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Richard Pettigrew (pettigrew)

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Bibliography

    Horsten, Leon and Pettigrew, Richard. 2011a. “Introduction.” in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Richard Pettigrew and Leon Horsten, pp. 1–13. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
    Horsten, Leon and Pettigrew, Richard. 2011b. “Mathematical Methods in Philosophy.” in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Richard Pettigrew and Leon Horsten, pp. 14–26. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
    Ladyman, James, Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2012. “Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(1): 162–186, doi:10.1017/S1755020311000281.
    Leitgeb, Hannes and Pettigrew, Richard. 2010a. “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.” Philosophy of Science 77(2): 201–235, doi:10.1086/651317.
    Leitgeb, Hannes and Pettigrew, Richard. 2010b. “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizating Inaccuracy.” Philosophy of Science 77(2): 236–272.
    Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2011. “Category Theory as an Autonomous Foundation.” Philosophia Mathematica 19(3): 227–254.
    Linnebo, Øystein and Pettigrew, Richard. 2014. “Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 64(255): 267–283.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2008. “Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics.” Philosophia Mathematica 16(3): 310–332.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2010. “Modelling Uncertainty.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 80: 309–316.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2011a. “Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/epistemic-utility/.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2011b. “An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory.” in EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, edited by Henk W. de Regt, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir Okasha, pp. 287–302. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings n. 1. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2011c. “Probability.” in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Richard Pettigrew and Leon Horsten, pp. 406–427. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2012a. “Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.” The Philosophical Review 121(2): 241–275.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2012b. “Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Nominalism.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(4): 687–709.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2013a. “Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.” Philosophy Compass 8(10): 897–908.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2013b. “Accuracy and Evidence.” Dialectica 67(4): 579–596, doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12043.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2013c. “A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.” Episteme 10(1): 19–35.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2015a. “What Chance-Credence Norms should Not Be.” Noûs 49(1): 177–196.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2015b. “Pluralism about Belief States.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 89: 187–204.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2015c. “Accuracy and the Credence-Belief connection.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15(16).
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2015d. “Risk, Rationality and Expected Utility Theory.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 798–826.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2015e. “Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/epistemic-utility/.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2016a. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2016b. “Review of Paul (2015).” Mind 125(499): 927–935.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2016c. “Review of Burgess (2015).” Philosophia Mathematica 24(1): 129–136.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2016d. “Jamesian Epistemology Formalised: An Explication of ‘The Will to Believe’ .” Episteme 13(3): 253–268, doi:10.1017/epi.2015.44.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2017. “Précis and Replies to Contributors for Book Symposium on Pettigrew (2016a).” Episteme 14(1): 1–30.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2018. “Making Things Right: The True Consequences of Decision Theory in Epistemology.” in Epistemic Consequentialism, edited by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, pp. 220–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2019a. Choosing for Changing Selves. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198814962.001.0001.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2019b. “On the Accuracy of Group Credences.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 137–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2019c. “Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(4): 761–774.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2019d. “Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemic-utility/.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2022. Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192864352.001.0001.
    Pettigrew, Richard. 2023. “Epistemic Utility Arguments for Epistemic Norms.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/epistemic-utility/.
    Pettigrew, Richard and Horsten, Leon, eds. 2011. The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
    Pettigrew, Richard and Titelbaum, Michael G. 2014. “Deference done right.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14(35).

Further References