Ian Ravenscroft (ravenscroft-i)
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Bibliography
Currie, Gregory and Ravenscroft, Ian. 1997. “Mental Simulation and Motor Imagery.”
Philosophy of Science 64: 161–180.
Currie, Gregory and Ravenscroft, Ian. 2002. Recreative Minds: Image and Imagination in Philosophy and
Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238089.001.0001.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Ravenscroft, Ian. 2021. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/folkpsych-theory/.
Neander, Karen and Ravenscroft, Ian, eds. 1993. Prospects for Intentionality. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 3. Canberra: RSSS
Australasian National University.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 1994. “Dennett’s Combinatorial Explosion Argument Against Brains
in Vats.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:
233–235.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 1997a.
“Physical Properties.” The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 35: 419–431.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 1997b. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win1997/entries/folkpsych-theory/.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 1998. “Neuroscience and the Mind.” Mind and
Language 13: 132–137.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2004. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/folkpsych-theory/.
Ravenscroft, Ian, ed. 2009a. Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the
Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2009b. “Introduction: Themes and Criticisms.” in
Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from
the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 1–20. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2009c. “Is Folk Psychology a Theory?” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, pp. 131–147. Routledge Philosophy
Companions. London: Routledge.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2010. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory/.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2011. “Problems, Questions and Concepts in the Philosophy of
Mind.” in The Continuum Companion
to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by James Garvey, pp. 1–34. London: Continuum
International Publishing Group.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2015. “The Natural Origins of Convention.”
Philosophia 43(3): 731–739.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2016. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/folkpsych-theory/.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2017. “Empathy and Knowing What It’s Like.” in
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of
Empathy, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, pp. 148–157. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2018. “Why
Reject Substance Dualism?” in The
Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan
J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and James Porter Moreland, pp. 267–282. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119468004.