Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ichikawa-j)
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Bibliography
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2008a.
“Scepticism and the Imagination Model of
Dreaming.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232):
519–527.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2008b.
“Imagination and Epistemology.”
PhD dissertation, Rutgers, New Jersey: Philosophy Department, Rutgers,
The State University of New Jersey.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2009a.
“Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the
Counterfactual [on Williamson (2007)].”
Philosophical Studies 145(3): 435–443.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2009b.
“Explaining Away Intuitions.” Studia
Philosophica Estonica 2(2): 94–116.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2011.
“Quantifiers and Epistemic
Contextualism.” Philosophical Studies 155(3):
383–398.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2012.
“Knowledge Norms and Acting
Well.” Thought 1(1): 49–55.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2013a.
“Basic Knowledge and Contextualist
‘E=K’ .” Thought 2(4): 282–292.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2013b.
“Review of Cappelen (2012).”
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21(1): 111–116.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2013c.
“Experimental Philosophy and
Apriority.” in The A Priori in
Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 45–66. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2013d.
“Virtue, Intuition, and Philosophical
Methodology.” in Virtuous
Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John
Turri, pp. 1–20. Philosophical
Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2014a.
“Justification is Potential
Knowledge.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2):
184–206.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2014b.
“Intuition in Contemporary
Philosophy.” in Rational
Intuition. Philosophical Roots, Scientific Investigations,
edited by Lisa M. Osbeck and Barbara S.
Held, pp. 192–212. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139136419.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2014c.
“Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist
Critiques.” in Intuitions, edited by
Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 232–255. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.003.0013.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2015.
“Ignorance and
Presuppositions.” Mind 124(496): 1207–1219.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2016a.
“Imagination, Dreaming, and
Hallucination.” in The Routledge
Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, edited by Amy Kind, pp. 149–162. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2016b.
“Modals and Modal
Epistemology.” in Knowledge Through
Imagination, edited by Amy Kind and Peter Kung, pp. 124–144. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.001.0001.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2016c.
“Review of Pritchard (2012).”
The Philosophical Review 125(1): 138–142.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, ed. 2017a.
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic
Contextualism. Routledge Handbooks in
Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2017b.
Contextualising Knowledge. Epistemology and
Semantics. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199682706.001.0001.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2017c.
“Introduction: What is Epistemic
Contextualism?” in The Routledge
Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan
Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 1–10. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2017d.
“Basic Knowledge First.” Episteme
14(3): 343–361.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2018.
“Internalism, Factivity, and Sufficient
Reason.” in The Factive Turn in
Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 66–83. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2020.
“Faith and Epistemology.”
Episteme 17(1): 121–140.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2009. “Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in
Fiction.” Philosophical Studies 142(2): 221–246,
doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2012. “Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge.”
Noûs 46(1): 127–158.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jarvis, Benjamin W. 2013. The Rules of Thought. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, Jarvis, Benjamin W. and Rubin, Katherine. 2012. “Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire
Psychology.” Analytic Philosophy 53(4): 327–343.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jenkins, Carrie S. I. 2017. “On
Putting Knowledge ‘First’ .” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and
Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 113–131. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Steup, Matthias. 2012. “The Analysis of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Steup, Matthias. 2017. “The Analysis of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
Further References
Cappelen, Herman. 2012. Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2012.
Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williamson (2021), doi:10.1002/9780470696675.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021. The Philosophy of Philosophy. 2nd ed. The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy.
Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Williamson
(2007), doi:10.1002/9781119616702.