Ralph Wedgwood (wedgwood-r)
Cited in the following articles
Perspective Lost?, What is the Point of Persistent Disputes?, The Attitudinalist Challenge to Perceptualism about Emotion, An Analysis of Fink's Argument in Favour of Normative Process-Requirements, Certainty and AssertionContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Byrne, Alex, Stalnaker, Robert C. and Wedgwood, Ralph, eds. 2001. Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysic for Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1998a. “Same-Sex Marriage: A Philosophical Defense.” in Philosophy and Sex, edited by Robert B. Baker, Kathleen J. Wininger, and Frederick A. Elliston, 3rd ed., pp. 212–230. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1998b. “The Essence of Response-Dependence.” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 37–60. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1998c. “The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6(2): 189–209.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1999. “The A Priori Rules of Rationality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 113–131.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2001a. “Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms.” The Philosophical Review 110(1): 1–30.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2001b. “Sensing Values? [on Johnston (2001)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 215–223.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002a. “Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism.” Topoi 21(1–2): 139–152.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002b. “Internalism Explained.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 349–369.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002c. “Practical Reason and Desire.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80: 345–358.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002d. “The Aim of Belief.” in Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 267–297. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2003. “Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, pp. 201–229. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2004. “The Metaethicists’ Mistake.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 405–426. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2005. “Railton on Normativity [on Railton (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 126(3): 463–479.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006a. “The Normative Force of Reasoning.” Noûs 40(4): 660–686, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00628.x.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006b. “The Meaning of ‘Ought’ .” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 127–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006c. “How We Know What Ought to Be.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 63–86.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006d. “The Internal and External Components of Cognition.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 307–325. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007a. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007b. “Normativism Defended.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 85–102. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007c. “Review of Peacocke (2004).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 776–791.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2008b. “Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest, and Human Nature.” in Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield, pp. 177–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305845.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2009a. “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 321–342. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2009b. “The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 499–519. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2009c. “The Normativity of the Intentional.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 421–436. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010a.“Schroeder (2008) on Expressivism: For – or Against?” Analysis 70(1): 117–129.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010b. “The Nature of Normativity: Précis [of Wedgwood (2007a)].” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 445–448.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010c. “The Nature of Normativity: A reply to [Holton (2010), Railton (2010) and Lenman (2010).” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 479–491.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010d. “The Moral Evil Demons.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 216–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2011a. “Instrumental Rationality.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 280–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2011b. “Defending Double Effect.” Ratio 24(4): 384–401. Reprinted in Hooker (2012, 35–52).
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2011c. “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 180–200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2012a. “Outright Belief.” Dialectica 66(3): 309–329, doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01305.x.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2012b. “Justified Inference.” Synthese 189(2): 273–295.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013a. “Doxastic Correctness.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 87: 217–234.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013b. “Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ .” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 70–92. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013c. “Review of Enoch (2011).” The Philosophical Quarterly 63(251): 389–393.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013d. “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem.” Synthese 190(14): 2643–2675.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013e. “The Weight of Moral Reasons.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume III, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 35–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013f. “A Priori Bootstrapping.” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 226–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2014a. “Rationality as a Virtue.” Analytic Philosophy 55(4): 319–338.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2014b. “The Right Thing to Believe.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 123–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2014c. “Moral Disagreement among Philosophers.” in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, pp. 23–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2015a. “The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’ .” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 123–143. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2015b. “An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 295–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2016a. “Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’ .” in Deontic Modality, edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, pp. 143–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2016b. “Review of Scanlon (2014).” The Philosophical Quarterly 66(262): 213–217.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2016c. “Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?” in After Marriage. Rethinking Marital Relationships, edited by Elizabeth Brake, pp. 29–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190205072.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017a. The Value of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198802693.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017b. “The Predicament of Choice.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 294–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017c. “The Coherence of Thrasymachus.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 53, edited by Victor Caston, pp. 33–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815655.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2018a. “Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic.” in Epistemic Consequentialism, edited by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, pp. 85–112. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2018b. “A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 374–398. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12130.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2018c. “The Unity of Normativity.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 23–45. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2019. “Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality .” American Philosophical Quarterly 56(1): 97–108, doi:10.2307/45128646.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2023. Rationality and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198874492.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2024. “How can ‘Evidence’ be Normative?” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 74–90. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Further References
Enoch, David. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously. A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001.
Holton, Richard. 2010. “Comments on Wedgwood (2007a).” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 449–457.
Hooker, Brad, ed. 2012. Developing Deontology: New Essays in Ethical Theory. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118368794.
Johnston, Mark. 2001. “The Authority of Affect.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 181–214.
Lenman, James. 2010. “Uggles and Muggles: Wedgwood (2007a) on Normative Thought and Justification.” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 469–477.
Peacocke, Christopher. 2004. The Realm of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199270724.001.0001.
Railton, Peter. 2003. Facts, Values, and Norms. Essays towards a Morality of Consequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613982.
Railton, Peter. 2010. “Staying in Touch with Normative Reality [on Wedgwood (2007a)].” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 459–467.
Scanlon, Thomas Michael. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001.