Benjamin W. Jarvis (jarvis-bw)

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Carter, J. Adam, Gordon, Emma C. and Jarvis, Benjamin W., eds. 2017a. Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Carter, J. Adam, Gordon, Emma C. and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2017b. “Knowledge First: An Introduction.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Carter, J. Adam and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2012. “Against Swamping.” Analysis 72(4): 690–699.
Carter, J. Adam, Jarvis, Benjamin W. and Rubin, Katherine. 2013a. “Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability.” Synthese 190(17): 3715–3729.
Carter, J. Adam, Jarvis, Benjamin W. and Rubin, Katherine. 2013b. “Knowledge: Value on the Cheap.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 249–263.
Carter, J. Adam, Jarvis, Benjamin W. and Rubin, Katherine. 2015. “Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.” Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1603–1623.
Carter, J. Adam, Jarvis, Benjamin W. and Rubin, Katherine. 2016. “Belief without Credence.” Synthese 193(8): 2323–2351.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2009. “Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction.” Philosophical Studies 142(2): 221–246, doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2012. “Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge.” Noûs 46(1): 127–158.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2013. The Rules of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, Jarvis, Benjamin W. and Rubin, Katherine. 2012. “Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology.” Analytic Philosophy 53(4): 327–343.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2012a. “Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don’t Guide.” Philosophical Studies 157(1): 1–25.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2012b. “The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42(3–4): 255–279.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2012c. “Truth as One and Very Many [on Lynch (2009)].” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(1): 105–114.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2013. “Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 529–551.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2014. “Evaluating the Extended Mind.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 209–229. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2015a. “Representing as Adapting.” Acta Analytica 30(1): 17–39.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2015b. “Epistemology and Radically Extended Cognition.” Episteme 12(4): 459–478.
Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2019. “The Problem of Environmental Luck.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman, pp. 273–283. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Lynch, Michael Patrick. 2009. Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.001.0001.