Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, edited by Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames, pp. 165–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Holton, Richard. 2013. From Determinism to Resignation; and How to Stop It.” in Decomposing the Will, edited by Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, and Tillmann Vierkant, pp. 87–102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.001.0001.
    Holton, Richard. 2014. Intention as a Model for Belief.” in Rational and Social Agency. The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, edited by Manuel R. Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, pp. 12–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794515.001.0001.
    Holton, Richard. 2015. Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 399–410. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
    Holton, Richard. 2018. Crime as Prime.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, volume III, edited by John Gardner, Leslie Green, and Brian Leiter, pp. 190–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Holton, Richard and Berridge, Kent C. 2016. Compulsion and Choice in Addiction.” in Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, edited by Nick Heather and Gabriel M. A. Segal, pp. 153–170. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Holton, Richard and Price, Huw. 2003. Ramsey on Saying and Whistling: A Discordant Note.” Noûs 37(3): 325–341.
    May, Joshua and Holton, Richard. 2012. What in the World is Weakness of Will? Philosophical Studies 157(3): 341–360.

Further References

    Carl, Wolfgang. 1994. Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origin and Scope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Crimmins, Mark. 1992. Talk about Beliefs. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Kenny, Anthony John Patrick. 1995. Frege – An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Peacocke, Christopher, ed. 1994. Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. Current Issues in the Philosphy of Mind. Proceedings of the British Academy n. 83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Tsohatzidis, Savas L. 1993. Speaking of Truth-Telling: The View from wh-Complements.” The Journal of Pragmatics 19: 271–279.
    Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001.
    Weiner, Joan. 1990. Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.