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James Ladyman (ladyman)

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Bibliography

    Berenstain, Nora and Ladyman, James. 2012. Ontic Structural Realism and Modality.” in Structural Realism. Structure, Object, and Causality, edited by Elaine M. Landry and Dean P. Rickles, pp. 149–168. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 77. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Bird, Alexander and Ladyman, James, eds. 2012. Arguing about Science. London: Routledge.
    Brown, Robin and Ladyman, James. 2009. Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(234): 20–38.
    Bueno, Otávio, French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2002. On Representing the Relationship between the Mathematical and the Empirical.” Philosophy of Science 69: 452–473.
    French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 1997. Superconductivity and Structures: Revisiting the London Account.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28(3): 363–393.
    French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 1998. A Semantic Perspective on Idealism in Quantum Mechanics.” in Idealization IX: Idealization in Contemporary Physics, edited by Niall Shanks, pp. 51–73. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 63. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 1999. Reinflating the Semantic Approach.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13: 103–121.
    French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2003a. Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure.” Synthese 136(1): 31–56, doi:10.1023/a:1024156116636.
    French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2003b. The Dissolution of Objects: Between Platonism and Phenomenalism.” Synthese 136(1): 73–77.
    French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2011. In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism.” in Scientific Structuralism, edited by Alisa Bokulich and Peter Bokulich, pp. 25–42. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 281. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_2.
    Ladyman, James. 1998. What is Structural Realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29(3): 409–424, doi:10.1016/s0039-3681(98)80129-5.
    Ladyman, James. 2000. What’s Really Wrong with Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51(4): 837–856.
    Ladyman, James. 2002. Understanding Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.
    Ladyman, James. 2004a. Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen (2003).” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55(4): 755–765.
    Ladyman, James. 2004b. Empiricism versus Metaphysics [on van Fraassen (2002)].” Philosophical Studies 121(2): 133–145.
    Ladyman, James. 2005a. Mathematical Structuralism and the Identity of Indiscernibles.” Analysis 65(3): 218–221, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00552.x.
    Ladyman, James. 2005b. Wouldn’t it be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism.” Metascience 14(3): 331–361.
    Ladyman, James. 2005c. Theories and Theoretical Terms.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Ladyman, James. 2007a. On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a Structure.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 81: 23–43.
    Ladyman, James. 2007b. Does Physics Answer Metaphysical Questions? in Philosophy of Science, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 179–202. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Ladyman, James. 2007c. Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological Positions.” in General Philosophy of Science. Focal Issues, edited by Theo A. F. Kuipers, pp. 303–376. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
    Ladyman, James. 2007d. The Epistemology of Constructive Empiricism.” in Images of Empiricism. Essays on Science and Stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, pp. 46–61. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.001.0001.
    Ladyman, James. 2007e. Structural Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/structural-realism/.
    Ladyman, James. 2008. Idealization.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, edited by Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, pp. 358–366. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Ladyman, James. 2009a. Weak Physicalism and Special Science Ontology.” in Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis, edited by Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, pp. 113–126. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 11. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
    Ladyman, James. 2009b. Structural Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/structural-realism/.
    Ladyman, James. 2010. Reply to Hawthorne (2010): Physics before Metaphysics.” in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, edited by Simon W. Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent, and David Wallace, pp. 154–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.001.0001.
    Ladyman, James. 2011a. The Scientistic Stance: The Empirical and Materialist Stances Reconciled.” Synthese 178(1): 87–98.
    Ladyman, James. 2011b. Structural Realism versus Standard Scientific Realism: the Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air.” Synthese 180(2): 87–101, doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9607-8.
    Ladyman, James. 2012. Science, Metaphysics and Method.” Philosophical Studies 160(1): 31–51.
    Ladyman, James. 2014a. Philosophy of Science.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, pp. 255–284. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Ladyman, James. 2014b. Structural Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/structural-realism/.
    Ladyman, James. 2016a. The Foundations of Structuralism and the Metaphysics of Relations.” in The Metaphysics of Relations, edited by Anna Marmodoro and David Yates, pp. 177–197. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735878.001.0001.
    Ladyman, James. 2016b. Are there Individuals in Physics, and If So, What Are They? in Individuals Across the Sciences, edited by Alexandre Guay and Thomas Pradeu, pp. 193–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199382514.001.0001.
    Ladyman, James. 2017. An Apology for Naturalized Metaphysics.” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. New Essays, edited by Matthew H. Slater and Zanja Yudell, pp. 141–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363209.003.0008.
    Ladyman, James. 2018a. Scientific Realism Again.” Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9(1): 99–107, doi:10.4245/sponge.v9i1.29356.
    Ladyman, James. 2018b. Intension in the Physics of Computation: Lessons from the Debate about Landauer’s Principle.” in Physical Perspectives on Computation, Computational Perspectives on Physics, edited by Michael E. Cuffaro and Samuel C. Fletcher, pp. 219–239. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316759745.
    Ladyman, James. 2023. Structural Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/structural-realism/.
    Ladyman, James and Bigaj, Tomasz F. 2010. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and Quantum Mechanics.” Philosophy of Science 77(1): 117–136.
    Ladyman, James, Douven, Igor, Horsten, Leon and van Fraassen, Bas C. 1997. A Defence of Van Fraassen’s Critique of Abductive Inference.” The Philosophical Quarterly 47: 305–321.
    Ladyman, James, Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2012. Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(1): 162–186, doi:10.1017/S1755020311000281.
    Ladyman, James and Presnell, Stuart. 2015. Identity in Homotopy Type Theory, Part I: The Justification of Path Induction.” Philosophia Mathematica 23(3): 386–406.
    Ladyman, James and Presnell, Stuart. 2017. Identity in Homotopy Type Theory: Part II, The Conceptual and Philosophical Status of Identity in HoTT.” Philosophia Mathematica 25(2): 210–245.
    Ladyman, James and Ross, Don. 2007. Every Thing Must Go. Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With David Spurrett and John Collier, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001.
    Ladyman, James and Ross, Don. 2010. Protecting Rainforest Realism: Authors’ Response [to reviews of Ladyman and Ross (2007)].” Metascience 19.
    Ladyman, James and Ross, Don. 2013. The World in the Data.” in Scientific Metaphysics, edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid, pp. 108–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.001.0001.
    Ladyman, James and Wiesner, Karoline. 2020. What is a Complex System? New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, doi:10.12987/yale/9780300251104.001.0001.
    Leitgeb, Hannes and Ladyman, James. 2008. Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontology.” Philosophia Mathematica 16(3): 388–396, doi:10.1093/philmat/nkm039.
    Ross, Don, Ladyman, James and Kincaid, Harold, eds. 2013. Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.001.0001.
    Waechter, Jonas and Ladyman, James. 2019. In Defence of Ordinary Objects and a Naturalistic Answer to the Special Composition Question.” in The Nature of Ordinary Objects, edited by Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer, pp. 82–128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316612897.

Further References

    van Fraassen, Bas C. 2002. The Empirical Stance. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
    Hawthorne, John. 2010. A Metaphysician Looks at the Everett Interpretation.” in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, edited by Simon W. Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent, and David Wallace, pp. 144–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.001.0001.
    Monton, Bradley and van Fraassen, Bas C. 2003. Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(3): 405–422.