Penelope Mackie (mackie-p)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Mackie, Penelope. 1987. “Essence, Origin and Bare Identity.” Mind 96: 173–201.
Mackie, Penelope. 1989. “Identity and Extrinsicness: Reply to Garrett (1988).” Mind 98: 105–117.
Mackie, Penelope. 1990. “Review of Sidelle (1989).” Mind 99(396): 635–637.
Mackie, Penelope. 1993a. “Ordinary Language and Metaphysical Commitment.” Analysis 53(4): 243–251.
Mackie, Penelope. 1993b. “Critical Notice of van Inwagen (1990).” Philosophical Books 34(2): 75–83.
Mackie, Penelope. 1994. “Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties.” The Philosophical Quarterly 44(176): 311–327.
Mackie, Penelope. 1998. “Identity, Time, and Necessity.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98: 59–78.
Mackie, Penelope. 2000. “Review of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994).” Mind 109: 149–152.
Mackie, Penelope. 2002a. “Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth.” Analysis 62(3): 225–236.
Mackie, Penelope. 2002b.“Forbes (2002) on Origins and Identities.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 341–353. Topoi Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
Mackie, Penelope. 2003. “Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise.” Noûs 37(4): 672–689.
Mackie, Penelope. 2006a. How Things Might Have Been. Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199272204.001.0001.
Mackie, Penelope. 2006b. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/identity-transworld/.
Mackie, Penelope. 2007. “Coincidence and Modal Predicates.” Analysis 67(1): 21–31.
Mackie, Penelope. 2008a. “Review Essay: Material Objects and Metaphysics [review of Hawley (2001), Hudson (2001), Merricks (2001), Sider (2001)].” The Journal of Philosophy 105: 756–771.
Mackie, Penelope. 2008b. “Coincidence and Identity.” in Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, pp. 151–176. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mackie, Penelope. 2010. “Response to Frank Jackson (2010).” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, edited by Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann, pp. 267–274. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001.
Mackie, Penelope. 2011. “Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111(1): 181–199.
Mackie, Penelope. 2014a. “Counterfactuals and the Fixity of the Past.” Philosophical Studies 168(2): 397–415.
Mackie, Penelope. 2014b. “Mumford and Anjum on Incompatibilism, Powers and Determinism.” Analysis 74(4): 593–603.
Mackie, Penelope. 2017. “Postscript to Forbes (1997).” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 2nd ed., pp. 896–901. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
Mackie, Penelope. 2018. “Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance.” in Metaphysics, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 265–287. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mackie, Penelope. 2020a. “Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(3): 449–464.
Mackie, Penelope. 2020b. “Can Metaphysical Modality Be Based on Essence?” in Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality. Themes from the Work of Kit Fine, edited by Mircea Dumitru, pp. 247–264. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199652624.001.0001.
Mackie, Penelope. 2021. “Essentialism and Modality.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 61–69. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Mackie, Penelope and Jago, Mark. 2013. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/identity-transworld/.
Mackie, Penelope and Jago, Mark. 2017. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/identity-transworld/.
Mackie, Penelope and Jago, Mark. 2022. “Transworld Identity.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/identity-transworld/.

Further References

Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 1997. “Essentialism.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 515–533. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017, 881–896).
Forbes, Graeme [R.]. 2002. “Origins and Identities.” in Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic Metaphysics, edited by Andrea Bottani, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Massimiliano Carrara, pp. 319–340. Topoi Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
Garrett, Brian John. 1988. “Identity and Extrinsicness.” Mind 97: 105–109.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1997. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Hale, Wright and Miller (2017).
Hale, Bob, Wright, Crispin and Miller, Alexander, eds. 2017. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
Hawley, Katherine. 2001. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275434.001.0001.
Hoffman, Joshua and Rosenkrantz, Gary S. 1994. Substance Among Other Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hudson, Hud. 2001. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, doi:10.7591/9781501725715.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, doi:10.7591/9781501713033.
Jackson, Frank. 2010. Language, Names, and Information. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444325362.
Merricks, Trenton. 2001. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199245363.001.0001.
Sidelle, Alan. 1989. Necessity, Essence and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Sider, Theodore. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019924443X.001.0001.