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Janet Levin (levin-j)

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Cited in the following articles

Certainty and Assertion

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Bibliography

    Levin, Janet. 1985. “Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15(suppl. 10): 85–104.
    Levin, Janet. 1986. “Could Love Be like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 49(2): 245–261.
    Levin, Janet. 1987. “Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65(4): 400–411.
    Levin, Janet. 1990. “Review of Hacker (1987).” The Philosophical Review 99(4): 654–656.
    Levin, Janet. 1991. “Analytic Functionalism and the Reduction of Phenomenal States.” Philosophical Studies 61: 211–238.
    Levin, Janet. 1995. “Folk Psychology and the Simulationist Challenge.” Acta Analytica 10(14): 77–100.
    Levin, Janet. 2000. “Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense.” Philosophical Studies 100: 151–174.
    Levin, Janet. 2001. “The Myth of Jones and the Return of Subjectivity.” Mind and Language 16: 173–192.
    Levin, Janet. 2002. “Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 571–591.
    Levin, Janet. 2004a. “The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition.” Philosophical Studies 121(3): 193–224.
    Levin, Janet. 2004b. “Functionalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/functionalism/.
    Levin, Janet. 2007a. “What is a Phenomenal Concept?” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter, pp. 87–110. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001.
    Levin, Janet. 2007b. “Can Modal Intuitions be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?” Inquiry 50(3): 253–269.
    Levin, Janet. 2008a. “Molyneux’s Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts.” Philosophical Studies 139(1): 1–28.
    Levin, Janet. 2008b. “Molyneux Meets Euthyphro: Does Cross-Modal Transfer Require Rational Transition?” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(3): 289–297.
    Levin, Janet. 2008c. “Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(2): 359–384, doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00136.x.
    Levin, Janet. 2009a. “Critical Notice of Knobe and Nichols (2008).” Analysis 69(4): 761–769.
    Levin, Janet. 2009b. “Functionalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/functionalism/.
    Levin, Janet. 2011. “Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41(3): 391–422.
    Levin, Janet. 2012a. “Tye’s Ptolemaic Revolution (review of Tye (2009)).” Analytic Philosophy 53(1): 98–117.
    Levin, Janet. 2012b. “Do Conceivability Arguments against Physicalism Beg the Question?” Philosophical Topics 40(2): 71–89.
    Levin, Janet. 2013a. “Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism.” Synthese 190(18): 4117–4136.
    Levin, Janet. 2013b. “Functionalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/functionalism/.
    Levin, Janet. 2015. “Reclaiming the Armchair.” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, edited by Christopher John Daly, pp. 448–479. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9781137344557.
    Levin, Janet. 2018a. “Materialism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 38–50. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Levin, Janet. 2018b. “Functionalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/functionalism/.
    Levin, Janet. 2019a. “Representational Exhaustion.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 247–272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
    Levin, Janet. 2019b. “Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(1): 57–71.
    Levin, Janet. 2023. “Functionalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/functionalism/.

Further References