Øystein Linnebo (linnebo)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bueno, Otávio and Linnebo, Øystein, eds. 2009a. New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bueno, Otávio and Linnebo, Øystein. 2009b. “Philosophy of Mathematics: Old and New.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Otávio Bueno and Øystein Linnebo, pp. 1–12. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Florio, Salvatore and Linnebo, Øystein. 2017. “Logic and Plurals.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, edited by Marija Jankovic and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 451–463. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Florio, Salvatore and Linnebo, Øystein. 2020. “Critical Plural Logic.” Philosophia Mathematica 28(2): 172–203.
Florio, Salvatore and Linnebo, Øystein. 2021. The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198791522.001.0001.
Horsten, Leon and Linnebo, Øystein. 2016. “Term Models for Abstraction Principles.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 45(1): 1–23.
Ladyman, James, Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2012. “Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(1): 162–186, doi:10.1017/S1755020311000281.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2003a. “Plural Quantification Exposed.” Noûs 37(1): 71–92.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2003b. “Frege’s Conception of Logic: From Kant to Grundgesetze.” Manuscrito 26(2): 235–252.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2004a. “Plural Quantification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/plural-quant/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2004b. “Frege’s Proof of Referentiality.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45(2): 73–98.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2004c. “Predicative Fragments of Frege Arithmetic.” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10(2): 153–174.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2004d. “Review of Fine (2002).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(4): 653–656.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2005. “To Be Is to Be an \(F\).” Dialectica 59(2): 201–222.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2006a. “Sets, Properties, and Unrestricted Quantification.” in Absolute Generality, edited by Agustı́n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, pp. 149–178. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2006b. “Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism.” Philosophical Studies 129(3): 545–574.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2006c. “Mending the Master: Burgess (2005).” Philosophia Mathematica 14(3): 338–342.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2007a. “Burgess on Plural Logic and Set Theory.” Philosophia Mathematica 15(1): 79–93.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2007b. “Review of Fine (2005).” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(227): 294–297.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2008a. “Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(230): 59–79.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2008b. “Retos epistemológicos al platonismo matemático.” Analı́tica 2. Translation of Linnebo (2006b).
Linnebo, Øystein. 2008c. “The Nature of Mathematical Objects.” in Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy, edited by Bonnie Gold and Roger A. Simons, pp. 205–220. Washington, D.C.: Mathematical Association of America.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2008d. “Plural Quantification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/plural-quant/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2009a. “Thin Objects.” in Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis, edited by Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, pp. 227–239. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 11. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2009b. “The Individuation of the Natural Numbers.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Otávio Bueno and Øystein Linnebo, pp. 220–238. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2009c. “Frege’s Context Principle and Reference to Natural Numbers.” in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. What Has Become of Them?, edited by Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, and Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, pp. 47–68. Synthese Library n. 341. Dordrecht: Springer.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2009d. “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/platonism-mathematics/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2010. “Pluralities and Sets.” The Journal of Philosophy 107: 144–164.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2011a. “Higher-Order Logic.” in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Richard Pettigrew and Leon Horsten, pp. 105–127. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2011b. “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/platonism-mathematics/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2012a. “Metaontological Minimalism.” Philosophy Compass 7(2): 139–151.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2012b. “Reference by Abstraction.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(1): 45–71.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2012c. “Plural Quantification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/plural-quant/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2013a. “The Potential Hierarchy of Sets.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 6(2): 205–228.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2013b. “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/platonism-mathematics/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2013c. “Føllesdal and Frege on Reference.” in Reference, Rationality, and Phenomenology. Themes from Føllesdal, edited by Michael Frauchiger, pp. 259–280. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy n. 2. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2014. “ ‘Just is’-Statements as Generalized Identities [on Rayo (2013)].” Inquiry 57(4): 466–482.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2016a. “Plurals and Modals.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 654–676. Reprinted in Yli-Vakkuri and McCullagh (2019).
Linnebo, Øystein. 2016b. “How to Harness Basic Law V.” in Unity and Plurality. Logic, Philosophy and Linguistics, edited by Massimiliano Carrara, Alexandra Arapinis, and Friederike Moltmann, pp. 19–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716327.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2016c. “Impredicativity in the Neo-Fregean Program.” in Abstractionism. Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 247–268. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2017a. Philosophy of Mathematics. Princeton Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2017b. “Plural Quantification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/plural-quant/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2018a. Thin Objects. An Abstractionist Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199641314.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2018b. “Truth in Mathematics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 648–667. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2018c. “Putnam on Mathematics as Modal Logic.” in Hilary Putnam on Logic and Mathematics, edited by Geoffrey Hellman and Roy T. Cook, pp. 249–268. Outstanding Contributions to Logic n. 9. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96274-0.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2018d. “On the Permissibility of Impredicative Comprehension.” in Being Necessary. Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica F. Leech, pp. 170–187. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2018e. “Dummett on Indefinite Extensibility.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 196–220. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12122.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2018f. “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/platonism-mathematics/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2019. “The Context Principle in Frege’s Grundgesetze.” in Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 90–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712084.001.0001.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2022a. “Generality Explained.” The Journal of Philosophy 119(7): 349–379, doi:10.5840/jphil2022119725.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2022b. “Plural Quantification.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/plural-quant/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2023. “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/platonism-mathematics/.
Linnebo, Øystein. 2024. “Reality as Tall and Fine, Not Flat and Coarse.” in Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones, pp. 191–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0005.
Linnebo, Øystein and Muller, F. A. 2013. “On Witness-Discernibility of Elementary Particles.” Erkenntnis 78(5): 1133–1142.
Linnebo, Øystein and Nicolas, David. 2008. “Superplurals in English.” Analysis 68(3): 186–197, doi:10.1093/analys/68.3.186.
Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2011. “Category Theory as an Autonomous Foundation.” Philosophia Mathematica 19(3): 227–254.
Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2014. “Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 64(255): 267–283.
Linnebo, Øystein and Rayo, Agustı́n. 2012. “Hierarchies Ontological and Ideological.” Mind 121(482): 269–308.
Linnebo, Øystein and Rayo, Agustı́n. 2014. “Reply to Florio and Shapiro [Florio and Shapiro (2014)].” Mind 123(489): 175–181.
Linnebo, Øystein and Shapiro, Stewart. 2019. “Realizability as a Kind of Truth-Making.” in Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 351–366. Philosophical Analysis n. 81. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110664812.
Linnebo, Øystein and Shapiro, Stewart. 2021. “Modality in Mathematics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 281–291. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Linnebo, Øystein, Shapiro, Stewart and Hellman, Geoffrey. 2016. “Aristotelian Continua.” Philosophia Mathematica 24(2): 214–246.

Further References

Burgess, John P. 2005. Fixing Frege. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Fine, Kit. 2002. The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199246182.001.0001.
Fine, Kit. 2005. Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199278709.001.0001.
Florio, Salvatore and Shapiro, Stewart. 2014. “Set Theory, Type Theory, and Absolute Generality.” Mind 123(489): 157–174.
Rayo, Agustı́n. 2013. The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662623.001.0001.
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and McCullagh, Mark, eds. 2019. Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315184074.